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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN VIRGINIA TAXATION 
A discussion of Virginia tax legislation, court decisions, Tax Commissioner rulings, and 
Att0rney General opinions from October 1, 2010 through September 30, 2011. 
I. CORPORATE INCOME TAX 
A. 2011 Legislation 
1. Federal Conformity. House Bill 1874 (Chapter 2) and Senate Bill 1384 
(Chapter 866) advanced Virginia's date of conformity to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) from 
January 22,2010 to December 31,2010. Virginia will continue to disallow: . 
• any bonus depre~iation allowed for certain assets under federal income 
taxation and any five year carry-back of NOLs allowed for NOLs 
generated in either taxable year 2008 or 2009; 
• deductions for applicable high yield discount obligations under IRC § 
163(e)(5)(f); and 
• tax exclusions under IRC § 108(i) related to cancellation of debt 
income realized in connection with a reacquisition of business debt at 
a discount after December 31, 2008, and before January 1, 2011. 
However for the 2010 taxable year, a taxpayer may elect to recognize 
the income ratably over a three year period. 
Virginia will continue to allow the federal deduction for qualified domestic production 
activities under IRC § 199 at a level equal to two-thirds of the federal deduction. In addition, 
this legislation reconforms the Virginia Code to a 2009 law that temporarily increased the federal 
earned income tax credit (EITC) for taxable year 2010, and repeal the provision adopted in the 
2010-2012 Appropriations Act that disallows the deduction for qualified motor vehicle taxes. 
The bills contain an emergency clause which states that it would be in force from its passage. "In 
addition, the legislation makes the repeal of provisions relating to the federal EITC and the 
deduction for qualified motor vehicle taxes retroactive to taxable years beginning on and after 
January 1, 2010. . 
2. " Research & DeVelopment Tax Credit. House Bil11447 (Chapter 742) and 
Senate Bill 1326 (Chapter 745) created a refundable individual or corporate income tax credit 
(Va. Code § 58.1;.439.12:08) for qualified research and development expenses paid or incurred 
during the taxable year. The credit amount is equal to (i) fifteen percent of the first $167,000 in 
Virginia qualified research and development expenses; or (ii) twenty percent of the first 
$175,000 in Virginia qualified research and development expenses if the research was conducted 
in conjunction with a Virginia public college or university, to the extent the expenses exceed the 
Virginia base amount for the taxpayer. The total amount of tax credits available for all taxpayers . 
who qualify is limited to $5 million for each fiscal year. If the total amount of tax credits applied 
for is less than the $5 million limit, the credits will be prorated and allocated to the taxpayers 
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who applied for the credit on a pro rata basis. This credit is effective for taxable years beginning 
on or after January 1,2011, but before January 1,2016. 
3. Telework Tax Credit. House Bill 2197 (Chapter 409) and Senate Bill 
1335 (Chapter 417) created an individual and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-
439.12:07) for employers who incur eligible telework expenses. ' The credit is equal to the 
eligible telework expenses incurred during the 2012 and 2013 calendar years, not to exceed 
$50,000 per employer. The maximum amount of expenses that could be used to detennine the 
amount of the credit would be $1,200 per employee. This legislation also creates an individual 
and corporate income tax credit for employers who conduct telework as~essments. This credit is 
equal to the costs of preparing the assessment, but would be limited to $20,000. In addition, this 
credit may only be churned one time by an employer. The amount of these credits is not allowed 
to exceed the tax liability of the taxpayer. To be eligible for either of the above credits, the 
employer will not be allowed to deduct the qualified expenses in any taxable year. The taxpayer 
will also not be eligible for this tax credit if any other income tax credit is also claimed. The 
total' aggregate amount of credits approved by the Tax Commissioner will not exceed $1 million 
for credits earned in taxable years 2013 and 2014. taxpayers will be required to apply to the 
Department of Taxation for an allocation of the credit. If the applications for the credit exceeded 
the, cap, the credits would be allocated to employers on a pro rata basis. J'his credit will be 
effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2013 but before January 1, 2015. 
However, taxpayers will be required to apply for the credits between September 1 and October 
31 of the year proceeding the taxable year for which the tax credit is to be earned. 
4. Barge and Rail Usage Tax Credit. House Bill 2385 (Chapter 820) and 
Senate Bill 1282 (Chapter 861) created an income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:09) for 
transporting additional containers oil a barge or by rail. The amount of the credit for any 
international trade facility will be equal to $50:00 per 20-foot equivalent unit moved by barge or 
rail rather than by trucks or other motor vehicles on Virginia's highways. The credit will be' 
allowed against the individual income tax, the corporate income tax, the tax on estates and trusts, 
the bank franchise tax, the insurance premiums tax, and the tax on 'public service corporations. 
No more than $1.5 million in tax credits will be issued in any fiscal year. The credit is effective 
for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2011, but before January 1, 2015. No tax 
credits may be issued after the fiscal year ending June 30,2015. 
5. Virginia Port Volume Increase Tax Credit. House Bill 2531 (Chapter 831) 
created an individual income tax and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:10) 
for taxpayers engaged in manufacturing goods or the distribution of manufactured goods that 
uses port facilities in the Commonwealth and increases its port cargo volume at these facilities 
by a minimum of five percent in a single calendar year over its base year port cargo volume. The 
credit is equal to an amount determined by the Virginia Port Authority. The Virginia Port 
Authority may waive the requirement that port cargo volume be increased by a minimum of five 
percent over bas~ year port cargo volume for any taxpayer that qualifies as a major facility. The 
maximum amount of tax credits allowed to all qualifying taxpayers may not exceed $3.2 million 
for each calendar year. Generally, a qualifying taxpayer may not receive more than $250,000 for· 
each calendar year. The credit is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 
2011, but before January 1,2016. 
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( 6. International Trade Facilitv Tax Credit. Senate Bill 1136 (Chapter 49) 
created an individual income tax and corporate income tax credit (Va. Code § 58.1-439.12:06) 
for either capital investment in an international trade facility or increasing jobs related to an 
international trade facility. The amount of the credit is equal to $3,000 per new qualified full-
time employee that results from increased qualified tr~de activities by the taxpayer or two 
percent of t4e amount of capital investment made by the taxpayer to facilitate the increased 
eligible trade activities. taxpayers may elect either credit, but will not be entitled to claim both 
credits in the same taxable year. No more than $250,000 in tax credits will be issued in any 
fiscal year. If the amount of tax credits requested exceeds $250,000, the credits will be allocated 
proportionately among all qualified taxpayers. The amount of the credit is limited to fifty 
percent of the taxpayer's tax liability for the taxable year. Any unused credit amount could be 
carried forward for ten years. This bill is effective for taxable years beginning on and after 
January It 2011, but before January 1, 2015; however no credits will be issued after the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 2015. ' 
7. .Clean Fuel Vehicle and' Advanced Cellulosic Biofuels Job Creation Tax 
Credit. Senate Bill 1236 (Chapter 176) extended the sunset date for the Clean Fuel Vehicle and 
Advanced Cellulosic Biofuels Job Creation Tax Credit from taxable years beginning on and 
before December 31,2011 to taxable years beginning on and before December 31, 2014. 
8 Coal Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit. Senate Bill 1111 
(Chapter 294) 'extended the sunset date for the redemption or refund provision of the Coal 
Employment and Production Incentive Tax Credit by a person with an. economic interest in the 
coal on which the credit was earned from July 1, 2011 to July 1,2016. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
No recent court decisions. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Captive REITs. P.D. 10-246 (October 26, 2010). The taxpayer requested 
a ruling on the application of Virginia's addback requirement pertaining to Captive Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (IREITs"). A limited. partnership (the II Fund ") owns membership interests in 
three separate REITs, which are organized as limited liability companies. One of the REITs 
("REIT 1 ") derives a portion of its income from properties located in Virginia. REIT 1 owns a 
99.9 percent limited partnership interest in REIT OP. REIT OP owns single member limited 
liability companies (ISMLLCs") that are treated as disregarded entities for federal tax purposes 
and other joint venture 'interests. It is these SMLLCs and joint ventures that hold the property 
and income that is sourced to Virginia. The remaining 0.1 percent general partnership interest in 
REIT OP is owned by REIT l's wholly owned subsidiary, REIT GP. REIT GP is taxed as a 
corporation for federal income tax, purposes. The Fund's general partner is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the taxpayer which is a C corporation. General Partner holds no units in the Fund; 
but as the general partner of the Fund, General Partner can make certain decisions for the Fund 
that do not require votes from the rest of the owners. The limited partners of the Fund are tax-
exempt entities, including state and local governmental pension plans exempt under Internal 
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Revenue Code ("IRC") § 115, corporate and multi-employer (Taft-Hartley) pension plans 
exempt under IRC § 501, and foundations and endowments exempt under IRC § 501. The Fund 
has over 200 partners and no one partner owns more than a 50 percent share in the Fund. 
Virginia Code § 58.1-402(B)(10) requires a Captive REIT to add to its federal. 
taxable income the dividends paid deduction allowed under the Internal Revenue Code. A REIT 
is considered a Captive REIT if it meets the following conditions: 
1. It is not regularly traded on an established securities market; 
2. More than 50 percent of the voting power or value of beneficial 
interests or shares of which, at any time during the last half of 
the taxable year, is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, 
by a single entity that is (i) a corporation or an association 
taxable as a corporation under the Internal Revenue Code; and 
(ii) not exempt from federal income tax pursuant to § 501 (a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code; and 
3. More than 25 percent of its income consists of rents· from real 
property as defmed in § 856( d) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
The taxpayer conceded that REIT 1 meets the first and third conditions listed 
above, but contended that it does not meet the second condition. The Tax Commissioner 
examined ,the ownership arid control of REIT 1 and determined that it does not meet the second 
condition and is not a captive REIT for purposes of the 'addition. None of the partners in the 
Fund, including the General Partner, own more than 50% of the Fund. The ,Tax Commissioner 
therefore determined that no one entity has control over the REIT. 
2. Nexus. P.D. 10-252 (November 10, 2010). The taxpayer, based in State 
A, coordinates on demand repair and maintenance services for customers that have locations in 
multiple states including Virginia When the taxpayer receives a call from one of its customers, 
it will engage and dispatch a third party service provider located near the cUstomer's facility to 
perform the required repairs and maintenance. The third party serviCe provider bills the taxpayer 
for the services perfonned, and the taxpayer bills the customer for the service call and the 
logistical service. The taxpayer is registered to do business in Virginia, but does not own or 
lease either tangible or real property, retain employees, or store inventory in Virginia. The 
taxpayer does not perform any marketing activities in Virginia but estimates it. generates 
approximately $2,000,000 in revenues resulting from activities conducted by third party service 
providers located in Virginia. The taxpayer requests a ruliIig as to whether th~ services provided 
by third party providers in Virginia would subject the taxpayer to Virginia income tax. The Tax 
Commissioner did not.have enough information regarding the taxpayer's relationship with the 
third party service providers to determine if the taxpayer is subject to Virginia income tax. The 
Tax Commissioner did say that if the third party service providers are independent contractors 
then the taxpayer is purchasing services from a vendor and reselling them to its customers and 
would not have nex1.:lS. However if the third party service providers are not independent 
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contractors, then the activities may exceed the P.L. 86-272 protections and create nexus for the 
taxpayer. 
3. Nexus: Activities of Related Members. P.D. 10-279 (December 22, 
2010). The taxpayer, a corporation commercially domiciled outside Virginia, is the parent 
corporation of four subsidiaries (Sl, PI, P2, and P3). The taxpayer has no property or payroll in 
Virginia. In addition to providing administrative and management functions on behalf of the 
corporate family, the taxpayer owns and manages certain intangible assets (trademarks, patents, 
manufacturing know-how, and other intellectual property) used by members of the corporate 
family. The taxpayer licenses intangible assets to Sl for an arm's length royalty fee. Sl uses the 
intangible assets in connection with the packaging, marketing and sales of its products. All four 
subsidiaries are commercially domiciled. outside Virginia. PI, P2, and P3 manufacture products 
that are sold by Sl and have no property, payroll, or sales in Virginia. SI imports, manufactures, 
markets, and sells products in the United States, incl~ding Virginia. Its activities in Virginia are 
limited to two employees that solicit orders for S l's products for approval at an office outside 
Virginia. The taxpayer requested a ruling that the activities of the corporate family in Virginia 
are not sufficient· to create nexus. The Tax Commissioner opined that based on the facts 
presented, none of the subsidiaries have nexus. 
4. Guidelines .and Rules for the Virginia Motion Picture Production Tax 
Credit. P.D. 10-281 (December 21, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued guidelines 'and rules 
for· the Virginia motion picture production tax credit. 
5. Fixed Date Conformity Tax Bulletin. P.D. 11-22 (February 18, 2011). 
The Tax Commissioner issued Virginia Tax Bulletin 11-1 to provide instructions to taxpayer for 
complying with House Bill 1874 and Senate Bill 1384 which updated Virginia'S date of . 
conformity with the Internal Revenue Code. 
6.. Alternate Method of Apportionment. P.D. n-52 (April 5, 2011). The 
taxpayer acquired stock in Corporation A through four separate transactions made in 1996 
through 1998. In connection with one of the transactions, the taxpayer granted Corporation A an 
exclusive license to use technology to produce a product developed by the taxpayer. Corporation 
A used the monetary proceeds from the other transactions to build a plant to manufacture the 
product. During the taxable years at issue, the taxpayer sold its stock in Corporation A, 
recognizing a capital gain. The taxpayer subtracted this gain on its Virginia corporate income 
tax returns as nonbusiness income. Pursuant to an audit, the Tax Department disallowed the 
subtraction of the capital gain and assessed additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed 
and contended it did not have a unitary relationship with Corporation A, and its ownership in 
Corporation A stock was not operational in nature. The taxpayer requested a refund of Virginia 
income tax paid for the taxable years ended December 31, 1999 through 2001, and November 
30, 2002. The Tax Commissioner treated the taxpayer's appeal as a request for. an alternate 
method of apportionment and denied the taxpayer's request. . 
In any proceeding with the Tax Department, the taxpayer bears the burden of 
showing that the imposition of Virginia's statute is in violation of the standards enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 504 U.S. 
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768 (1992). In this matter, the taxpayer was required to demonstrate that its investments are not 
operational assets involved in a unitary. business. In considering the existence of a unitary 
relationship, the Supreme Court has focused on three objective factors: (1) functional integration; 
(2) centralization of management; and (3) economies of scale. (See Mobil Oil Corp. v 
Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue 
Dept. ofN.M., 458 U.S. 352 (1982); and Allied-Signal.) The Tax Commissioner agreed that the 
taxpayer did not have a' unitary relationship with Corporation A based on these criteria. 
However, the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer's relationship with Corporation A 
was operational rather than a passive investment function which means that the gain is subject to 
Virginia income tax. The Tax Commissioner noted that while not functionally integrated, the 
taxpayer did agree to provide Corporation A with technical assistance, training, and instruction 
in order to enable Corppration A to design, construct, start-up, test, and operate a manufacturing 
facility for the taxpayer's product. As a result of the taxpayer's investments, Corporation A was 
able to build a plant to manufacture and sell the product, and its gross revenues increased by' 
more than 1,600 percent trom the 1996 through 1999. The technology license agreement 
required the taxpayer to provide technical assistance at Corporation A's manufacturing facility. 
The agreement also allowed Corporation A employees to observe procedures. in the taxpayers' . 
fabrication line and afforded Corporation A support for the its fabrication process, device 
modeling, quality control and reliability testing. Based on the agreement and information 
provided, the Tax Commissioner determined the taxpayer was able to significantly influence 
Corporation A's operations. 
7. Interest Add-Back and Net Operating Loss. P.D. 11-57 (April 12, 2011). 
The taxpayer, commercially domiciled outside Virginia, files a consolidated corporate income 
tax return with its subsidiaries for federal income tax purposes. In Virginia, the taxpayer and a 
number of affiliated entities file separate returns. The taxpayer was audited. for the 2003 and 
2004 taxable years, resulting in numerous return adjustments and an 'assessment for the 2004 
taxable year. The taxpayer filed an appeal contesting: (1) the add back of interest expense from 
the intercompany loan with one of its affiliates for the 2004 taxable. year, and (2) the auditor's 
adjustments to net operating loss deductions (NOLDs) carried forward into the audit period. The 
Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment. First, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
taxpayer was not required to add back interest expense paid to the related entity pursuant to 
. Virginia Code § 58.l-402(B)(9)(a)(2) as the related entity held no intimgible property. Virginia 
,Code § 58.1-402(B)(9)(a)(2) requires a taxpayer to add back intercompany interest expenses and 
costs that are directly or indirectly related or connected to transactions involving intangible 
property. 
On the second issue, the taxpayer incurred NOLs for the taxable years ended 
March 3, 2001 (2000 taxable. year), March 2, 2002 (2001 taxable year), and February 28, 2004 
(2003 taxable year). On its Virginia returns, the taxpayer carried the resulting NOLDs forward 
without carrying them back as required under· IRC § 172. The taxpayer contended that because 
. the Tax Department has never issued any guidance on how to elect to forego the carryback, the 
taxpayer's carry forward of an NOLI? resulting from a net operating loss (NOL) incurred for the 
taxable year ended 2000 taxable year constituted a de facto election to forgo the carryback of the 
NOL. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and stated that the Tax Department had issued guidance. 
in three separate rulings issued in 1988, 1993, and 2005. Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner 
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adjusted the auditor's NOL computations while requiring the taxpayer to carryback the NOL. 
. Observation: If there is a ruling that clearly shows why regular regulation development is 
desperately needed in Virginia, it is this one. While the taxpayer probably did not do the best job 
of indicating its election to forego the NOL carryback, the Tax Commissioner expected the 
taxpayer to search thousands upon thousands of rulings to fmd one of the three rulings issues in 
the last twenty-three years stating the Tax Department's policy on how to elect to forego an NOL 
carryback. If the Tax Department promulgated a regulation with its policy on how to elect to 
forego an NOL carryback, this matter may have never occurred. 
8. Responsible Officer. P.D. 11-73 (May 17, 2011). The taxpayer owned 
10% of the stock of the Corporation and was its secretary and treasurer. The taxpayer's son (the 
"President") was president and owned a 60% share of the Corporation. The Tax Department 
issued assessments to the Corporation for withholding tax liabilities owed for the taxable periods 
October 2008 through March 2009. When the Corporation failed to pay the deficiencies, the Tax 
Department converted the assessments to othe taxpayer and the other officers of the Corporation 
as permitted under Va. Code § 58.1-1813. The taxpayer paid the assessments and filed an appeal 
contending he should not be held personally liable for the unpaid withholding taxes of the 
Corporation because hi's sole responsibilities were as the Corporation's registered agent 
responsible for filing the annual report with the Virginia state Corporation CoIl1.IDlssion (SCC). 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was not a responsible office and ordered a 
refund of the taxes. The available evidence did not indicate whether the taxpayer had the 
authority to sign the Corporation's tax returns or to prevent the Corporation's failure to pay the 
tax liability. 0 
9. Statute of Limitations. P.D. 11-111 (June 17,2011). The taxpayer and its 
affiliates were audited for the 2006 and 2007 taxable years. Numerous adjustments were made, 
resulting in assessments of additional corporate income tax and interest. The taxpayer agreed to 
all of the adjustments except for the disallowance of net . operating loss deductions (NOLDs) 
carried forward from the 2004 and 2005 taxable years. The auditor concluded that the taxpayer 
had failed to properiy make an election to forgo the two-year carryback rule for the net operating 
losses (NOLs) incurred in 2004 and 2005. The auditor also determined that the taxpayer was 
barred by the statute of limitations from filing amended returns for the taxable years to which the 
NOLDs could have been carried back. The taxpayer appealed the audit results contending the 
auditor misapplied federal and state regulations and the taxpayer made a proper election by its 
actions. In the' alternative, the taxpayer sought an equitable resolution to this matter by 
permitting a credit against the audit assessments for the amount of the refund the taxpayer would 
have received if it had carriedOthe NOLDs back. 
Under IRC § .172(b)(3) and Treas. Reg .. § 301.9100-2T, a taxpayer is entitled to 
relinquish the carryback period by including a statement with the federal return or amended 
return. Under Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (V AC) 1O-120-325(B)(2), taxpayers 
are required to file astatement with the Virginia return. for the taxable year in which the NOL 
occurred. The taxpayer contended that the purpose of this election is to commit a taxpayer to 
forgo the carryback period, so that the taxpayer cannot file an amended return to redistribute the 
NOLD to prior years. The 'taxpayer also argued that it's filing history clearly demonstrates that it 
had no intent. to file amended returns and redistribute the NOLDs. The Tax Commissioner 
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disagreed with this interpretation. Instead, he detennined that because title 23 VAC 10-120-325 
pennits an election to forgo the carryback of an NOL independent of any federal election 
provided the taxpayer files its federal and Virginia returns on a different basis, Virginia's 
requirement that a taxpayer file a statement with the Virginia return in order to make the election 
would not be subject to the interpretation of a similar federal regulation. Therefore, the Tax 
Commissioner detennined that. the assessments were correct as the taxpayer did not indicate 
anywhere on its 2004 and 2005 Virginia tax returns that it intended to elect to forgo the 
carryback of the NOLDs incurred in those taxable years. As far as the equitable recoupment 
argument, the Tax Commissioner detennined that equitable recoupment is not applicable to this 
situation as the taxpayer had an avenue for relief, but failed to act within the statute of 
limitations. 
10. Nexus. P.D. 11-139 (August 2, 2011). The taxpayer, a corporation 
commercially domiciled in State A, provides engin~ering technology and consulting services. 
The taxpayer's affiliates flied a Virginia consolidated income tax return for the 2007 taxable 
year. Under audit, the Tax Department determined that the taxpayer had nexus with Virginia and 
included it in the Virginia consolidated return. . The Tax Department issued an assessment for 
additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the audit assessment contending the activities 
in Virginia were not sufficient to establish nexus. During 2007, the taxpayer had no property or 
sales in Virginia. The taxpayer did employ two employees who resided in Virginia. The 
taxpayer registered with Virginia to withhold income tax on behalf of the resident employees. 
The taxpayer was located outside Virginia and had no contracts to perform services in Virginia. 
The employees that lived in Virginia performed services pursuant to a contract in State B dUring 
2007. The employees performed no activities on behalf of the taxpayer in Virginia. Therefore, 
the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer did not have nexus with Virginia for the 
2007 taxable year and should not have been included in the Virginia consolidated return. 
11. Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax. P.D. 11-147 (August 10, 2011). 
For pUrposes of computing the taxable income of a corporation, Virginia requires an addition for 
income taxes and other taxes based on net income. A taxpayer requested a ruling as to whether 
the Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax, effective for taxable years beginning on or after 
. January 1, 2007, is required to be added back. Virginia's modification under Va. Code § 58.1-
402(B)(4) requires an addition for net income taxes and "other taxes, including franchise and 
excise taxes, which are based on, measured by, or computed with reference to net· income, 
imposed by the Commonwealth or any other taxing jurisdiction, to the extent deducted in· 
detennining federal taxable income." The Tax Commissioner determined that because the . 
Kentucky Limited Liability Entity Tax excludes almost all b1,lSiness expenses normally permitted 
in detennining net income, the Tax Department would not consider it to be a tax based on, 
measUred by, or computed. with reference to net income. Therefore, the Kentucky Limited 
Liability Entity Tax is not required to be added back under Va. Code § 58.1-402(B)(4) when 
computing Virginia taxable income . 
. D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
1. Transfer and Carryforward of Unredeemed Coal Tax Credits under 2010 
Senate Bill 1111. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 11-022 (April 1,2011). Delegate Albert C. Pollard, Jr. 
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asked' about the impact of Senate Bill 1111 and whether the proposed measure would allow 
unredeemed tax credits earned before 2006 to be sold, and/or whether the unused tax credits can 
be carried forward after 2016. The Attorney General did not address whether Senate Bill 1111 
would allow unredeemed tax credits earned before 2006 to be sold. However, he stated that 
generators of electricity can continue to rely on these tax credits and continue to carry them over 
after July 1, 2016. 
II.' INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
A. 2011 Legislation 
1. Land Preservation Tax Credit. House Bill 1820 (Chapter 212) and Senate' 
Bill 1232 (Chapter 296) amended Va. Code § 58.1-512 to provide that the maximum amount of 
land preservation tax credits that may be issued in any calendar year is $100 million, adjusted for 
inflation, plus any credits 'that have been disallowed or invalidated by the Tax Department. 
These bills also clarify that, if within 30 days after an application for tax credits has been filed 
the Tax Commissioner provides written notice to the donor that the preparation of a second 
qualified appraisal is warranted, the land preservation tax credit application will not be deemed 
complete until the fair market value of the donation has been [mally determined by the Tax 
Commissioner~ The Tax Commissioner would then be required to make a final determination 
within 180 days of notifying the donor, unless the donor files an appeal. The donor would have 
the right to appeal any decision in accordance with the standard 'appeal process. The legislation 
was effective on July 1,2011. 
2. Land Preservation Tax Credit. Senate Bill. 1153 (Chapter 377) amended 
Va. Code § 58.1-512 to clarify that a land preservation tax credit will not be reduced by the 
amount of unused credit that could have been claimed in a prior year but was unclaimed. In P.D. 
04-190 (October 20,2004), the Tax Commissioner ruled that when a taxpayer holds a recycling 
tax credit and (i) does not claim it on their tax return and (ii) the statute of limitations for 
amending the return expires, then the taxpayer may not carry over the portion of the credit he 
could have used. This legislation prevents application of the foregoing rule to unused land 
preservation tax credits. The legislation was effective on July 1,2011. 
3. Winery Tax Credit. House Bill 1837 (Chapter 214) and Senate Bill 1264 
(Chapter 226) created an individual and corporate income tax credit (Va; Code § 58.1-339.12) 
, for Virgini~ farm wineries and vineyards in an amount equal to 25 percent of the cost of all 
qualified capital expenditures made in connection with the establishment of new Virginia farm 
wineries and vineyards ,and capital improvements made. to existing Virginia farm wineries and 
vineyards. The total amount of tax credits available for a calendar year would not be permitted 
to exceed $250,000. The legislation is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 
1,2011. 
, 4. Livable Home Tax Credit. HO,use Bill 1950 (Chapter 365) amended Va. 
Code § 58.1-339.7 to expand the Livable Home Tax Credit to allow a licensed contractor who 
builds new residences or retrofits existing residences to improve accessibility to be eligible for 
the tax credit. This legislation increases the maximum credit amount from $2,000 to $5,000 for 
the purchase or construction of each new residential structure or unit, or for retrofitting an 
existing residence. Any unused tax credits will be allowed to be carried over for seven taxable 
years or until the total amount of the tax credit issued has been taken, whichever is sooner. This 
legislation also bifurcates the existing cap of $1 million for credits earned each year. One-half of 
the $1 million will be reserved for the purchase or construction of a new residence, and one-half 
will be reserved for retrofitting or renovating an existing residence. Any portion of the $500,000 
reserved for the purchase or construction of a new residence that is not used will be allocated to 
the remaining balance of tax credits authorized for retrofitting or renovating existing residences. 
Any portion of the $500,000 reserved for retrofitting or renovating existing residences that is not 
used will be allocated to the remaining balance of tax credits authorized for the purchase or . 
. construction of a new residence. 
This legislation also provides that if the total amount of tax credits applied for 
exceeds the amounts allocated by the Department of Housing and· Community Development 
("DHCD") for the fiscal year, the credits will be prorated and allocated to the taxpayers on a pro 
rata basis. Under this legislation, DHCD will not be allowed to· issue any tax credits for 
transactions or dealjngs between affiliated entities or to the same or different persons for the 
same retrofitting, renovation, or construction project. In addition, this legislation does not allow 
a tax credit for the purchase, construction, retrofitting, or renovation of a residential rental 
property. This legislation is effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,2011. 
5. Refundable Agricultural Best Management Practices Credit.. Senate Bill 
974 (Chapter 352) amended the individual income tax credits allowed for agricultural best 
management practices (Va. Code § 58.1-339.3) to make such credits refundable. The legislation 
permits a pass-through entity that allocates credits among taxpayers to designate a general 
partner, member-manager, or shareholder as the person that the Department would be required to 
first contact for the coliection of taxes in the event any portion of the credit is disallowed in the 
future. The legislation also prohibits the costs used to· determine this credit from being used to 
claim any other Virginia income tax credit. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
6. Neighborhood Assistance Act Tax Credit Expansion. House Bill 2231 
(Chapter 370) amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-439.18 arid 58.1-439.21 to expand the types of 
business firms eligible for tax credits under the Neighborhood Assistance Act to include trusts. 
Under this legislation, a trust that makes a contribution to an organization that qualifies as a 
neighborhood organization will be eligible to . receive an income tax credit from that 
neighborhood organization. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011. 
7. Neighborhood Assistance Act Credit Extension. Senate Bill· 1129 
(Chapter 317) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.20 to extend the sunset date for the issuance of tax 
credits allQwed under the Neighborhood Assistance Act from 2011 to 2014. . 
·8. Neighborhood Assistance Act Credit: Pharmacists. Senate Bill. 742 
(Chapter 132) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.22 to expand the health care services eligible for 
tax credits under the Neighborhood Assistance Act to include pharmacists donating 
pharmaceutical services to patients of a nonprofit free clinic when the· services are performed at 
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the direction of an approved neighborhood organization that has received an allocation of tax 
credits from the Department of Social Services, regardless of where the services are delivered. 
This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
9. Neighborhood Assistance Act: Impoverished People. Senate Bill 863 
(Chapter 312) amended Va. Code § 58.1-439.18.to change the defmition of "impoverished 
people" for all purposes under the Neighborhood Assistance Act Tax Credit program to include 
individuals with family annual income not in excess of 200 percent of the current federal poverty . 
guidelines. This legislation was effective on July 1, ~O 11. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
No recent court decisions. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Domicile. P.D. 10-249 (November 4, 2010). The taxpayers, a husband 
and wife, maintain a residence in Virginia and a residence in State A. Beginning in 2005, the 
taxpayers began residing in State A for more than 183 days per year and qualified for State A's 
homestead exemption. The taxpayers renewed and continue .to maintain. their Virginia driver's 
licenses. They have four vehicles registered in Virginia. In 2003, the taxpayers registered to 
vote in State A and acquired State A identification cards. The taxpayers filed nonresident 
Virginia returns for the taxable years at issue and reported all passive income derived from 
Virginia based pass-through entities as Virginia source income. The auditor determined that the 
taxpayers were Virginia domiciliary residents for the taxable years at issue an<;l issued 
assessments. The taxpayers appealed the assessments contending they successfully terminated 
their Virginia domicile and acquired a State A domicile. The Tax Commissioner disagreed 
fmding that the taxpayers never abandoned their Virginia domicile. 
2. Domicile.' P.D. 10-255 (November 12, 2010). The Tax Department 
received information from. the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating that third-party 
fmancial documents for the 2007 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address. A 
review of the Tax Department's records indicated that the taxpayer had not filed a Virginia 
. individual income tax return. The Tax Department requested an explanation or a tax return from 
the taxpayer. When no response was received, an income tax assessment was issued. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending he was domiciled in State A during the 2007 
taxable year. The facts the taxpayer provided the Tax Commissioner showed that he had been a 
long-time domiciliary resident of State A when he moved to Virginia in 2000 .. In November 
2006, he returned to live in State A. He took a number of actions indicating an intent to 
reestablish his domicile in State A. He established a permanerit place of abode and obtained a 
driver's license in State. A. His business interests were located in State A. In addition, he spent 
the vast majority of his time in State A during 2007. The only evidence linking the taxpayer to 
Virginia for the 2007 taxable year was a Virginia address on the third-party information 
statements provided to the IRS. Based on this evidence, the Tax Commissioner abated the 
assessment. 
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3. Domicile. P.D. 10-256 (November 12,2010). In June 2006, the taxpayer 
moved from Virginia to State A when he accepted an employment engagement under a one-year 
agreement. The taxpayer passed the State A bar exam and was admitted to practice in State A in 
May 2007. At the end of the one-year employment period, the taxpayer declined an offer to· 
work for another one-year term and moved back to Virginia in June 2007. While in State A, the 
taxpayer leased several houses. He also continued to hold his Virginia driver's license and his 
car remained registered in Virginia. His federal and State A tax returns were filed using a 
Virginia address. The Tax Dep~ent obtained information from the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) indicating that the taxpayer received taxable income in 2006 and requested information to 
verify whether the taxpayer was subject to Virginia income tax. When the taxpayer failed to 
respond, an assessment was issued based on the available information. The taxpayer appealed 
the assessment, contending he took sufficient steps to establish residency in State A and all 
income earned in 2006 was earned in State A. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment as 
he determined that the taxp~yer did not take sufficient steps to abandon his Virginia domicile. 
4. Land Preservation Credit. P.D. 10-257 (November 15, 2010). The Tax 
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 10-11 announcing that the annual aggregate cap on the land 
preservation tax credit increased to $108,424,000. 
5. Adjustment to Federal Adjusted Gross Income. P.D. 10-260 (December 2, 
2010). The'taxpayer, a resident of Virginia, was audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
for the 2005 taxable year. As a result of the audit, the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income. 
(F AGI) was. increased .. The taxpayer amended his 2005 Virginia S Corporation return and .( 
included a letter stating he was advised by the IRS to report the income earned from the S 
Corporation on his individual income tax return. The taxpayer also stated in the letter that he did . 
not believe the adjustment would affect his Virginia taxable income. The IRS notified the Tax 
Department of the change in .the taxpayer's F AGI and the Tax Department issued an assessment 
to the taxpayer for additional tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending 
he reported the results of the audit to the Tax Department and provided the Tax Department with 
sufficient information to make adjustments to his Virginia income tax return. . The Tax 
Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment. In this case, the taxpayer filed. an amended 
the return for the S-Corporation but failed to notify the Tax Department that the IRS had also 
adjusted his FAGI. The taxpayer included a note indicating the income had been "moved" but 
gave no information as to how the income affected his F AGI. The Tax Commissioner did not 
consider the taxpayer's submission to be of sufficient detail to accurately recompute his Virginia 
income tax liability for the 2005 taxable year .. 
6. Domicile. P.D. 10-265 (December 15, 2010). In 1991 the taxpayers, a 
husband and wife, moved from Virginia to State A and established their domiciliary residence: 
In 1996 the taxpayers sold their State A home when the husband was transferred to Country A. 
While in Country A, the taxpayers acquired Country A driver's licenses. In 2000 the taxpayers 
surrendered their State A driver's licenses and acquired Virginia driver's licenses. In 2003 the 
wife moved into a' Virginia residence' purchased by the taxpayers. During 2006, three vehides 
were registered in Virginia in the wife's name. The taxpayers' daughter attended a Virginia 
university, and paid out-of-state tuition, and the taxpayers' son attended a private secondary 
school. A federal tax return was filed using the husband's employer's post office box located in 
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State A. The wife registered to vote and has voted in Virginia. The husband has maintained his 
State A voter registration and votes in State A via absentee ballot. The taxpayers have continued 
to renew their Virginia driver's licenses and they remain current. The Tax Department obtained 
information from, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) indicating the taxpayers received taxable 
income in 2006 and requested information to verify whether the taxpayers were subject to 
Virginia income tax. The Tax Department requested additional information from the taxpayers 
in order to determine their residence for the taxable year in question. Based on the information 
provided, the auditor concluded, that the taxpayers were domiciliary residents of Virginia and 
issued an assessment for the 2006,taxable year. The taxpayers appealed and conceded that the 
wife was a Virginia resident during 2006, but contended that the husband remained a domiciliary 
resident of Country A. The Tax Commissioner agreed that the husband was not a domiciliary 
resident of Virginia as he did not abandon his domicile in Country A. 
7. DoiniCile. P.D. 10-270 (December 16, 2010). The taxpayers, a husband 
and wife, moved to Virgwa in the early 1990s. While residing in Virginia, the husband 
established and solely owned a business that operated in Virginia In 2003, the taxpayers legally 
separated and the husband acquired a place of abode in State A. In November 2003, the husband 
acquired a State A driver's license, but did not surrender his Virginia license. The husband's 
Virginia driver's license was renewed in February 2006. While in State A, the husband became 
part owner ofa business located in State B. He travels to and performs Services in State A and 
State B on behalf of his State B business. He also performed services in Virginia and a 
neighboring state several days per month on behalf of his Virginia business. When he performed 
services on behalf of his Virginia business, he spent his nights in State C. During 2006 and 
2007, the taxpayers had, four vehicles jointly registered in Virginia. Joint federal tax returns 
were filed using the husband's, State A address. The husband registered and voted ire State A 
since November 2003, but did not end his Virginia voter registration. The wife registered and 
voted in Virginia The taxpayers filed joint nonresident Virginia individual income tax returns 
using the husband's address. ' The taxpayers were audited and the auditor concluded that the 
taxpayers were both actual and domiciliary residents of Virginia. As a result, assessments were 
issued for additional tax and interest for the 2006 and 2007 taxable years. The taxpayers 
appealed and conceded that the wife was a Virginia resident during 2006 and 2007, but 
contended the husband was not an actual or domiciliary resident of Virginia. The Tax 
Commissioner reviewed the evidence provided and determined that the husband was present in 
Virginia for less than 183 days and was' not an actual resident. The Tax Commissioner also 
deterrnifled that the husband was not a domiciliary resident despite the taxpayers numerous 
connections with Virginia However given the fact that the' wife remained in Virginia, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that it was reasonable under the specific facts and circumstances of 
this case that the Virginia residence and some of the taxpayers' joint possessions would remain 
for the benefit and use of the wife. 
8. Statute of Limitations. P.D. 10-271 (December'16, 2010). The Tax 
Department received information from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that tax documents 
for the 2002 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address. The taxpayer did not 
file a 2002 Virginia individual income tax, return. The Tax Department requested additional 
information from the taxpayer in order to determine her domicile for that taxable year. When 
adequate response was riot .received, an assessment was issued in February 2005. In February 
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2008, the assessment was partially satisfied by an offset of the taxpayer's federal income tax 
refund. The taxpayer provided documentation· on May 5, 2010, showing that she was a 
domiciliary resident of another state in 2002, and requested a refund of the offset payment. The 
Tax Department abated the remaining assessment, but did not issue a refund of the overpayment 
because the statute of limitations had expired. The taxpayer appealed the Tax Department's 
denial of the refund request, citing personal circtimstances, and asked that the Tax Department 
make an exception to the statute of limitations in her case. The Tax Commissioner denied the 
taxpayer's request as he is bound by the law and not allowed to make exceptions to the statute of . 
limitations. 
9. Mailbox Rule. P.D. 10-272 (December 16,2010). On December 29,2006 
the taxpayers took a distribution from an individual retirement account (IRA).· The distribution 
was included in the taxpayer's 2006 federal adjusted gross income· (F AGI). The taxpayers 
instructed the fmancial inst~tution holding the· IRA to mail checks for the entire amount of the 
distribution directly to the.institution that administers the Virginia. College Savings Plan (VCSP) 
for deposit into accounts set up for the taxpayers' children. The taxpayers claimed a deduction 
against their 2006 Virginia taxable income for the contributions, pursuant to Va. Code 
§ 58.1-322 D(7)(a). Under audit, the auditor denied the deduction for the 2006 taxable year 
becauSe the transferred funds were not posted until early January 2007. The taxpayers appealed 
the assessment contending the transfers were made within the 2006 taxable. year under rules 
established by the Internal Revenue Service. The Tax Commissioner abated the assessment as 
the funds were mailed and postmarked on December 29, 2006 for unconditional delivery. 
10. Foreign Source Income. P.D. 10-274 (December 16,2010). During 2007, 
the taxpayer was a shareholder in a Virginia S Corporation (VSC). VSC wholly owned a C 
corporation (VDISC) that operated as a domestic international sales corporation (DISC) for 
federal income tax purposes. VDISC was subject to Virginia income tax ·on all of its Virginia 
taxable income for the 2007 taxable year. On its Virginia income tax return, VSC subtracted all 
of the dividends received from VDISC. The subtraction: was passed through to the taxpayer, 
who subtracted the VDISC dividends in determining her Virgipia taxable income. The· Tax 
Department denied the subtraction, reduced the amount the overpayment claimed on· the 
taxpayer's 2007 individual income tax return, and issued the reduced amount as a refund. The 
subtraction was denied because individual income taxpayers are no longer permitted to claim a 
foreign source income subtraction. The taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending that Va. 
Code § 58.1-390.2 provides that owners are only liable for tax on their separate individual 
capacities on income passed through to them. She reasons that, because the VDISC dividend 
subtraction is reflective of·the income passed through to the shareholder, the taxpayer is entitled 
to the subtraction: In addition, the taxpayer asserts ·that Va. Code § 58.1-391 does not limit 
modifications to those permitted under 58.1-322. The Tax Coinmissioner upheld the assessment 
as. Va. Code § 58.1-391 restricts subtractions that an individual may take to pass-through income 
to those in Va. Code § 58.1-322. As Va. Code § 58.1:.322 does. not permit a subtraction for 
. foreign source income, the subtraction was riot allowed. Virginia Code § 58.1-390.2 clarifies the 
owners' responsibility for the .income tax liability of a pass-through entity and does not limit the 
amount of income for which an owner may be subject to tax. 
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11. Actual Resident & Retirement Income. P.D. 10-283 (December 28, 
2010) .. The Tax Department received information from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
indicating the taxpayer had income from Virginia sources. The Tax Department requested that 
the taxpayer file the proper Virginia individual income tax return or provide an explanation 
concerning why the income was not taxable. When an adequate response was not received, the 
Tax· Department issued an assessment based on the information provided by the IRS. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessment, contending she was not a domiciliary resident of Virginia 
during the 2005 taxable year and that most of the income was retirement income from her former 
employer in State A. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. Based on the evidence 
provided by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner determined that she was present in Virginia for 
more than 183 days in 2005 and was an actual resident. As the taxpayer was a 2005 actual 
resident of Virginia, Virginia, not State A, is peimitted to'tax the retirement income under Public 
Law 104-95, as codified at Title 4 U.S.C.A § 114, which prohibits a state from imposing an 
income tax on any retirement income received by an individual who is not a resident or 
domiciliary of that state. -
12. Domicile. P.D. 11-05 (January 11, 2011). The Tax Commissioner 
considered an appeal by an individual assessed with additional income tax for the 2006 and 2007 
taxable years and determined that the individual was a Virginia domiciliary resident as he did not 
abandon his Virginia domicile. The taxpayer was relocated by his employer to State A. In State 
A, the taxpayer rented an apartment, received financial documents, and filed his federal income 
tax return from his State A address. However, the taxpayer continued to maintain his house in 
Virginia, owned motor vehicles registered in Virginia, and he held a Virginia driver's license that 
he renewed in November 2007. The taxpayer indicated that he kept his cars registered in 
Virginia because the insuran~e rate was lower than in State A. However, the Tax Commissioner 
considers a taxpayer's continued connections to Virginia for the purpose of taking advantage of 
favorable Virginia laws in order to gain the benefits oflower costs available to Virginia residents 
. to be strong intent of a taxpayer's desire to be a domiciliary resident of Virginia. 
13. . Marine Pilot's Pass-Through Income Subject to . Virginia Income Tax. 
P.D. 11-12 (January 21, 2011). A nonresident marine pilot requested a ruling on whether pass-
through income he receives from an association of marine pilots that operates in Virginia is 
subject to Virginia income tax. The Tax Commissioner ruled that the paSs-through income is not 
entitled to the federal exemption for wages paid to a marine pilot operating in more than one 
state. As the association has Virginia source income, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
nonresident marine pilot should pay Virginia income tax on his portioQ.· of the association's 
Income. 
14. Subtraction for Death Benefits. P.D. 11-14 (January 25, 2011). The 
beneficiaries of an estate received lump sum death benefit payments from four life insurance 
annuities following the death of their mother in 2008; Each beneficiary subtracted the death . 
benefit payment on his 2008 Virginia individual income tax return. One beneficiary was audited 
and the subtraction for the death benefits was disallowed, which resulted in a reduction of refund 
claimed by the beneficiary and his wife on their 2008 Virginia return. A ruling on behalf of the 
beneficiaries of the estate' was requested that each beneficiary was entitled to subtract the death 
benefit payments in accordance with Virginia Code § 58.l-322(C)(32)~ The Tax Commissioner 
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agreed that the beneficiaries should be allowed the subtraction. Virginia Code § 58.1-322(C)(32) 
allows a subtraction for death benefit payments if (i) the source of the payment is an annuity 
contract between a customer and an insurance company; (ii) the annuity payment was awarded to 
the beneficiary in a lump sum; and (iii) the payment was subject to taxation at the federal level. 
15. Residency of Spouse of Active Duty Military Service Member. P.D. 11-
16 (February 11, 2011). In June 2007, the taxpayer moved from State A to Virginia. In early 
2009, she married a service member on active duty in the armed forces in Virginia. The service 
member, who had been stationed in State A, was deployed overseas in 2006 and reassigned to 
Virginia when he returned in late 2008. The taxpayer claimed the military spouse exemption 
from individual income taxation on her 2009 taxable year Virginia income tax return. Under 
review, the, Tax Department disallow~dthe military spouse exemption because the 
documentation provided showed the taxpayer was not married to the service member when she 
moved to Virginia. The -:r:ax Department concluded that she was a resident of Virginia and 
changed the 2009 filing to a resident return. The taxpayer appealed contending both she and her 
service member spouse were domiciliary residents of State A in 2009. 
The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayer's appeal. First, the Tax 
Commissioner examined her facts and circumstances and detennined that the taxpayer became a 
, Virginia domiciliary resident in 2007 before she was married. The Tax Commissioner also 
examined the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 571 et seq., as 
amended effective for the 2009 taxable year. Under the Act, a spouse can neither lose nor 
acqWre domicile or residence in a state when the spouse is present in the state solely to be with 
the service member in compliance with the service member's military orders if the residence or 
domicile is the same for both the service member and spouse. The taxpayer did ilot acquire her 
Virginia domicile when her spouse was assigned to Virginia as she acquired her Virginia 
domicile baSed on her own actions prior to her marriage to the servicememberin 2009. 
16. Land Preservation Tax Credit: Receipt of Credits by a Personal 
Representative. P.D. 11-20 (February 18,2011). A mother and daughter (the "Donors") made a 
donation of land eligible for the Land Preservation Tax Credit in December 2006. The Daughter 
died in, February 2007 and the mother died in May 2008. The taxpayer qualified as the personal 
representative on behalf of the estates of the Donors. In his capacity as personal representative, 
the taxpayer submitted an application for the credit and simultaneously filed a ruling request with 
the Tax Commissioner asking that he qualify to receive the credits. The Tax Commissioner 
determined that because the donation' was made by the Donors before their deaths, the credit 
could be claimed on the fmal income tax returns of the Donors. However, any used credits may 
not be transferred by the taxpayer. 
17. Statute of Limitations on Reporting Federal Changes. P.D. 11-29 
(February 28,2011). The taxpayers were audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the 
2005 and 2006 taxable years. The IRS adjusted the taxpayers' 2005 and 2006 federal income tax 
returns, resulting in a change to federal taxable income. The taxpayers did not file amended 
2005 and 2006 Virginia Income tax returns reflecting the IRS adjustments. As a result, the Tax 
Department issued assessments for the 2005 and 2006 taxable years. The taxpayers appealed the 
assessments, contending they were not issued within the. three-year limitations period. The Tax 
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Commissioner upheld the assessments as Virginia Code § 58.1-311 requires any individual to 
report a change or correction in federal taxable income within one year of the final determination 
of such change or correction by filing an amended return with the Tax Department. If the 
taxpayer fails to file an amended return, Virginia Code § 58.1-312(A)(3) permits the Tax 
Department to assess the appropriate tax at any time. 
18. Disability Subtraction.· P.D. 11-32 (March 3, 2011) is a request for 
redetermination of P.D. 10-153. In P.D. 10-153, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
taxpayers, a husband and wife, were not entitled to the disability income subtraction for the 
taxable years at issue because the husband, who received.the income, was not permanently and 
totally disabled. The husband late former spouse was the individual for whom the disability 
income was approved. In P.D. 10-153, the Tax Commissioner found that an individual must 
meet two tests in order to be allowed a subtraction' for disability income on the Virginia 
individual income tax return: (1) The individual must receive disability income, and (2) The 
individual must be absent from work because of a permanent andtotal disability. The taxpayers 
requested a redetermination, contending the payments qualified as disability income under 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 22(c)(2)(B)(iii), and neither the Code of Virginia nor the IRC re-
characterize this type of income once the permanently disabled person dies and subsequent 
payments are made to the spouse. . The Tax Commissioner upheld the prior ruling. While the 
Tax Commissioner did not dispute the characterization of the income under the IRC,' he 
determined that the deduction under Virginia Code sec. 58.1-322(C)(4)(b) can only be claimed 
by an individual who is permanep.tly or totally disabled. 
19. Land Preservation Credit: Claiming Credits Not Transferred To You. 
·P.D. 11-33 (March 3, 2011). The taxpayers, a husband and wife, purchased land preservation 
credits to' be claimed on their 2005 and 2006 Virginia income tax returns. At the time of the 
purchase of the credits, the notification form filed with the Tax Department, indicated that the 
'sellers retained the credits. The taxpayers jointly claimed the 'credits on their 2005 and 2006 
returns. In 2008, the Tax Department devalued the credits on a pro-rata basis to all holders of the 
credits. The devaluation of the credits resUlted in assessments of tax being issued to the' 
taxpayers for the 2005 and 2006 taxable years. The taxpayers paid the assessments and filed an 
appeal contending they are entitled to claim credits that were retained by the sellers at the time of 
transfer. (WHAT???) Thankfully, the Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayers right to claim 
the other credits and noted that the Commonwealth is not a party to the transaction and cannot 
grant credits that were not transferred. 
20. Business Expense v. Hobby Expense. P.D. 11-36 (March 7, 2011). The 
taxpayers, a husband and wife, operated an import business during the 2007 taxable year. The 
business incurred losses, that were reported on federal Schedule C. Under review, the auditor 
determined that the business had reported consistent losses in prior 4rXable years and was not 
operated for profit. As a result, the auditor disallowed the deductions claimed on the Schedule C 
,and issued an assessment for additional tax and interest for the 2007 taxable year. The taxpayers 
paid the assessment and filed an appeal contending they intended to make a profit from the 
operations of the business, but changing market conditions affected the viability of the business. 
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The Tax Conimissioner agreed with the taxpayers and ordered an appropriate 
refund. The Tax Commissioner recognized that Treasury Regulation § 1-183-2(b) identifies nine 
factors that should be taken into account when determining whether an activity has a profit 
motive: (1) The manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the 
taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the 
activity; (4) expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of 
the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of 
income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which 
are earned; (8) the fmancial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or 
recreation. All facts and circumstances in this regulation must be considered in determining if an 
activity is engaged 'in for profit. The regulation also states that no one factor is determinative and . . 
consideration is not necessarily limited to these nine factors. Using the nine factors, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the taxpayers conducted their business for profit and allowed the 
deduction. Query: Did the auditor apply the nine .factors? Based on the ruling, the auditor 
appeared to arrive at his conclusion based solely on the fact that the business was consistently 
reporting losses. If Virginia auditors are going to conduct audits based on federal laws, 
shouldn't they understand and recognize federal law before they rriake any adjustments? 
21. Income Earned by Indian Reservation Resident. P.D. 11-38 and 11-39 
(March 14, 2011). During the taxable years at issue, the taxpayer, an Indian, resided on an 
Indian reservation. On his Virginia individual income tax return, the taxpayer claimed a 
subtraction for' wages, interest,. dividends, and retirement income in computing his Virginia 
taxable income, which was partially disallowed. The taxpayer was assessed with the difference. 
He appealed the assessments; contending the income resulted from activities conducted on an 
Indian reservation. In P.D. 10-156, the Tax Department upheld assessments because certain 
pension, dividend, and interest income received by the taxpayer and subtracted on his income tax 
returns did not result from pursuits conducted by an Indian residing on a reservation. The 
taxpayer requested a redetermination, contending the 1677 treaty between Virginia and the 
Indians is still in effect and the sites of the income at issue, received by a tribe member living on 
the reservation, is exempt from taxation by Virginia under the treaty. The Tax Commissioner 
upheld the prior ruling as the taxpayer did not show evidence that the dividend or interest income 
at issue was received from pursuits conducted on the reservation or that the pension income at 
issue resulted from employment conducted by an Indian residing and working on the reservation. 
22. Sale of S Corporation and Personal Residence. P.D. 11-48 (March'31, 
2011). A married couple (the "taxpayers") currently residing in Virginia own all of the shares of 
a Virginia S corporation (VSC). The taxpayers' intend to sell VSC and their Virginia home and 
change their domiciliary residence to another state. The taxpayers are considering a proposal' 
that require a buyer to make an initial payment at closing and contingent payments based on the 
S corporation's revenue in future years. The taxpayers requested a ruling as to their Virginia 
income tax liability on the contingent payments. In addition, the taxpayers sought guidance 
concerning any potential Virginia tax liability resulting from installment payments of principal. 
and interest from the sale of their Virginia personal residence after they move out of Virginia. 
The Tax Commissioner opined that whether the contingent payments would be subject to 
Virginia income tax depends on how the taxpayers sell VSC. If the taxpayers sell the stock of 
VSC, any payments the taxpayers receive once they change their residency would not be taxable 
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by Virginia. However if the taxpayers sell the assets of VSC or sell the stock and make an 
election under IRC § 338(h)(1O) to treat the stock sale asa sale of assets, all payments would be 
subject to Virginia taxation. The payments on the sale of the residence would only be subject to 
Virginia income tax to the extent that the payments are not excluded from federal mcome 
taxation. 
23. Credit for Taxes Paid to Other States. P.D. 11-50 (April 4, 2011). The 
taxpayers are Virginia residents who claimed a tax credit on their Virginia individual income tax 
return for income tax paid to State A. The income tax due to State A was reduced by a credit for 
investing in a historic' rehabilitation project (the "historic rehabilitation credit"). When filing 
their Virginia income tax return, the taxpayers claimed a credit for tax paid to another state based 
on the total amount of tax. due to State A before application of the historic rehabilitation credit. 
Under audit, the auditor reduced the tax credit for tax paid to another state to the actual tax 
payment and issued an assessment for additional tax and interest. The taxpayers appealed the 
assessment contending the-instructions for the Vitginia income tax return states a taxpayer 
receives credit for the. "amount of credit of tax paid to another state." The taxpayers asserted 
there is no law or regulation that requires reduction of the qualifying tax liability by the amount 
that State A properly granted as a credit for payment of the State A tax. Without citing any law 
and only a prior ruling of the Tax Commissioner, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
assessment is correct as the credit is only for amounts paid to other states in cash, not credits. 
24. Domicile. P.D. 11-58 (April 13, 2011). The taxpayers, a husband and 
wife, filed a Virginia part-year income tax return for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayers 
performed a number of actions consistent with obtaining and maintaining a domicile in Virginia. 
The husband obtained a Virginia driver's license in 2004. In September 2005 the taxpayers 
leased an apartment in Virginia and filed a part-year Virginia return for the 2005 taxable year. 
They moved to another apartment in Virginia in 2006. The wife obtained her Virginia driver's 
license in 2006. They also had an automobile registered in Virginia in 2006. The only evidence 
provided showing a connection with another state is a 2006 part year return filed with State A. 
The taxpayers did not show that they established a permanent place of abode, engaged in 
. employment for an indefinite period of time, registered property, or obtained drivers' licenses in 
any other state' during 2006. Under review, the auditor determined the taxpayers were 
domiciliary residents of Virginia for the entire taxable year and issued an assessment. The 
taxpayers filed an appeal contending they filed a part-year resident return because they did not 
obtain employment in Virginia until October 2006. The Tax Commissioner' upheld· the 
assessment.. . 
25. Credit for Taxes Paid to Other States & Statute of Lirnitations .. P.D. 11-64 
(April 21, 2011). The taxpayers are Virginia residents who owned rental property in State A. In 
February 2009, an audit by State A 'resulted in an income tax assessment. An amended 2004 
Virginia income tax return was filed in March 2009 claiming a credit for income tax paid to State 
A. The Tax Department denied the refund because the return was filed beyond the statute of 
limitations. The taxpayers appealed the denial of the refund contending they could claim a 
refund within one year of State A's fmal determination. In the alternative, they argued that the 
State A assessment impacted their 2009 federal income tax return, thereby opening up the statute 
to allow them to file an amended return within one year of a fmal determination by the Internal 
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Revenue Service (IRS). The taxpayers also asserted that a refund could be permitted because the 
claim resulted from the payment of an assessment and their amended Virginia return raised 
issues solely related to the State A assessment. The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayers' 
request for a refund. First, the alternative arguments were denied as the State A assessment did 
not require the taxpayer to file an amended federal return nor can it reopen the statute of 
limitations under the same provision that a Virginia assessment would. 
Qn the primary argunient, the Tax CoIIllilissioner referred to prior law and stated, "Under 
Va. Code § 58.1-1823A(v), a taxpayer has one year from the fmal determination of a change 
made by any other state to file an amended return tb request a refund resulting from credits for 
taxes paid to other states. ... This provision, however, clearly states that a taxpayer must have . 
previously claimed a credit for taxes paid to such state tax pursuant to Va Code § 58.1-332 in 
. order to file an amended return claiming a refund resulting from an audit conducted by another 
state." Prior to 2010, Virginia Code § 58.1-1823(A)(v) stated, "Any person filing a tax return or 
paying an assessment requiTed for any tax administered by the Department of Taxation may file 
an amended return with the Department within the later of: ... (v) one year from the final 
determination of any change or correction in the income tax. of the taxpayer for any. other state, 
provided that the taxpayer previously claimed a credit for such tax pursuant to § 58.1-332 and 
that the refund does not exceed the amount of the decrease in Virginia tax attributable to such 
change or correction." Effective July 1, 2010, the requirement that a credit was claimed on the 
original return no longer exists. . 
26. Extension for Victims of Severe Storms. P.D. 11-62 (April 19, 2011). 
The Tax Commissioner issued Tax aulletin 11-3 to grant a thirty day filing and payment 
extension to those individuals and businesses affected by the severe storms that caused tornadoes 
and flooding on April 8,2011, in Pulaski County, and on April 16, 2011, elsewhere in Virginia. 
27. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-66 (April 26, 2011). The 
. taxpayer and her spouse, an active duty military servicemember, were assigned to a military duty 
station in State A in June 2005. In May 2008, the spouse received a change of duty 'station and 
transferred to a military installation in Virginia. The wife moved to Virginia with her husband. . 
The taxpayer filed a nonresident claim for individual income tax withheld in February 2010, for 
the 2009 taxable year. In this claim the taxpayer attested that she and her spouse were 
domiciliary residents of State B. The claim was denied on the basis that the information 
provided supported the taxpayer's claim that her spouse is a domiciliary resident of State B, but it 
did not support her claim of domicile. The taxpayer filed an amended claim in August 2010, 
attesting that she was erroneously advised and should have claimed State A as their domiciliary 
residence. The Department agreed that the taxpayer maintained· her domicile in State A, but 
determined her spouse did not abandon his State B domicile. Therefore they did not share the 
same domicile prior to being stationed in Virginia. The taxpayer filed an appeal, contending that 
she and her spouse shared domicile in State A, and she should be allowed a refund for individual 
income tax withheld in 2009. 
The Tax Commissioner denied the claim as he determined that the spouse was domiciled 
in State B while the taxpayer was domiciled in State A. The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 
(the "Act"), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 571 et seq., was amended, effective for 2009'taxable year 
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and thereafter, to provide that a spouse can neither lose nor acquire domicile or residence in a 
state when the spouse is present in the state solely to be with the service member in compliance 
with the service member's military orders if the residence or domicile is. the same for both the 
service member and spouse. Information provided to the Tax Commissioner showed that the 
spouse elected State B as his withholding state. He also maintained motor vehicles registered in 
State B and held a State B driver's license. The taxpayer provided the Tax Department with a 
copy of a State B driver's license issued January 2010. In addition, the service member and the 
taxpayer maintained a residence in State A and held State A identification cards issued in 2006. 
During the 2010 taxable year, while stationed in Virginia, the· service member and the taxpayer 
transferred all vehicle registrations to State A. They registered to vote in State A. The service 
member reported an error in the withholding state to the Department of Defense, contending the 
withholding state should be State A, and was incorrect since 2005. 
28. Tax Preparer Error. P.D. 11-78 (May 26, 2011) and P.D. 11-82 (May 31, 
2011). The taxpayer is a VIrginia resident who filed individual income tax returns for the 2007 
and 2008 taxable years. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed itemized deductions for 
charitable contributions, job expenses, and certain miscellaneous expenses. The Tax Department 
also adjusted the taxpayer's mortgage interest deduction. The taxpayer appealed the assessments . 
contending he relied on the expertise of the tax preparer to complete the returns properly. The 
. taxpayer conceded that the itemized deductions reported were incorrect but believes the tax 
preparer should be held responsible for the. incorrectly completed returns. The TaX 
Commissioner upheld the assessment as he does not· have the authority to assess the taxpayer's 
liability against the tax preparer. The Tax Commissioner noted that the taxpayer may have a 
cause of action against the tax preparer. 
29. Domicile. P.D. 11-79· (May 26, 2011). The taxpayer filed a 2006 Virginia 
resident part-year return. In April 2006, the taXpayer: was transferred by his employer to State A. 
In June 2006, he was transferred to Country A. He was then transferred to two other foreign 
countries in 2008 and.2010, respectively. The Tax Department received information from the 
IRS that tax documents for the 2007 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address. 
The taxpayer did not file a 2007 Virginia individual income tax return. The Tax Department 
requested additional information from the taxpayer in order to determine his residence for that 
taxable year. Based on the information provided by the taxpayer, the Tax Department 
determined that he was a Virginia domiciliary resident during the 2007 taxable year and issued 
an assessment for individual income tax. The taxpayer appealed the aSsessment asserting that he 
abando"ned his Vrrginia domicile when he was transferred to State A, and he was a resident of 
Country A during the 2007 taxable year. 'The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessinent. The 
Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer failed to abandon his Virginia domicile as he 
maintained a Virginia driver's license and continued to use a Virginia address for mail purposes .. 
Also, the taxpayer's employment contracts showed 'that his various assignments were only 
temporary and the taxpayer did not attempt to obtain a permanent residence after he left Virginia. 
30 ... Domicile/Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-90 (June 2, 2011). 
The taxpayer moved to Virginia from State Ain February 2008. In April 2008, she married a 
military service member assigned to a duty station in Virginia The taxpayer engaged in 
activities consistent with establishing domicile within Virginia. She obtained a permanent place 
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of abode and accepted employment in Virginia in February 2008 prior to her 'marriage to the 
service member. Her employer began withholding Virginia income tax from her salary. The 
taxpayer also maintained connections to State A. She continued to hold a StateA driver's license 
and maintained a permanent place of abode. In 2008,. the taxpayer updated her motor vehicle 
registration in State A to include the service member. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for 
withholding for the 2009 taxable year. The auditor, denied the taxpayer's claim on the basis that 
. the taxpayer established residence in Virginia prior to marrying the service member. The 
taxpayer appealed contending her only purpose in Virginia was to be with the service member. 
The Tax Commissioner ordered the taxpayer's withholding refunded and found that the taxpayer 
demonstrated her intent to maintain her State A domicile in 2008. The evidence further indicated 
to the Tax Commissioner that she did not establish a Virginia domicile in 2009 and the taxpayer 
and her service member spouse maintained their domicile in State A. 
Observation: This ruling is an indictment of the Tax Department's audit staff. If a 
Virginia resident maintained their Virginia home, driver's license, and motor vehicle registration 
after moving to another state, they wouJd have been assessed with Virginia individual income tax 
as a Virginia resident every time. Such an assessment would probably be upheld, depending on 
other facts, as individuals are required to abandon their previous state of domicile to change their 
domicile. Here however, the opposite facts exist. The taxpayer maintained significant 
connections with State A and the audit staff argued that she changed her domicile to Virginia, yet 
the auditor determined that the taxpayer had a Virginia domicile. Which is it? 
31. D.C. Unincorporated Business Franchise Tax. P.D.11-92 (June 2, 2011). 
A taxpayer representative requested a ruling on the application of the credit allowed by Va. Code 
§ 58.1-332 for income taxes paid to other states to the D.C. Unincorporated Business Franchise 
Tax, (','UBFT") and whether Virginia policy has changed as a result of District of Columbia v. 
Bender, 906 A.2d 277 (2006). The representative's clients ·are a married couple living in 
Virginia. The husband is the sole member of a Virginia LLC that operates a consulting business 
located in the District. The LLC was subject to the UBFT. He asked if the couple can claim the 
Virginia credit for income taxes paid to other states for this tax. 'The policy for not allowing such 
a credit was most recently upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court in Mathy v. Commonwealth, 
253 Va. 356, 43 S.E.2d 802 (1997). In doing so, the Virginia Court relied on the characterization 
of the tax by the DC Court in Bishop v. District of Columbi~ 401 A.2d 955 (D.C. 1979),' 
reinstated en bane, 411 A.2d 997, eert. 'denied 446 U.S. 996 (1980). The recent Bender case 
clarified the holding of the Bishop decision, and the representative claimed that it undercuts the 
rationale behind Virginia Supreme Court decision in Mathy. Therefore, the representative 
. asserted that the Tax Department should ignore the Mathy decision and allow taxpayers to claim 
the income tax credit for the UBFT. The Tax Commissioner declined the invitation to 
administratively overrule the Virginia Supreme Court's decision in Mathy and reaffirmed 
Virginia'S policy of interpreting Va. Code § 58.1-332 as not allowing credit for the UBFT. The 
Tax Commissioner declined to ignore the Virginia Supreme Court's holding in Mathy for several 
reaSons as (1) decisions of the courts of other states are not binding on Virginia administrative 
agencies; (2) the Tax Department has consistently hdd administratively, and argued in court, its' 
position that the UBFT does not, and never has, qualified for Virginia's credit for income taxes 
paid to other states; and, (3) he was not persuaded that the Virginia, Supreme Court would reach a 
different result if the matter came before it again. 
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32. Mortgage Interest Deduction. P.D. 11-93 (June 3, 20.11). The taxpayer 
claimed an itemized deduction for mortgage interest on his 20.0.7 Virginia individual income tax 
return. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed the mortgage interest deduction because the 
taxpayer's father was listed as the owner of the home and the payer of the interest on the federal 
information return, Form 1098. The taxpayer appealed contending that he is entitled to deduct 
the mortgage interest expense because he lived in and owned the home, made the payments on 
both mortgages, and paid the home maintenance expenses. The Tax Commissioner upheld the 
. assessment as the information provided by the taxpayer did not clarify any of the outstanding 
issues. In this case, the taxpayer and· his father share the exact same name. The federal 
information return reporting the mortgage interest bears the father's Social Security number .. 
Based on the deed, it. was unclear to the Tax Commissioner as to whether th,e taxpayer or his 
father had legal title to the residence. In addition, the mortgage documents, bank statements, and 
utility bills provided bear th,e name shared by the taxpayer and the father .. 
33. Change in Federal Adjusted Gross Income. P.D. 11-100. (June 9, 20.11). 
The taxpayers, a husband and wife, were audited by the IRS for the 20.0.5 and. 20.0.6 taxable years. 
The IRS shifted passive activity . losses from 20.0.6 to 20.0.5, resulting in an increase·in federal 
adjusted gross income (F AGI) in the 20.0.6 taxable year and a decrease in the 20.0.5 taxable year. 
As a result of the shift in income, the amount of Social Security benefits included in :the 
taxpayers' FAGI was also adjusted. The taxpayers failed to file amended Virginia income tax 
returns for either the 20.0.5 or 20.0.6 taxable years reflecting the federal adjustments as ·required 
under Virgiitia law. As a result, the Tax Department issued an assessment for the 200.6 taxable 
year.· The taxpayers appealed the assessment contending the IRS adjustment to the passive 
activity losses did not affect the net Virginia tax liability for the 20.0.5 and 20.0.6 taxable years 
combined. In addition, the taxpayers asserted that the Tax Department included nontaxable 
Social Security benefits in computing their liability. The Tax Commissioner disagreed· as 
Virginia law required the taxpayers to file an amended return to claim the 20.0.5 refund. As the 
statute· of limitation had expired, the taxpayers could not claim this refund and thus could not 
offset the 20.0.6 tax due. However, the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment did not 
include the subtraction for Social Security benefits and ordered that the assessment be adjusted. 
34. Domicile. P.D. 11-101 (June 9, 20.11). The taxpayer was a student at a 
university in State A during the 20.0.7 taxable year. He resided in a fraternity house and paid 
State A tuition. The taxpayer was registered to vote in State A. During the 20.0.7 taxable year, 
the taxpayer completed an internship in State A. The taxpayer filed a State A part-year re~ident 
return for 20.0.7, reporting the income he earned from his internship. The taxpayer acquired a . 
Virginia driver's license in 20.0.2, which he renewed in January 20.0.6 and January 20.11. In 20.08, 
he accepted full-time employment in State A to commence after his graduation with the company 
for which he interned in 2DD7~ The Tax Department received· information from the IRS that tax 
documents for the 20.0.7 taxable year were sent to the taxpayer at a Virginia address.· The 
taxpayer did not file a 20.0.7 Virginia individual income tax return. The Tax Department 
requested additional information from the taxpayer in order to determine his residence for that 
. taxable year. Based on the information provided by the taxpayer, the Tax . Departm~nt 
determined that he was a Virginia domiciliary resident during the 20.0.7 taxable year and issued 
an assessment for individual income tax. The. taxpayer appealed the assessment contending he· 
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took sufficient steps to establish residency in State A and all the income earned in 2007 was 
earned in State A. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment as the taxpayer 
maintained all of his Virginia connections thus never abandoned his Virginia domicile. 
35. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-104 (June 10, 2011) .. The 
taxpayer moved to Virginia in May 2003. She established a permanent place of abode, accepted 
employment at a Virginia company, and in October 2003, married a nonresident military service 
member serving at a VirgIDia duty station. Prior to moving t,o Virginia, both the taxpayer and the 
service member were domiciliary residents of State A. The taxpayer obtained a Virginia voter's 
registration card in 2008 and surrendered her State A driver's license and obtained a Virginia 
driver's license in 2009. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for nonresident withholding for the 
2009 taxable year. Under review, the Tax Department concluded that the taxpayer was a 
resident of Virginia before she married the service. member, denied the refund claim and issued 
an assessment for tax and interest. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending she shared 
the same domicile as the service member prior to joining him in Virginia. The Tax 
Commissioner upheld the refund denial as the taxpayer took sufficient steps to abandon her 
domicile in State A and establish domicile in Virginia prior to marrying the servicemember. 
Thus, 'the protection afforded by the. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act did Ilot apply. ' 
36. Unreported Federal Adjustment. P.D. 11-107 (June 14, 2011). The 
taxpayer was audited by the IRS for the 2006 taxable year. The IRS adjusted the taxpayer's 2006 
federal adjusted gross income (FAGI). The taxpayer did not amend her Virginia income tax 
return to report the IRS adjustment. As a result, the Tax Department issued an assessment for 
the taxable year in question. The taxpayer appealed the assessment contending· the prepare! 
made an error when filing the income tax return. , Specifically, the taxpayer contended that her 
accountant failed to properly report a deduction for education expenses,resulting in the 
adjustment to her federal taxable income. Due to personal issues at the time, the ,taxpayer 
indicated that she did not contest the IRS assessment. The Tax Commissioner upheld the 
assessment after refusing to go behind an IRC audit despite the authority to adjust F AGI. 
Interesting quote: "However, where the IRS has examined the federal taxable income of a· 
taxpayer, the Department does not look behind the IRS's fmal determination." 
37. Above the Line AudIt. P.D. 11-108 (JUlie 14,2011). The Tax Department 
audited the taxpayers' Virginia individual income tax returns for the' 2007 and 2008 taxable 
years. The 'auditor adjusted the itemized'deductions for the 2007 taxable year and disallowed tI1e 
itemized deductions claimed for 2008 based on documentation provided by the taxpayers. The 
taxpayers· appealed the assessments contending' that many of. the documents required to 
, substantiate the itemized deductions were lost during a foreclosure proceeding. The Tax 
Commissioner upheld the assessment due to a lack of documentation. 
38. Actual Residency. P.D. 11-109 (June 14, 2011). The Tax Department 
received information from the IRS indicating that third-party fmancial documents for the 2007 
taxable ye~ were sent to the' taxpayer at a Virginia address. The Tax Department requested 
information to verify whether the taxpayer was subject to Virginia income tax. When the 
taxpayer failed to respond, an assessment was issued based on the available information. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessment contending lie waS domiciled in State A during the 2007. The 
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Tax Commissioner reviewed the evidence provided by the taxpayer and detennined that he was 
domiciled in State A in 2007. However, evidence also indicated that the taxpayer was present in 
Virginia for 190 days in 2007. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment and determined 
that the taxpayer was an actual resident. 
39. Domicile. P.D. 11-113 (June 20, 2011). In 2006, the taxpayer and her 
spouse resided in State A. The couple also owned a house in Virginia, and the taxpayer held a 
Virginia driver's license. Her employer was based in State B, which borders Virginia. In early 
2007, the spouse was transferred by his employer to Country A and the couple sold their home in 
State A. The taxpayer continued to work for her employer in State B and lived m the home in 
Virginia when she was not in Country A with her spouse. The Tax Department received 
infonnation from the IRS indicating the taxpayer had income for the taxable year at issue. The 
taxpayer was requested to file a Virginia individual income tax return for the taxable year at 
issue, provide a copy of th~ return filed, or explain why she was not subject to Virginia income 
taxation. When an adequate response was not received, the Tax Department issued an· 
assessment. The taxpayer appealed the . assessment. contending she changed her domicile to 
Country A in 2007, the income from her employment was exempt under federal law, and her 
income was insufficient to require filing. While never addressing the last two arguments, the 
Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was domiciled in Virginia. 
According to the Tax Commissioner, the taxpayer performed several actions consistent 
with an intent to change domicile in 2007. The home in State A was sold after the spouse was 
transferred to Country A and the taxpayer traveled to Country A with the spouse. However the 
Tax Commissioner also noted that the taxpayer also performed a number of actions indicating an 
intent to establish her domicile in Virginia. The taxpayer purchased a home,· registered an 
automobile in Virginia, and obtained a Virginia driver's license prior to 2007. In addition, the 
taxpayer spent more days in Virginia than in Country A or State A in 2007. Based upon these 
circumstances, the Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. 
Observation: Ninety-nine times out of one hundred, the Tax Commissioner correctly 
decides residency appeals. This case is number one hundred based on the facts in this ruling. In 
fact, the outcome does not match the policy stated in this ruling. The ruling states,. 
"In order to change from one legal domicile to another legal domicile, there must 
be (1) actual abandonment of the old domicile,· coupled with an intent not to 
return to it, and (2) an acquisition of a new domicile at another place, which must 
be formed by personal presence and an intent to remain there pennanently or 
indefinitely. The burden of proving that the domicile has been changed lies with 
the person alleging the change." 
Based on the facts that the Tax COIiunissioner wrote, nothing was acquired in Virginia when the 
taxpayer sold the State A house. All of the taxpayer's Virginia connections existed when she 
was presumably domiciled in Sta,te A. It is not clear based on the ruling if adequate steps were 
taken to establish domicile in Country A. However even if the steps weren't adequate, the 
. taxpayer did nothing to acquire a domicile in Virginia. Based on the facts cited in this ruling and 
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presuming that the actions taken to establish a domicile in Country A were not sufficient, the 
correct outcome would be to say that the taxpayer is still a domiciliary resident of State A. 
40. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-114 (June 21, 2011). The 
taxpayer was a State A resident who attended college in Virginia. In March 2004, the taxpayer 
obtained a Virginia driver's license. After graduating in May 2004, the taxpayer returned to State 
A. In June 2005, the taxpayer returned to Virginia and married a nonresident military service 
member, who was domiciled in State A. The couple moved into a residence in Virginia because 
the service member was stationed in an adjacent state. The taxpayer obtained full-time 
employment and registered a motor vehicle in Virginia. The taxpayer. renewed her Virginia 
driver's license and registered to vote in Virginia in 2008. In April 2010, the taxpayer transferred 
ownership of a motor vehicle. to the service member and the vehicle was registered in State A. 
She also surrendered her Virginia driver's license for a State A driver's license while continuing. 
to reside in Virginia. The taxpayer filed a claim for refund of nonresident withholding tax for the 
2009 taxable year. The tax Department denied the claim on the basis that the taxpayer. 
abandoned her State A domicile in 2005, and no longer shared the same domicile as the service 
member. The taxpayer appealed the refund denial, contending she was complying with Virginia 
laws when obtaining aoVirginia driver's license and registering to vote in Virginia, and she never 
intended to establish domicile in Virginia. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the 
refund denial. 
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act provides that military and naval personnel do not 
abandon their legal domicile solely by complying. with military orders that station them in a 
different state or country whether permanently or temporarily. The Act did not apply to the 
spouses of military and naval personnel before 2009. The Tax Department has ruled that 
residency status of a taxpayer requires analysis separate from their military spouse. In Virginia 
Tax Bulletin (VTB) 10-1 (1/29/2010), the Tax Department explained that the domicile of a 
military spouse must be the same as the service member in order to be exempt from Virginia's 
income tax. The determination of a military spouse's domicile requires analysis of the facts and 
circumstances. The elements that may be examined include: 
1. Whether the person claiming exemption is married to a service 
member who is present in Virginia pursuant to military orders. 
2. The service member's domicile. 
3. The spouse's domicile and the circumstatices in which it was 
established. 
4. The extent to which the spouse has maintained contacts with the 
domicile. 
5. Whether the spouse has taken any action in Virginia that is 
inconsistent with maintaining a domicile elsewhere. 
In his examinations of the taxpayer's facts and circumstances, the Tax Commissioner determined 
that the taxpayer took sufficient steps to establish a Virginia domicile while abandoning all 
relevant connections with State A by 2008. 
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( 41. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-119 (June 24, 2011). The 
taxpayer married a service member while they both served in the military in State A. Both were 
released from active duty, but the service member joined another branch of the military service 
in 2003. The taxpayer retired from his full-time employment in 2002. In July 2006, the service 
member was assigned to a duty station in State B, which borders Virginia. The taxpayer and the 
service member purchased a condominium, registered to vote, obtained driver's licenses, and 
registered a motor vehicle in Virginia. In late 2009, the service member was transferred to a 
duty station abroad. Before moving, both the taxpayer and the service member surrendered their 
Virginia driver's licenses and voter's registrations. They also moved all their personal items to 
State A. In December 2009, they obtained driver's licenses and registered to vote in State A. 
The Virginia condominium was sold in January 2010 .. The taxpayer filed a refund claim for 
nonresident withholding tax for the 2009 taxable year. Under review, the Tax Department 
disallowed the military spouse exemption because he was a domiciliary resident of Virginia. In 
, addition, the Tax Department changed the 2009 Virginia income tax return to a resident return 
and issued an assessment. The taxpayer filed an appeal contending he was an eligible spouse of 
an active duty service member. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld both the refund 
claim denial and the assessment. The basis for this decision was that the taxpayer was a 
domiciliary resident of Virginia in 2009. Lesson: Before you-request a refund for a client, make 
sure your client is not vulnerable to an assessment. The request for refund may cost your client. 
42. Domicile. P.D. 11-120 (June 30, 2011). The Tax Department was 
notified by the IRS that the taxpayer received financial statements at a Virginia address for the 
2007 taxable year. Under audit, the Tax Department found that the taxpayer received financial 
statements at multiple post office boxes in Virginia and in State A. Because the taxpayer held a 
Virginia' driver's license and owned motor vehicles registered in Virginia, the' Tax Department 
concluded that the taxpayer was a domiciliary resident of Virginia. As a result, the Tax 
Department issued an assessment for tax, penalty and interest. The taxpayer appealed the 
assessment contending that during 2007 she and her husband were in transition between Virginia 
and State A while their Virginia home was under construction. The Tax Commissioner 
determined that the taxpayer was a resident of Virginia for the 2007 year. Query: There are not 
enough facts in this ruling to judge whether the correct decision was made. However, the 
presence of a key faet is never mentioned. ' The Tax Commissioner mentioned that there' is no 
evidence that the home under construction was completed in 2007. Assuming it was not, did the 
taxpayers reside in Virginia? Was the taxpayer ever a domiciliary resident of State A? 
43. Domicile. P.D. 11-129 (July 20,2011). The taxpayer and his wife moved 
to State A in 1995. For many years, the wife had been diagnosed with a debilitating disease for 
which she has been receiving treatment in State B, which borders Virginia.. The taxpayers 
maintained a residence in Virginia where they would return in order for the wife to receive 
treatments. Eventually, the wife moved to Virginia permanently while the taxpayer continued to 
. travel back and forth to State A. The Tax Department audited the taxpayer and concluded that he 
established a domiciliary residence in Virginia. Assessments for additional individual' income 
tax and interest were issued for the 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The taxpayer appealed the 
assessments contending .he continues to maintain his domicile inState A. The Tax 
Commissioner agreed with the' taxpayer and. abated the assessment. Even though it was 
determined that the taxpayer rented his home in State A, he maintained all of his other 
27 
connections to State A. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer demonstrated no 
intent to abandon his State A domicile. 
44. Military Wages. P.D. 11-133 (July 25,2011). The taxpayer, a resident of 
Vrrginia, claimed subtractions froni the federal. adjusted gross income for' National. Guard and 
combat duty pay on his 2007 Virginia individual income tax. return. He also claimed 
subtractions for National Guard compensation, combat duty pay, and basic military, wages on 
the 2008 return. Under audit, the Tax Department disallowed the subtraction for combat duty 
pay and National Guard compensation arid allowed subtractions for basic military pay. As a 
result, the· Tax Department issued assessments for additional tax and interest for the taxable years 
at issue. The taxpayer appealed the assessments contending that Virginia statutes allow a 
military servicemember who meets the qualifications to claim multiple military subtractions. 
Title 58.1 of the Code of Virginia provides three subtractions for military compensation. 
Military servicemembers may be eligible for a subtraction for: (1) military pay and allowances 
earned while serving in a combat zone or qualified hazardous duty area (Va~ Code § 58.1-
322(C)(23)); (2) military basic pay for personnel on extended active duty for periods in excess of 
90 days (Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(21)); and (3) wages or salaries received for active and inactive 
service in the National Guard of the Commonwealth (Va. Code § 58.1-322(C)(11)). 
Servicemembers may be eligible for more than one subtraction, but the same income may not be 
included in more than one subtraction. In other words, a servicemember may not deduct the 
same income for both the military basic pay subtraction and the National Guard subtraction. All 
of the subtractions under Va. Code § 58.1-322(C) are prefaced by the words "To the extent 
included in federal adjusted gross income." No military compensation excluded from F AGI can 
be used to claim a military subtraction in computing Virginia taxable income. 
After examining the taxpayer's records,· the Tax. Commissioner ordered certain 
adjustments to the audit. The taxpayer's W-2 provided detail of the excluded combat duty or 
qualified hazardous duty pay but did not provide the detail required to ascertain the officer's 
active service pay from any. taxable combat duty pay. . Without such detail, the. Tax 
Commissioner could not determine if combat duty or a qualified hazardous duty pay was 
included in the FAGL Therefore, the taxpayer was allowed to present such detail to the Tax 
Department within 30 days. 
Virginia Code § 58.1-322(C)(1l) allows a subtraction of wages or salaries received by 
any person for active and inactive service in the National Guard of the· Commonwealth of 
Virginia. The amount of the subtraction is the lesser of the amount of National Guard income 
received not to exceed the amount of income from 39 calendar days of service, or $3,000. 
National Guard personnel may only claim the subtraction if their rank is captain (03) and below. 
The taxpayer provided evidence of his membership as a captain in the Commonwealth's National 
Guard; however the National Guard income subtraction was disallowed because the income basis 
was the same as the basis used, to calculate the basic military pay. After calculating the 
taXpayer's military basic pay subtraction, the remaining inilitary income exceeded the $3,000 
. subtraction. Although this income was included in the formula for calculating the military basic 
pay subtraction, it was not included in the amount actually subtracted. The Tax Commiossioner 
determined that this remaining income was eligible for the National Guard .su~tractions and not 
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subject to double exclusion and the subtraction is In accordance with Va. Code § 58.1-
322(C)(11 ). 
45. Itemized Deductions. P.D. 11-140 (August 2, 2011). The Tax 
Department adjusted the taxpayers' itemized deductions reported on their 2010 Virginia income 
tax return resulting in a reduction of the taxpayers' refund. The taxpayers appealed the 
adjustments to the mortgage interest deduction, cash and non-cash charitable gifts, and' 
unreimbursed employee expenses contending they provided adequate documentation to claim the 
deductions. The Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment to allow the mortgage deduction 
and certain charitable gifts based on provided documentation. However, the non-cash gifts were 
disallowed as the taxpayers did not produce an appraisal which is required under Treas. Reg. 
§ 1. 170A-13( c)(1). (A taxpayer must obtain a qualified appraisal to substantiate the donation of 
similar items that have an aggregated value of greater than $5,000.) The Tax Commissioner also 
disallowed the deduction fo~ mileage for the taxpayers commute to work. 
46. Innocent Spouse. P.D. 11-144. (August 5, 2011). The taxpayer separated 
from her spouse during 2008. and divorced in 2010. The spouse electronically filed a joint 
Virginia indIvidual income tax return for the 2008 taxable year and a refund was issued. The 
taxpayer filed a separate Virginia individual income tax return and paid the balance due. The 
Tax Department processed the taxpayer's return and issued an assessment to the taxpayer to 
recover the refund issued from the joint return. The taxpayer appealed .the assessment 
cOIitending she did not agree to file a joint 2008 return and is not liable for the balance due 
related to the filling of the joint Virginia return. The Tax Commissioner agreed and abated the 
assessment. Evidence provided by the taxpayer demonstrated that she never agreed to file a joint 
Virginia income tax return with her spouse. Because the joint return was filed without her 
permission and she appropriately filed a separate Virginia return reporting .her separate tax 
liability; the taxpayer would not be jointly liable for any assessment resulting from the joint 
return. 
47. Carryback of Net Operating Loss Deduction. P.D.11-1S0 (August 26, 
2011). The taxpayers incurred'a net operating loss (NOL) on their 2008 federaltncome tax 
return. For federal income tax purposes, the taxpayers carried back the 2008 NOL to their 2004 
through 2006 income tax returns. Because Virginia does not conform to this federal five-year 
NOL carryback rule, the taxpayers carried back the 2008 NOL to the 2006 taxable year .. The 
Tax Department processed the 2006 amended return but could not issue a refund because the 
taxpayers had claimed a credit for taxes paid to State A on their original return and all taxes paid . 
to Virginia had been refunded. The taxpayers requested permission to apply the 2008 NOL to 
the 2007 taxable year. The Tax Commissioner denied this request. 
Under Virginia's conformity with federal statutes, the Tax Commissioner noted that the 
taxpayers properly carried the 2008 NOL back to the 2006 taxable year. The entire amount of 
the 2008 NOL was used to reduce the taxpayers' 2006 F AGI. As a result, the taxpayers' 2006 
Virginia tax liability was reduce4 and the taxpayers did receive the tax benefit of the 2008 NOL 
according to the Tax Commissioner. The taxpayers asserted that the interaction between State 
A's tax laws and Virginia policy cause the taxpayers to lose the tax benefit of-the NOL. Under 
State A's rules, nomesidents are required to make an addition for NOLs occurring in other states. 
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Thus, the taxpayers' 2006 State A tax liability was not reduced by the 2008 NOL. Likewise, 
because the out-of-state tax credit offset their Virginia liability in its entirety, the taxpayers were 
not able to claim a refund of Virginia income tax as a result of the 2008 NOL carryback. 
Because they did not receive the tax benefit from the 2008 NOL, the taxpayers asserted that they -
should be able to carry the NOL forward to the 2007 taxable year for Virginia income tax 
purposes. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that under the federal statutes to which Virginia 
conforms, however, the 2008 NOLD would not be permitted to be carried forward because it was 
used in its entirety to reduce F AGI for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayers did receive the 
benefit of a reduced Virginia income tax liability for the 2006 taxable year even though they did 
not realize an additional refund as a result of the credit for taxes paid to State A. Therefore, the 
taxpayers were not allowed to carry forward the 2008 NOL to their 2007 Virginia income tax 
return. ' 
48. . Land Preservation Credit Devaluation., P.D. 11-154 & P.D. 11-155 
(August 30, 2011). VALLCplirchased a hrrge tract of-undeveloped land in a rural Virginia 
locality in June 2002. At the time of purchase, the land was' zoned for agricultural- -and low 
density single family residential uses. In December 2004, V ALLC conveyed a conservation 
easement on approximately 64% of the tract to a nonprofit organization. Pursuant to the 
conveyance of the easement, V ALLC registered its donation with the Tax Department for 
purposes of the Land Preservation Credit (the "Credit"). Subsequently, V ALLC transferred a 
portions of the Credit to another pass-through entity based on an appraisal that valued the 
easement at approximately four times the purchase price of the entire property .. The remaining 
portion of the Credit was passed through to V ALLC's members. 
Under examination, the Tax Department prepared an appraisal that reduced the value of 
the easement. The Tax Department revalued the Credit based on this appraisal and issued 
assessments against the entities that received the transferred Credits. V ALLC appealed -the 
revaluation of the Credit contending its appraiser followed the accepted professional standards 
and the easement was properly valued in V ALLC's appraisal. Subsequent to V ALLC's appeal, 
the Tax Department commissioned appraisals from two different third party appraisers. After 
examining the appraisals, V ALLC amended its appeal, arguing that its appraisal most fairly 
valued the easement. 
V ALLC's. appraiser appraised the value of the property prior to the -easement at 
approximately $36 million and valued it after the easement at $5 million, resulting in the value of 
the easement at approximately $31 million. The appraiser used a "discounted cash flow 
analysis" to determine the value of the easement. The appraiser describes the "discounted cash 
flow analysis" as a combination of using the cost approach, the income approach and the sales 
comparison approach. The appraiser used individual waterfront lot sales -in various counties 
throughout Virginia as sales comparisons. The appraiser estimated that the 81 lots would- sell out 
in 2 ~ years while appreciating at two percent per month. The appraiser stated that infrastructure 
would be funded through a community development authority. The appraiser then added in the 
timber value. The Tax Department's examination revealed numerous problems with V ALLC's 
appraisal. There were no sales comparisons with other large 'acreage sales as comparisons. 
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Instead, the appraiser used comparisons of individual waterfront lots located in other counties, 
incomplete sales data, and does not support his adjustments. The supporting documentation for 
proposed development costs was not complete and no support was provided to show that a 
conimunity development authority would be formed or would fund such infrastructure. The land 
was part of a larger purchase that was acquired in 2002 for approximately $2,850 per acre. In 
December 2004, the appraiser's value of the property prior to conveyance of the easement is . 
$22,300 per acre. Such an increase presumes that either V ALLC purchased the property at 
significantly below its fair market value or the subject property appreciated by almost eight times 
the purch8$e price in approximately 2Y2 years. No evidence in the appraisal supported either 
conclusion. 
The Tax Department commissioned two independent third party appraisals subsequent to 
V ALLC's appeal. After reviewing these appraisals, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
appraisal prepared by one of the third party appraisers most accurately reflected the value of the 
subject easement. The third party appraiser valued the property prior to the easement at 
$8,275,000 and valued it after the easement at $4,375,000, resulting in the value of the easement 
of $3,900,000. The third party appraiser used the sales comparison approach with four 
comparables that ranged in size form 298 to 653 acres with water frontage. The value per acre 
ranged from $3,272 to $8,551 before easement. The third party appraiser then looked at the sale 
of four comparable properties that sold with limited development potential. The. third party. 
appraiser then made some significant adjustments based on the location, size and physical 
characteristics of these properties. The range of the sales price before adjustments was $965 to 
$1,339 per acre. After the adjustments were made, the appraiser determined that the value of the 
subject property after the easement is $2,700 per acre. The third party appraiser's value of the 
property before the easement appeared reasonable to the Tax Commissioner and had the best 
comparables and best analysis in the Tax Commissioner's opinion. The value after the easement 
is well .above the comparables, and the percentage of diminution appeared reasonable to the Tax 
Commissioner. Accordingly, the Tax Commissioner determined that the appraisal by the third 
party appraiser represented the most accurate valuation of the easement and upheld the 
assessments. 
Comment: Based .on the ruling, V ALLC' s appraisal sounded as if it had major flaws. 
In particular, the lack of an analysis using the sales comparison approach with comparable sales 
was likely fatal to this appraisal. The Tax Commissioner probably· did not have a difficult 
decision on whether to reject V ALLC's appraisal. However, language in the ruling is troubling 
for future appeals. The Tax Commissioner stated that the third party appraiser's value seemed 
reasonable. What is reasonable? Who in the Tax Department is qualified to make such a 
determination? When determining· reasonableness, what is the standard? The Tax Department 
does not employ a licensed appraiser. This ruling gives a window into the analyses that should 
be included in an appraisal but also creates a question of how to determine what is reasonable. 
49. Hurricane Irene. P.D. 11-156 (September 9, 2011). The Tax 
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-9 to provide a one week filing and payment extension to 
certain individuals and businesses affected by Hurricane Irene. 
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50. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. P.D. 11-158 (September 16, 2011). 
The taxpayer, a resident of State A, married a military service member domiciled and stationed 
in State B in July 2001. In May 2006, the service member was assigned to a duty station in State 
C.· The taxpayer and the service member moved to Virginia. The taxpayer filed a special claim 
for refund to receive her income tax withholding for the 2009 taxable year. The Tax Department 
denied the refund on the basis that the taxpayer did not share a domicile with her husband prior 
to residing in Virginia. Therefore, she did not qualify for the relief under the Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act (the "Act"). The taxpayer appealed the denial of the refund contending that both 
she and the service member were domiciliary residents of State A. The Act provides that 
military and naval personnel do not abandon their legal domicile solely by complying with 
military orders that station them in a different state or country whether permanently or 
temporarily. The Act did not apply to the spouses of military and naval.personnelbefore 2009. 
The Tax Department has ruled that residency status of a taxpayer requires analysis separate from 
their military spouse. In Virginia Tax Bulletin (VTB) 10-1 (1/29/2010), the Tax Department 
explained that the do,rucile of a military spouse must be the same as the service member in order 
to be exempt from Virginia's income tax. The determination of a military spouse's domicile 
requires analysis of the facts and circumstances. The Tax Commissioner examined the facts and 
circumstances of the taxpayer and her spouse and determined that her spouse was not domiciled 
in State A. The service member demonstrated. his intent to abandon State B by registering his 
motor vehicles, registering to vote, and electing to withholding individual income tax in State A. 
However, the documents provided to the Tax Commissioner indicated he never physically 
resided in State A. Therefore he was never a resident of State A. . 
51. Domicile. P.D. 11-159 (September 19, 2011). The Tax Department 
received information from the IRS that the taxpayer received wages that may be subject to 
Virginia income tax. The Tax Department requested information from the taxpayer to determine 
her Virginia taxable income. When no response was received, the Tax Department issued 
assessments for the 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The taxpayer appealed the assessments 
contending that she was employed as a·travel nurse and did not receive income from Virginia' 
sources, nor did she reside in Virginia during the taxable years in question. The taxpayer 
admitted that she did not change her residency from Virgini~. and she paid income tax to the 
states in which the income was earned. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessments as the 
taxpayer failed to abandon her domicile. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
No recent opinions. 
III. RETAIL SALES AND USE TAXES 
·A. 2011 Legislation 
1. Registration with Local Commissioners of Revenue. fJouse Bill 2183 
(Chapter 663) and Senate Bi111226 (Chapter 674) amend~d Va. Code §§ 58.1-604.2 and 58.1-
613 to authorize local commissioners of the revenue to allow dealers seeking ~o register for the 
general Retail Sales and Use Tax and out-of-state contractors who are subject to the special use 
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tax in Virginia the option of registering with the local commissioner of the revenue, rather than 
registering with the Tax Commissioner. The local commissioner would be required to follow the 
guidelines, rules, or procedures set forth by the Tax Commissioner in providing these services. 
This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. . 
2. Contractors: Sale and Installation of Financial Institution Security. House 
Bill 1524 (Chapter 360) amended Va. Code § 58.1-610 to treat any business primarily engaged 
in the furnishing and installation of tangible personal property that provides electronic or 
physical security on real property used by fmancial institutions as a retailer of such property for 
the purpose of the Retail Sales and Use Tax. As a retailer, the business would be required to 
collect the tax from purchasers of the tangible personal property providing security, rather than 
the business paying the tax on its purchase of the materials, even in situations in which such 
property is installed on real estate that is not for the use of a financial institution. This legislation 
was effective on July 1, 201}. 
3. Fanners Market Exemption. House Bill 1942 (Chapter 466) amended Va. 
Code §§ 58.1-609.2 and 58.1-1707 to provide an exemption from the Retail Sales and Use Tax 
for agricultural produce and eggs when such items are raised and sold by an individual at retail in 
local farmers markets and at roadside stands, provided that the annual sales by the agricultural 
producer do not exceed $1,000.· The legislation also provides a litter tax exemption for 
individuals who raise and sell agricultural produce in local fanners markets and at roadside 
stands and individuals who sell eggs in local farmers markets or at roadside stands; and whose 
annual income from such sales does not exceed $1 ;000, provided that the container the producer 
provides. to hold purchased items has been previously used. This. legislation was effective on 
July 1, 2011. 
4. Spaceport Exemption. Senate Bill 965 (Chapter 286) amended Va. Code 
§ 58.1-609.3 to remove the sunset date of the Retail Sales and Use Tax exemption for space 
facilities, space propulsion systems, satellites, space vehicles, space stations, and related items 
used to conduct "spaceport activities." The exemption was set to expire on July I, 2011. 
5. Exemption for Certain Drilling Equipment Senate Bill. 1343 (Chapter 
183) amended Va. Code § 58.1-609.3 to extend the sunset date for the Retail Sales and Use Tax 
exemption for machinery, tools, and equipmeJJ.tused in the extraction of natural gas or oil from· 
July 1,2011 to July 1,2016. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
No recent court decisions. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Aesthetic Injectable Implants .. P.D. 10-243 (October 21, 2010). The 
taxpayer requested .a reconsideration ofa prior appeal in which the Tax Commissioner 
determined that the sale of aesthetic injectable implants was subject to the sales tax. In its 
request for reconsideration, the taxpayer contended that the aesthetic injectable implants are 
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prescribed and used to treat lipoatrophy resulting from drug therapy used in the treatment in 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) patients. As such, the taxpayer contended the implants 
are used for medically necessary treatments and not only for cosmetic purposes. The Tax 
Commissioner upheld the prior determination. Virginia. Code § 58.1-609.10(10) provides an 
exemption for "prosthetic devices. and ... other durable medical equipment . and devices, and 
related parts and supplies specifically designed for those products ... When such items or parts 
are purchased by or on behalf of an individual for use by such individual." Prosthetic devices are 
defmed in Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code 10-210-940 to mean "devices which 
replace a missing part or function of the body and shall include any supplies physically 
connected to sUCih devices." The 'Tax Commissioner· was . not persuaded by the taxpayer's 
argument. He determined that the aesthetic injectable implant used to enhance a patient's facial 
appearance by restoring the skin's volume does not qualify for exemption from the tax as the 
implant is a cosmetic treatment rather than the replacement of missing body part or function of 
the body for medical purpo~es. 
2. Manufacturing Exemption: Purging' Compounds. P.D. 10-244 (October 
21, 2010). The taxpayer manufactures products made of plastic resins. The taxpayer utilizes 
molds and injection molding machinery in its production process. The injection molding 
machines are used to manufacture products of different colors and resin formulas. Each machine 
can produce different products and colors but only one product color or resin formula can be 
manufactured during a particular production run. Prior to a color or resin formula change for the 
next production run, the taxpayer uses purging compounds to purge or remove from. the 
machines' injection lines the resin used in the previous production run. The cleaning of the 
. injection lines occurs between production runs so production must be stopped before the' 
cleaning takes place. The taxpayer was audited by the Tax Department and appealed an 
assessment of use tax on purchases of purging compounds used to clean production machinery. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the purging compounds' do not qualify for the' 
manufacturing exemption as the cleaning process cannot be an integral part of the taxpayer's 
production process because' production or manufacturing is not occurring when the cleaning is 
performed. 
3. Credit for Use Tax Paid by Customers. P.D. 10-248 (November 4,2010). 
The taxpayer is a furniture manufacturer. An audit resulted in the aSsessment of sales tax on 
untaxed sales. The taxpayer contests the tax assessed on sales made to two customers because it 
claims that these customers self-assessed the use tax owed on the untaxed sales' made by the 
taxpayer during the audit period. The taxpayer asks for a credit equal to the use tax claimed to 
be paid by the two customers on the untaxed sales for the entire audit period. This requested 
credit would exceed the amount of the sales tax liability applicable only to the untaxed sales of· 
the two customers in question. The Tax Commissioner denied the taxpayer's request for a credit 
as the information submitted to claim the credit was incomplete. The taxpayer did not provide a 
signed ·and dated statement from either customer certifying that (i) the listings provided show all 
of the untaxed sales made by the taxpayer during the taxpayer's audit period, (ii) such customer 
correctly reported and remitted all of the consumer use tax owed to the Department of Taxation 
on such untaxed sales for the audit period in question, and. (iii) such remitted use tax was 
correctly computed based on the taxable sales price of all such untaxed sales of tangible personal 
property made by the taxpayer to such customer during the audit period in question. 
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Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner overruled a 1990 ruling (P.D. 90-76) that 
granted permission for the hotel to calculate sales tax refunds for exempt rooms on the first day 
of each month based on the least number of rooms occupied· during the previous ninety day 
period. In essence, the method in P.D. 90;.76 created a cutoff point on the first day of each 
month for counting the number of days that the hotel's rooms are occupied. In· the instant ruling, 
the Tax Commissioner disagreed that nip,ety day periods can be set starting with the first day of 
each month for purposes of administering this exemption. The Tax Commissioner stated that 
under the statute, a room must be occupied for more than ninety continuous days to qualify for 
the exemption. The Tax Commissioner also noted that the statute does not state that a specific 
method should be used to count consecutive days and it does not. limit the ninety continuous day 
requirement in any way. 
5. Mouth Guards. P.D. 10-254 (November 12,2010). The taxpayer sells a 
line of custom fitted sports mouth guards. In instances where a dental patient would like to 
purchase a mouth guard, the patient's dentist will take an impression of the patient's teeth and 
send the impression to the manufacturer of the mouth guards. The manufacturer will produce a 
mouth guard in one of three versions: a mouthpiece designed for the most comfortable fit to be . 
used in non-contact sports; a mouth guard with a strap designed to off~r additional protection for· 
contact sports; a mouth guard without a strap to offer additional protection for contact sports . 
. The taxpayer requested a ruling regarding whether one or more of these versions is an exempt 
dental service, a prescription medical device, a prosthetic device,. or safety gear. If the provision 
of the mouth guards is deemed to be a sale of tangible personal property, rather than a dental 
service, the taxpayer inquires whether it can acc'ept a resale exemption certificate from the 
dentist and whether. the dentist should charge sales tax on the sale to the patient. The Tax 
Commissioner opined that the mouth guards do not meet the definition of durable medical 
equipment to qualify for an exemption. The mouth' guards do not appear to serve a medical 
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purpose because they are not used to address some illness or injury; are for use by the patients in 
sporting events, not in the homes of the patients as required; and, are used to prevent injury to 
those participating in sports, and are also designed to improve athletic performance., On, the 
taxpayer's second question, the Tax Commissioner responded that dentists, should provide a' 
resale exemption certificate and then charge sales tax on'the sale to the patient. 
6. Charcoal Briquettes. P.D. 10-259 (November 19, 2010). The taxpayer 
requested a ruling on whether charcoal briquettes qualify for the exemption provided under Va. 
Code § 58.1-609.10(1). Charcoal briquettes that are the subject of the ruling request are 
predomfuately sold in consumer sized bags at retail stores. They are advertised as fuel for use on 
an outdoor grill and are strictly meant for cooking. The ruling request stated that the charcoal 
briquettes are not used for heating a home, nor can they be used for cooking inside the home. 
The Tax Commissioner opined that the charcoal briquettes do not qualify for the exemption 
provided under Va. Code § ';;8.1-609.10(1). Virginia Code § 58.1-609.10 1 specifically states the 
types of fuels that are subject to the exemption and do not provide for the exemption to apply to 
other products, ,such as charcoal briquettes, used as fuel for home heating purposes or for 
cooking and heating water. 
7. Pollution Control Exemption & Direct Pay Permits. P.D. 10-262 
(D~cember 14,2010). The taxpayer is a workwear and textile services company. As a result of 
an audit, the taxpayer was assessed the tax on untaxed sales and purchases. The taxpayer 
contests the ,tax assessed on (i) chemicals for use in the taxpayer's wastewater system, and (ii) 
sales for which the taxpayer had direct pay permits on file from its customers~ The Tax 
Commissioner adjusted the assessment to remove sales for which the taxpayer had direct pay 
permits on file. The auditor initially included the sales because the permits 'were not valid. The 
Tax Commissioner accepted the same permits. The Tax Commissioner upheld the tax assessed 
on the purchase of the chemicals for use ill the taxpayer's wastewater system as the chemicals 
were not certified as certified pollution control equipment as required by Virginia Code § 58.1-
3660. 
8. Related. Entity Purchases and Government Contract. P.D. 10-263 
(December 15, 2010). The taxpayer is an' information technology services business that 
performs contract work for the federal government. The taxpayer was audited and assessed use 
tax on various purchases, some of which were made in connection with government contracts. 
The taxpayer appealed and maintajned that the. audit erroneously includes use tax assessed on 
purchases that were made by related but separate entities.' 'The taxpayer contended that 
purchases, made in connection with certain government contracts qualify for the resale exemption . 
because the true object of the contracts was the sale of tangible personal property to the federal 
government. The Tax CoIllIllissioner .upheld the assessment as the taXpayer did not provide 
sufficient information proving that the purchases were made by related entities and the true 
object of the government contracts were the purchase of tangible personal property. 
9. Information Services. P.D. 10-264 (December 15,2010). The taxpayer is 
engaged in providing commercial information about the financial condition of businesses. The 
taxpayer maintains a database for customers to access fmnographic and fmancial information to 
. evaluate credit and supplier risk. For the new service offering, a paying subscriber will be able 
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to access a global database via the Internet to perfonn searches and create customized reports of 
summary trade data, basic credit scores, legal filings, and general company infonnation. The 
subscriber may also purchase upgraded data packages and workflow add-ons. For an additional 
fees, the taxpayer offers six upgraded data packages that provide access to various additional 
data for viewing online or using to generate a report. The additional fee for an upgraded data 
package is included in the total annual subscription fee if purchased simultaneously with the core 
service offering. If purchased ata later date, the upgraded data package is invoiced separately. 
In addition to upgraded data packages, the taxpayer offers workflow add-ons for an additional 
fee that is separately invoiced. The workflow add-ons are web based tools providing a variety of 
functionalities for customers. Customers receive no software. The taxpayer requested a ruling 
on the sales tax implications of providing this service. The Tax Commissioner opined that the· 
taxpayer is only providing nontaxable services to its customer and should not. collect any' sales 
tax. The Tax Commissioner also noted that the taxpayer will be liable for sales and use tax on 
purchases of tangible persol!al property that is used in providing these services. 
. 10. Prescription Drug Exemption. P.D. 10-267 (December 16, 2010). The 
taxpayer operates a medical practice. The taxpayer was audited and assessed tax on untaxed . 
purchases of tangible personal property for use in its practice. At issue is the'tax assessed on the 
taxpayer's purchase of an injectable tuberculin antigen used to screen for tuberculosis. The 
auditor concluded that the tuberculin antigen is subject to the tax based on Public Document 
(P .D.) 91-178 (8/23/91). The taxpayer appealed and maintained that the injectable tuberculin 
antigen is exempt from the tax as are vaccines and other 'prescription drugs. The Tax, 
Commissioner adjusted the assessment by removing the injectable tuberculin antigen after 
discovering the Food and Drug Administration (the."FDA") guidelines and the Virginia Board of 
Phannacy classify it as a prescription drug. 
11. Glass Sold With and Without Installation. P.D. 10-280 (December 22, 
2010). The taxpayer is a glass and glazier contractor that also sells mirrors and other products at 
retail. The taxpayer maintains a retail shop where inventory of glass, hardware and various 
metal extrusions are maintained. The taxpayer seils windows, products for maintenance of glass 
and glass products, shower doors for replacement; and shower enclosures, many of which 'are 
special order items. All items are available for pickup by customers or may be installed by the 
taxpayer. The taxpayer indicates that all items become real property upon installation either by 
the customer or by the taxpayer. The taxpayer .collects sales tax on retail sales of tangible 
personal property sold without installation. For all installed sales, the taxpayer remits the use tax 
on the. cost of materials and supplies used. The taxpayer requested a ruling verifying that it was 
collecting, remitting, and paying the proper sales and use tax. The Tax Commissioner verified 
the taxpayer's tax collection practice and briefly discussed the sales and use tax rules concerning 
real property contractors. 
12. Interstate Commerce: Contract Carrier or Common Carrier. P.D. 11-06 
(January 14, 2011). The taxpayer is a manufacturer of concrete structural materials who was 
assessed with additional sales tax based on sales the taxpayer claimed were exempt. The 
taxpayer claimed that F.O.B. origin transactions held in the four-month sales sample constitute 
exempt sales in interstate commerce. According to the taxpayer, the carrier in these contested 
transactions is registered as an interstate carrier and delivered the taxpayer's product from the 
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taxpayer's Virginia plant to its North Carolina customer. The taxpayer appealed the assessment 
and the TaX Commissioner upheld the assessment. In the appeal, the Tax Commissioner found 
that the shipping terms for the taxpayer's products were F.O.B. shipping point in Virginia and 
the buyer assumed all costs and liabilities related to the shipping of the product~. However, the 
taxpayer argued that the products were shipped to the buyer via common carrier as the carrier is 
registered as an interstate carrier with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The Tax 
Commissioner determined that there is no evidence that such carrier operated in the capacity of a 
common carrier under the common definitions of a "common carrier." Instead, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the carrier operated as a contract carner. for the contested 
deliveries based on the facts presented. 
13. Fancy Soap is not Medicine. P.D. 11-07 (January 20, 2011). A taxpayer 
requested a ruling on whether the sale of antibacterial gels, soaps, and sanitizers, including 
antibacterial hand soaps, antibacterial hand gels, antibacterial hand sprays, antibacterial hand 
lotions, antibacterial hanl wipes, hand gel sanitizers, conditioning hand sanitizers, hand 
sanitizers, and antibacterial hand foams are exempt under the exemption for nonprescription 
drugs and proprietary medicines. The Tax Commissioner had previously opined in. a Tax 
Bulletin that the exemption does not apply to cosmetics, toilet articles, devices, food products 
and supplements, or vitamins and mineral concentrates sold as dietary supplements (except when 
sold pursuant to a written prescription by a licensed physician). The Tax .Commissioner 
determined that the taxpayer's antibacterial products are deemed cosmetics or toiletry articles 
and are subject to the sales tax. 
14. . Burden of Proof. P.D. 11-08 (January 20,2011). In an exceptionally long 
determination, the Tax Commissioner adjusted an audit on a variety of issues. In this appeal, 
there was no overriding issue. However, the one point that can be learned is that the taxpayer 
has the burden of proof when appealing an assessment. Pursuant to Va. Code section 58.1-
205(1), any assessment issued by the Department is deemed prima facie correct. IIi addition, a 
taxpayer has the burden of proving an exemption from a tax regardless of whether the transaction 
is for the sale or purchase of tangible personal property. Convincing evidence must be provided 
to the Tax Department in support of any exemption cl8.im. 
15. Fabrication. P.D. 11-09 (January 21, 2011). A professional longarm 
quilter who owns an industrial sized quilting machine requested a ruling on whether the service it 
provides is subject to sales tax. The taxpayer's clients bring completed quilt tops to the taxpayer, 
along with the backing fabric and batting that goes in between the two layers. The taxpayer puts 
the three pieces together by quilting all three layers in a design agreed upon with the clients. The 
quilted piece is returned to the clients with one edge still open. The clients place binding around 
the. perimeter of the quilt after the quilt is returned to them by the taxpayer. The taxpayer stated 
that the majority of the total cost to its clients is for labor. The only material used by the 
taxpayer is thread, which represents about 2 to 3 percent of the total cost. In instances where the 
taxpayer provides the batting to its customers, the taxpayer charges its customers separately for 
the batting. The Tax Commissioner determined that the services provided by the taxpayer 
should be considered fabrication and subject to sales tax. Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative 
Code (V AC) 10-210-560(A) defines "fabrication" as "An operation which changes the form or 
state of tangible personal property ... " Furthermore, Title 23 VAC 10-21D-560(B) states, "A 
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person regularly engaged in the fabrication of tangible personal property for sale at retail must 
collect and pay the tax on the sales price of the property." 
16. Government Contractor. P.D. 11-10 (January 21, 2011). The taxpayer 
was assessed with sales tax on charges for the hosting and maintenance of a database website for 
use· by the government and for charges for exhibits furnished to a. federal agency. The Tax 
Commissioner reviewed each of the contracts and. determined that sales tax was not due on the 
,charges and removed them from the audit. For the hosting and maintenance charges, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the true object of the task orders was for the provision of exempt 
services to the federal government. As a service provider, a taxpayer is generally liable for sales 
tax on its purchases of tangible personal property used or consumed in the performance of such 
services. However, the Tax Commissioner found that the taxpayer did not purchase any tangible 
personal property to use in the provision of the services and therefore did not owe any additional 
sales and use tax as a result of providing these services. As to the charges for the exhibits, the 
Tax Commissioner reviewed the contract and determined that it Was a contract for the provision 
of tangible personal property despite the incidental services that were provided with the exhibits. 
17.' Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-11 (January 21,2011). The taxpayer 
was assessed with additional sales and use tax on various expenses and fixed· asset purchases that 
the taxpayer claimed were exempt under the manufacturing exemption. The Tax Commissioner 
determined' that none· of the items qualified for the manufacturing exemption and upheld the 
assessment. Each group is addressed below: 
• The auditor determined that the forklifts were being used to 
perform construction renovations at a new facility owned by the 
taxpayer. Despite the taxpayer's argument that the forklifts would 
be used in an exempt activity upon the opening of the new facility, 
the Tax Commissioner found that the forklifts were being used in a 
taxable manner. . 
• The Tax Commissioner also concluded that floor scrubbers are not 
exempt under the manufacturing exemption even if' they are 
essential to the cleanliness of the facility. 
• The taxpayer used storage racks to store finished products. As the 
products were finished, the Tax Commissioner determined that the 
storage racks were not used directly in the manufacturing process .. 
• Purchases of various it.ems such as t091s, cleaners, lubricants, floor 
brushes, light bulbs, maintenance supplies, and construction 
. materials were. deemed taxable as they were also not used directly 
in the manufacturing process. 
In addition to the manufacturing exemption issues, the Tax Commissioner . 
determined that the purchase of desks and tables weretaxaqle purchases of tangible personal 
. property, not real property. 
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18. Valid Exemption Certificates. P.D. 11-15 (February 11, 2011). A 
taxpayer was audited and assessed sales tax on sales reported as tax exempt but not supported by 
valid exemption certificates. The taxpayer protested the assessment and presented exemption 
certificates to substantiate the assessed sales. The Tax Commissioner accepted the exemption 
certificates after determining each was valid and removed the associated exempt sales from the 
. audit. 
19. Late Filing Penalty. P.D. 11-18 (February 11, 2011). The Tax 
Department audited the taxpayer and assessed the taxpayer for the underpayment of sales tax 
based on collected but unremitted sales .tax. Based on its.financial capability, the taxpayer filed 
all returns and paid some of the returns under the 2009 amnesty program. For the unpaid returns, 
the taxpayer was assessed with tax, interest, and penalty for late filing. The taxpayer entered a . 
payment plan and appealed: the assessment of the late filing penalty. The Tax Commissioner 
denied the taxpayer's appeal as the taxpayer did not present cause sufficient to allow for a waiver 
of the late filing penalties. 
20. . Tangible Personal Property Sold with Birthday Party Packages. P.D. 11-. 
24 (February 25, 2011). The taxpayer sells party packages primarily for birthday parties, but 
also for other' special events for children. The parties include a meeting room, a party 
coordinator, party set-up, games, a t-shirt for the host child, pizza, cake, and .invitations, as well 
as clean-up. The taxpayer requested a ruling regarding whether it should charge the retail sales 
and use tax on sales of its party package services. The Tax Commissioner determined that the 
taxpayer is selling party services and that the tangible personal property provided at the parties is 
incidental to the service. Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer 
should pay sales and use tax on its purchases of tangible personal propertY to be provided with 
the parties. 
The taxpayer also requested a refund of remitted sales tax if the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the sale of party services were not taxable. The taxpayer stated 
that a flat fee is charged to the customer, but the sales tax is not passed OIi to the customer for the 
service requested. . Instead, the assumed tax remittance amount is calculated as an' accounting 
function. The Tax Commissioner determined that in order to receive a refund, the taxpayer 
would need to provide documentation demonstrating that either the tax was paid by the taxpayer 
directly, or that the taxpayer has refunded to its customers t4e sales tax paid at the time the 
purchases took place. The taxpayer would need to file amended returns with the Tax Department 
as part of the refund process. 
21. Food Samples. P.D. 11-26 (February 28, 2011). The taxpayer is a food 
grocer headquartered out-of-state with stores located in Virginia. Food items are selected (either 
by the corporate office or an individual store) for demonstration in the taxpayer's stores. Once 
selected, the food item is removed from the taxpayer's resale inventory and prepared for 
distribution as samples to the taxpayer's customers. The taxpayer requested a ruling on whether 
the eligible food items given away as samples by the taxpayer in Virginia are subject to the full 
tax rate or the reduced rate. Relying solely on a 1999 tax bulletin (Tax Bulletin 99-11, October 
1, 1999), the Tax Commissioner opined that samples of eligible food products removed from the 
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taxpayer's resale inventory are subject to the reduced sales and use tax rate .. Query: In 12 years, 
why has the Tax Department never promulgated regulations on the reduced sales tax rate for 
food? 
22. Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-35 (March 4, 2011). The Tax 
Commissioner continued the Tax Department's questionable practice of ignoring the Virginia 
Tax Code regarding the manufacturing exemption for sales and use tax. This ruling involved a 
taxpayer who fabricates and installs granite, metal, and concrete countertops. The taxpayer cuts, 
forms and shapes the raw materials into custom countertops that it installs in real property. The 
auditor concluded that the taxpayer is·a fabricator and a real estate construction contractor. The 
auditor assessed the use tax on the taxpayer's purchases of machinery used in its fabrication of 
custom countertops. The taxpayer protested the auditor's· conclusion that it. is a fabricating 
contractor and cites the definition of manufacturing in Virginia Code sec. 58.1-602, which 
provides that businesses cl~sified in SIC code group 32 qualify as "industrial in nature". 
Virginia Code sec. 58.1-602 establishes that "industrial in nature" for purposes of the 
manufacturing· exemption "shall include, but not be limited to, those businesses classified in 
codes .... 20 through 39 published ip. the Standard Industrial Classification Manual ... " The 
Tax Commissioner decided that the taxpayer was not eligible to receive the manufacturing 
exemption solely on the basis of what he perceives is the proper industty classification of the 
taxpayer. The Virginia Tax Code clearly states Plat whether a manufacturer is industrial in 
nature is not limited to its industry classification. However, the Tax Commissioner did not 
include any analysis in his ruling other than stating what he perceived as the taxpayer's industry 
classification. 
Rant: The definition itself is clearly problematic as it includes the Standard· Industrial 
Classification manual codes which were replaced in 1997 by the North American Industry 
Classification System. The translation between the two industrial classification code sets can be 
confusing for both businesses and the state. However, this is not. an excuse for the Tax 
Commissioner to ignore, not misinterpret, the words in the statute. Unfortunately, this "reading" 
is not new. I suspect that if this issue is.ever litigated, the Tax Departmen.t's policy will change. 
23. Used Car Cutoff Units. P.D. 11-40 (March 14,2011). The taxpayer is a 
car dealership that sells used cars. The taxpayer purchases cutoff units which are installed in 
cars purchased by customers with less than acceptable credit. An audit by the Department 
resulted in an assessment for use tax on the purchase of the cutoff units on the belief that the 
cutoff units remain the property of the taxpayer after the associated vehicle is sold. The taxpayer . 
protested the use tax contending that these units are resold to the customer and taxable to such 
customers. The Tax Commissioner examined the contraCt between the taxpayer and its 
customers and found that the contract specifically considered. the cutoff unit to remain the 
property of the taxpayer after the vehicle purchase.. Based· on this language, the Tax 
Commissioner upheld the assessment. 
24. Printed Materials. P.D. 11-43 (March 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a 
strategic marketing firm that functions primarily as the marketing department for its clients. The 
taxpayer provides strategy, creativity and production management services for its clients for 
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media advertising and non-media campaigns. The taxpayer was audited and assessed with 
additional sales and use tax for numerous items. The Tax Commissioner upheld the majority of 
the appeal as the taxpayer did not provide sufficient information on some issues and the purchase 
of printed materials the taxpayer claiffied was exempt was taxable. F or the purchase of printed 
materials to be exempt from sales tax, the materials must be stored in Virginia for 12 months or 
less and distributed outside of Virginia .. 
25. Sale of Compressed Air. P.D. 11-46 (March 24, 2011). The taxpayer sells 
and repairs scuba diving equipment. The taxpayer also offers scuba tank fill-ups. The tanks are 
filled with compressed air using specialized machinery that reduces air volume while increasing 
its pressure inside the tank. As part of the fill-up, the taxpayer may also check the tanks for 
safety and perform pressure tests. As a result of an audit by the Tax Department, the taxpayer 
was assessed the tax on sales of compressed air. The auditor relies upon Title 23 of the Virginia 
Administrative Code (V AC) 10-210-660, which states that the sale of oxygen is taxable. The 
auditor also cites Title 23 -VAC 10-210-560, which addresses taxable fabrication labor. The 
taxpayer protested the assessment and disputed the application of the cited regulations.. The 
taxpayer contends the sale of compressed air was not held taxable in the prior audit ~d cites . 
Public Document (P.D.) 87-158·(6/2/87) in support of its position that it is selling services and 
not tangible personal property. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. P.D. 87-158 
addressed the taxability of tire inflation services through the sale of compressed air. The 
taxpayer in this case is not selling a service and the authorities cited by the auditor were found to 
be correct. 
26. Government Contract.· P.D: 11-56 (Aprii 11, 2011). The taxpayer 
provides information technology services to federal, state, and local governments, as well· as to 
industry clients. The taxpayer appealed ·an assessment of tax on tangible personal property 
purchased pursuant to a contract with an agency of the federal government. The taxpayer 
maintained the contract was for the sale of tangible personal property to the federal government 
agency, and the purchase of the tangible personal property at issue is exempt of the tax pursuant 
to the resale exemption. The taxpayer also maintained that the transactions at issue relate to a 
single· order placed by the federal government pursuant to an indeterminate purpose contract. 
The taxpayer stated that the order directed the taxpayer.to acquire office furniture, and the 
taxpayer enjoyed the resale exemption with respect to these transactions. The taxpayer disagreed 
with the audit fmdings that the furniture was purchased pursuant to a real property construction 
contract. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment as the taxpayer did not provide the 
indeterrnillate purpose contract. Instead, the Tax Commissioner reviewed the taxpayer's order, 
SOW and proposed contract line item number with the government agency to determine the 
application of the tax on the purchases at issue. The Tax Commissioner determined· that the 
furniture was purchased under a real property construction contract. 
27. . Maintenance Contract. P.D. 11-60 '(April 15, 2011). The taxpayer sells 
new and used motorcycles and operates an in-house parts and repair facility. The taxpayer also 
sells related goods, such as helmets, clothing, and bike accessories. The taxpayer appealed an 
assessment of tax on the purchase of software support made' during the audit period. The· 
taxpayer contended that the audit staff erroneously assumed a bill that listed a monthly software 
support fee was for a maintenance contract that provides parts and labor subject to the tax 
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pursuant to Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (VAC) 10-210-910. The taxpayer 
maintained the bill is for remote software support, and the vendor never replaces tangible 
personal property as part of this support. The taxpayer al~o maintained that the contract is for 
labor services only and provided a copy of the service agreement entered into with its vendor. 
The Tax Commissioner reviewed the service agreement and disagreed with the taxpayer. The 
Tax Commissioner noted that the' service agreement provides for loaner equipment to be 
provided to the taxpayer as needed. As the maintenance agreement provided for both tangible 
personal property and services, the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment was 
correct. 
28. Trade Name v. Legal Name. P.D. 11-67 (May 6,2011). The taxpayer is a 
wholesaler of medical devices and primarily 'sells to hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes. As a 
result of an audit, an assessment was issued for a sale made exempt of the tax. The auditor 
denied the certificate of e~emption because the name on the certificate of exemption for the 
customer was inconsistent with the purchaser's name on the invoice. The auditor held the sale 
taxable. The taxpayer protested the tax assessment and asserted that the sale qualifies for 
exemption. The Tax Commissioner abated the assessment as documentation provided by the 
taxpayer showed that the taxpayer's legal name is shown on the exemption certificate while the 
taxpayer's trade name is shown on the invoice. 
29. Medical Exemptions. P.D~ 11-68 (May 11, 2011). The taxpayer 
purchases a medical food product (VSL#3) that is used for the dietary management of patients 
with ulcerative colitis, irritable bowel syndrome or an ileal pouch. The medical food product-
consists of live freeze dried lactic acid bacteria in powder or capsule fonn and is intended for use 
under the supervision of a physician. The medical food product is used to maintain adequate and 
balanced functioning of the human gastrointestinal tract of a patient who, because of chronic 
medical needs, cannot achieve such by the modification of the nonual diet alone. The supplier 
ships the medical food product directly to the taxpayer and charges the applicable Virginia use 
tax on the invoice. The taxpayer requested a ruling that the medical food product is exempt from 
the retail sales and use tax. The Tax Commissioner detennined that the medical food product 
does not qualify for an exemption and is subject to, the retail sales and use tax. The Tax 
Commissioner discussed two exemptions: the medicine and drug exemption and the 
nonprescription drug exemption. The medical food product does not qualify for the medicine 
and drug exemption as it does not contain a drug as defmed under the Virginia Orug Control Act 
the federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. The medical food product does not qualify for the 
nonprescription drug exemption as it is not a drug and it does not cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent 
a disease in human beings. Lastly, the Tax Commissioner noted that the medical food product 
also does not qualify for the reduced food tax rate as it is not defmed as food under the federal 
Food Stamp Act of 1977. 
30. Real Property Contractor and Seller of Tangible Personal Property.' P.D. 
11-69 (May 11, 2011). The taxpayer is a steel fabrication and erection business that was audited 
by the Department. The taxpayer contracts with general 'contractors to fabricate and install 
structural steel for commercial real property construction projects. In addition, the taxpayer 
fabricates construction materials and supplies ("deliver only items") that are delivered to the job 
site for use by other contractors. The contract tenus and pricing for the deliver only items are 
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included in the same contracts that require the taxpayer to perfonn real property construction 
services. The taxpayer contested the audit assessment of retail sales tax on the deliver only 
items. The. Tax Commissioner upheld the audit and detennined that the. taxpayer is a reai 
property contractor and a seller of tangible personal property. As a retailer, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the taxpayer should have collected and remitted sales tax on its 
. sale of "deliver only" items. . 
31. Insufficient Documentation. P.D. 11-70·(May 11, 2011). The taxpayer 
offers infonnation technology solutions, and consulting to its customers. The taxpayer offers 
comprehensive technology solutions to include server, storage, software, application solutions, 
services and fmancing to its customers .. The Tax Department audited the taxpayer and issued an 
assessment for additional tax and interest on untaxed sales. The taxpayer disagreed with certain 
exceptions included in the sales exceptions list and appealed. The Tax Commissioner upheld the' 
assessment. The Tax Commissioner' determined that the taxpayer provided insufficient 
documentation to prove that the taxpayer's sales were of nontaxable services to that the federal' 
government was the purchaser. Also in several cases, the documentation provided by the . 
taxpayer, such as statements of work, contradicted the taxpayer's arguments, and indicated that 
the taxpayer was also selling tangible personal property. 
32. Satellite Television Programming Provider Subcontractor. P.D. 11-71 
(May 11,2011). The taxpayer is a subcontractor for a satellite television programming provider 
(the "prograniming provider"). The taxpayer installs satellite dish equipment for the 
programming provider's customers. The taxpayer purchases the satellite. equipment from an 
a.:fflliate of the programming provider exempt. of the tax pursuant to the resale exemption. The·. 
, taxpayer maintains that ·once the equipment is installed, and the customer signs a contract with 
the programming provider, the equipment is transferred to the programming provider and 
becomes the property of the programming provider. The taxpayer states that iUs reimbursed by 
the programming provider, dollar for dollar, for the equipment installed. The taxpayer maintains 
that the programming provider charges its customers sales tax on the lease of the equipment. As 
a result of the Department's audit, the taxpayer contested the use tax assessed on the satellite 
equipment purchases. The taxpayer contended that it is not liable for the tax because ownership 
of the property rests with the programming provider. To support its position, the taxpayer 
provided documentation of its agreement and reimbursement arrangement with the programming 
provider. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. The Tax· Commissioner determined 
that the programming provider was selling services to its customers and the equipment was 
incidental to the services. Therefore, the taxpayer's sale to .the programming provider was a 
taxable sale not eligible for a resale exemption. 
33. Accelerated Sales Tax Guidelines. P.D. 11-72 (May 11,2011). The Tax 
Commissioner issued revised accelerated sales tax guidelines and rules to, reflect changes made 
by 2011 House Bill 1500 (Chapter 890) which increases the annual threshold for dealers and 
direct payment pennit holders who are reqUired to make an accelerated sales tax payment from 
$1 million of taxable sales and/or purchases to $5.4 million of taxable sales and/or purchases. 
34~ Road Service Charges. P.D. ,11-74 (May 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a 
motor vehicle repair business that specializes in retail tire sales and repairs. The taxpayer 
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perfonns off-site tire repair and replacement services for cOJllIllercial vehicles. In a typical 
transaction, the taxpayer receives a service request and dispatches a service technician to assist 
the customer. The service technician drives to the customer's site and makes the vehicle 
operational by repairing or replacing one or more tires on the vehicle. The taxpayer bills the 
customer a labor charge as a separate line item on the sales invoice. The labor charge may be . 
listed on the sales invoice as "Road Service Call," "Road· Service Per Hour" or "OTR Road 
Service Per Hour." The labor charge is based on the total amount of time taken by the service 
technician to perfonn' the service call for each customer. The taxpayer does not charge ret~l 
sales tax on the road service charges. A separate tire dismounting and mounting charge is also. 
billed on the customer's 'sales invoice. The taxpayer was audited and assessed sales tax on the 
road service charges. The taxpayer appealed and argued that the charges are not taxable because 
they are for the technician's direct labor, which varies for each call. The Tax Commissioner 
upheld the assessment as he detennined that when the taxpayer sold a tire to a customer and 
included road service charges, the road service charges were taxable as they were incidental to a 
sale of tangible personal property. . 
35. Biological Soft Tissue Products. P.D. 11-75 (May 18, 2011). The 
taxpayer is a manufacturer and seller of two biological soft tissue products. The taxpayer sells 
the soft tissue products (allograft tissue and a xenograft product) to hospitals and med,ical service 
. providers used in the treatment of individual patients suffering from damaged soft tissue. The 
products are used in the repair or replacement of missing ·or permanently malfunctioning body 
parts. The FDA classifies the allograft tissue as "banked human tissue" subject to the rules and 
regulations under the American Association of Tissue Banks; The Virginia Board of Pharmacy 
concurs with the FDA classification and deems the allograft tissue as a SclJ.edule VI controlled 
substance under the Virginia Drug Control Act. The xenograft product is porcine dermis that has 
been processed to form an acellular tissue matrix and supports the repair of damaged tissue by 
allowing rapid revascularization and cell repopulation required for tissue regeneration. The FDA 
classifies the xenograft product as a medical device. The Virginia Soard of Pha.n:nacy concurs 
with the federal classification and deems the xenograft product as a Schedule VI medical device 
under the. Virginia Drug Control Act The taxpayer requested a ruling that the biological' soft 
tissue products qualify for exemption under the provisions of Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(10) and 
23 VAC 10-21O-940(A). 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the allograft tissue· is a Schedule VI controlled 
substance, not a medical device, the sale of which is exempt.from sales and use tax. Pursuant to 
Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(9), the taxpayer may sell the allograft tissue exempt of the tax to a 
licensed physician, optometrist., licensed nurse practitioner, or lic~nsed physician assistant for' 
use in his professional practice. The taxpayer may also sell the allograft tissue exempt of the tax 
to a' licensed hospital, nursing home, clinic, or similar corporation not otherwise exempt under 
this section. The Tax Commissioner also determined that the xenograft tissue is a medical 
device .. The taxpayer may only sen the xenograft product exempt of the tax when such product 
is purchased by or on behalf of an individual for use by such individual. 
36. Fabrication. P.D. 11-77 (May 26,2011). The taxpayer cuts bricks that are 
used by masonry contractors to construct brick arches. The contractors purchase and furnish the 
bricks that the taxpayer cuts to their specifications. The taxpayer returns the cut bricks to the 
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contractors and the bricks are then used to construct arches. The Tax Department audited the 
taxpayer and assessed retail sales tax on the labor charges billed to, the contractors for cutting the 
bricks. The Tax Department treated the taxpayer's charges to cut the bricks as taxable fabrication 
labor. The taxpayer appealed and argued that the cutting of bricks does not constitute fabrication 
as the term is defined in the dictionary and that the cutting of bricks, is an exempt service. The 
Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. 23 VAC 10-210-560(A) defmes fabrication as n[a]n 
operation which changes the form or state of tangible personal property ... n The Tax 
Commissioner determined that the "fabrication" defmition in the regulations was the proper 
definition of "fabrication" and that the cutting of bricks by the taxpayer was fabrication. 
37. ,Diplomatic Exemption. P.D. 11-81 (May 26, 2011). The taxpayer 
'operates a restaurant. An audit resulted in the assessment of use tax on various items including 
untaxed purchases of tangible personal property. Sales tax was also assessed on untaxed meals 
sold to churches and foreigI! diplomats. The taxpayer appealed the tax assessed on meals sold to 
foreign diplomats and asserted that it complied with the Department's diplomatic exemption 
regulation. The taxpayer further asserts that the diplomatic exemption was disallowed by the 
auditor because copies of the diplomat's exemption cards were not in the restaurant's files. The 
Tax Commissioner agreed with the taxpayer. 23 V AC' 10-210-694' provides the diplomatic 
exemption and states, "No exemption certificate is required; however, the record of the sale must 
indicate the exemption card number of the purchaSer." The taxpayer kept a record of the 
diplomats' exemption card numbers. Also, the taxpayer contested the amnesty penalty applied to 
the assessment. Per P.D. 09-140 (September 28,2009), as amended by P.D. 09-175 (October 29, 
2009), the 20% post-amnesty penalty does not apply to any uncontested liability that is paid 
within 30 days from the date of assessment and paytnent for any ,contested liability remaining , 
upon resolution of an appeal under Va. Code § 58.1-1821 that is paid within 30 days from the 
date of the Tax Commissioner's fmal determination. Based on this language, the Tax 
Commissioner agreed to, waive the penalty pending payment of the uncontested liability within 
30 days. ' 
38. Reconsideration: Coordination with Tennessee Sales Tax. P.D. 11-86 
(June 2, 2011). The taxpayer is a Virginia business that leases or rents construction equipment 
from a Tennessee lessor for use in Virginia projects. Pursuant to an audit, the taxpayer was 
assessed Virginia use tax on such equipment rentals on the basis that the Tennessee sales tax had 
been erroneously charged and collected on the month-to-month rentals: The taxpayer appealed 
such assessment but the Tax Department upheld it. The taxpayer seeks reconsideration of the 
Tax Department's prior determination. The Tax Commissioner overruled the prior 
determination. The prior determination applied Virginia's long-standing policy with respect to 
the treatment of rentals transported between two states. Under Virginia's policy, each monthly 
invoice is treated as a separate rental and subject to taxation by the state in which the property is 
located. However, Tennessee does not treat the rentals at issue as separate transactions. Instead, 
Tennessee taxes the initial rental agreement and subsequent month-to-month rentals; The Tax 
Department made inquiries with the legal department of the Tennessee Department of Revenue 
(TDOR). Based on a review of some of the taxpayer's redacted rental agreements, the TDOR 
concluded that such rental agreements are taxable in Tennessee because the rental agreements 
are executed in Tennessee, the property is delivered to the customer in Tennessee, and the rental 
period is for a continuous period (i. e., without interruption from the pick up of the property in 
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Tennessee to the return of the property to the Tennessee lessor). Based on these facts, the Tax 
Commissioner determined that Tennessee has the first right of taxation. Accordingly, while the 
rented equipment used in Virginia remains subject to taxation in Virginia, the Tax Commissioner 
allowed a credit pursuant to Va. Code § 58.1-611 for the Tennessee sales tax paid on the rentals 
at issue. 
39. Sales of Eggs and Agricultural Products at Farmers Markets and Roadside 
Stands. P .D. 11-98 (June 9, 2011). The Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-7 regarding . 
sales of eggs and agricultural products at farmers markets and roadside stands pursuant to 2011 
House Bill 1942. 
40. Common Carrier Exemption. P.D. 11-99 (June 9, 2011). The taxpayer is 
a common carrier of freight and passengers by rail. An audit resulted in the assessment of 
consumer use tax on various items of tangible .personal property· purchased for use or 
. consumption in the taxpayer~s operations. The taxpayer appealed the assessment on two types of 
items assessed in the audit: portable. cab heaters and an event recorder. The cab heaters were 
purchased to repair or replace the heaters on locomotives. . The taxpayer contended that the 
primary operational function of a cab heater is to defrost the windshield of the locomotive. 
Without a properly, functioning heater, the taxpayer maintained that the locomotive cannot be 
safely operated when the windshield is fogging. An event recorder is used to record incoming 
and outgoing phone and radio transmissions with the rail traffic' controller. The voice recordings 
are stored indefinitely on compact discs in the event of a railroad' incident requiring 
investigation. These recordings are also used to conduct efficiency tests of rail traffic controllers 
to determine whether proper procedures were followed. The taxpayer argued that these· items are 
exempt pursuant to the·railway common carrier regulation set out in 23 VAC 10-210-382. The 
Tax Commissioner agreed that the . cab heaters should be exempt, but . disagreed that the event 
recorders should also be exempt. To be exempt under 23 VAC 10-210-382, property must be 
used directly in the rendition of the service provided by the common carrier. The Tax 
Commissioner determined that while both items may be essential to providing the transportation 
service, only the cab heaters were used directly in the rendition of the service. 
41. Unremitted Sales Tax and Reduced Food Tax Rate. P.D. 11-106 (June 14, 
2011). The taxpayer operates a restaurant. The taxpayer collected sales tax at the 5% rate on its 
sales of food and remitted tax at a 2.5% rate to the Tax Department. The taxpayer was. assessed 
for the difference. between its collected and unremitted sales tax. The taxpayer appealed and 
contended that it only sells food for home consumption and is being assessed as a restaurant in 
error. In addition, the taxpayer states that it was confused as to the correct filing procedures and. 
believes its reporting error should have been discovered earlier by the Tax Department, thereby 
avoiding'. the assessment of penalties and interest. The Tax Commissioner upheld the 
assessment. The Tax Commissioner determined that the food sold by the taXpayer was not 
eligible for the reduced food tax rate as the food sold was hot take-out meals. In addition, the 
taxpayer was required to. remit all tax collected under Va. Code § 58.1-625. 
42. Software Purchases. P.D. 11-112 (June 20, 2011). The taxpayer provides 
satellite mobile communications. . An audit resulted in the assessment of use tax on untaxed 
purchases of software that the taxpayer contended were electronically downloaded and therefore 
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not subject to taxation. The Tax Commissioner ultimately adjusted the assessment. The 
taxpayer provided evidence that the ftrst purchase of software was electronically downloaded, 
however the Tax Commissioner noted numerous other references to a compact disc or physical . 
delivery. As the totality of the evidence was not clear, the Tax Commissioner upheld the 
assessment with regard to this purchase. The taxpayer failed to provide requested documentation 
on the second purchase and the Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment with regard to this 
purchase as well. The Tax Commissioner removed the third purchase of software from the audit 
because if it was' delivered in a tangible state, the taxpayer's evidence showed that it was 
delivered to a location outside of Virginia. Thus it was not subject to Virginia sales tax. 
43. Toilet Pumping. P.D. 11-118 (June 23,2011). The taxpayer leases or 
rents portable toilets. The Tax Department's audit disclosed that during the audit period, the 
taxpayer charged.for pumping services that were not taxed as part of the gross proceeds reported 
on monthly sales tax returns .. The taxpayer disagreed with the application of the tax to pumping 
services contending these services are optional and have been separately charged: The taxpayer 
submitted additional documentation stating that the untaxed rentals were treated properly and 
appealed the assessment. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the assessment. The 
issue of whether toilet pumping is subject to sales tax has already been address by the. Virginia 
Supreme Court in LZM Inc. v. Department, 296 Va. 105, 606 S.E.2d 797 (2005). Title 23 of the 
Virginia Administrative Code 1O.;,210-4040(D) states that the true object of the refuse disposal 
operations is the actual pickup and removal of the refuse ,from its customers. However~ the true 
object of the taxpayer's portable toilet operation was the provision of the tangible personal 
property, the portable toilet, not the waste removal pumping services. Customers would have no 
need for pumping services without the provision of the portable toilets. Accordingly, the 
pumping services were incidental to the provision of the tangible personal property. 
44. Installation Charges. P.D. 11-127 (July 6, 2011). The taxpayer installs 
home theatre systems for both residential and commercial customers. The taxpayer was assessed 
with sales tax on separately stated installation charges. Citing Virginia regulation Title 23 V AC 
10-21O-4040(C)(3) which provides, "[s]eparately stated labor or service charges for the repair, 
installation, application or remodeling of tangible personal property are not subject to the tax," 
the Tax Commissioner detennined that the separately stated charges were exempt and removed' 
the charges from the audit. 
45. Government Contractor. P.D. 11-128 (July 6, 2011). The taxpayer is a 
general contractor located in Virginia. An audit resulted in the assessment of consumer use' tax 
on various purchases of construction materials and other tangible personal property used or 
consumed by the taxpayer. The taxpayer contests the use tax assessed on tangible personal 
property used or consumed in connection with its real property construction contracts with a 
local public school system t6 provide materials, labor, equipment, and supplies to construct a bus 
garage addition at a public school and a canopy at an existing bus garag~. The taxpayer appealed 
contending that materials used in the perfonnance of such contracts are not subject to taxation as 
the local government was exempt from sales tax. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment 
as the governmental exemption only applies to tangible personal property purchased directly by 
the government. ' . 
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46. Government Mandated Purchases. P ~D. 11-130 and P .D. 11-131 (July 21, 
2011). The taxpayer is a public water service corporation: Following an audit by the 
Department, the taxpayer was assessed use tax on purchases of materials and equipment. The 
taxpayer" protested the assessment and argues that the 'purchases are exempt under the 
manufacturing exemption. The taxpayer also asserted that the purchases should be exempt.ofthe 
tax because they were required by the Virginia Department of Health. The. Tax Commissioner 
did riot have enough information to determine if the manufacturing exemption was· applicable 
and sent the audit back to the auditors. However, the Tax Commissioner determined. that the 
purchases were not exempt due to their m.andate by the Virginia Department of. Health. Title 23 
VAC 10-210-920(B)' instructs that the' requirements of federal, state or local law do not 
automatically render the purchases made under such requirements tax exempt. Although certain 
purchases 'by the taxpayer may be required by the. Virginia Department of Health, those 
requirements db not make the p:urchases at issue exempt from the retail sales and. use tax. 
-
47. . Transportation Charges. P:D. 11-134 (July 26; 2011). The taxpayer is a 
contract furniture dealer .. The· taxpayer purchases furniture from' manufacturers for contract 
customers and has the furniture shipped (transportation-in) to an independently owned and 
operated warehouse. The . independent service contractor delivers· and installs the furniture for 
the taxpayer's customers. In this case, the taxpayer passed the transportation-in charge on to its 
customers as a separate· charge on the sales invoice but did not collect the sales tax on such 
charge. An assessment was issued on these charges. The taxpayer contended the auditor 
characterized the transportation':'in charges as shipping and handling and erroneously- taxed such 
charges. The Tax Commissioner disagreed and upheld the audit. . Title 23 of the Virginia 
Administrative Code 10-210-6000 interprets Va. Code § 58.1~609.5(3) and provides that the tax 
does not· apply to transportation or· delivery charges added to a taXable sale,. provided such 
transportation charges are separately stated on the invoice to' the customer. Such charges, 
commonly known as "transportation-out, '.' are charges for the . delivery of the tangible personal 
property from' the seller to the purchaser. Exempt transportation and delivery charges do not 
include charges from a manufacturer to a· retailer's place of business, commonly known as 
. "transportation-in" relating to purchases for .resale. 
48. Spray Paint· Booths. P.D. 11-135 (July 26, 2011). The taxpayer 
manufactures wood cabinets, tables and similar products. The taxpayer was audited by the Tax. 
Department and assessed use tax on the purchase of two' paint spray booths. The taxpayer 
appealed contending that the paint spray booths qualify for the manufacturing exemption. The. 
taxpayer contended. that the paint spray booths are used directly in its production process and are 
. an indispensable and immediate part of its manufacturing process. The paint spray booths are 
enclosed spaces that 'create a special environment for the controlled applicatiori of fInishes. The 
paint spray booths allow adjustment~ to be made to drying times, temperature and humidity and 
limit the amount of dust particles and other airborne contaminants that can potentially degrade . 
the fInishes that are applied to products. The taxpayer states that the use of the paint spray 
booths insures .the integrity and uncompromised quality of the taxpayer's fInished products', 
Relying on' previously issued rulmgs, the Tax Commissioner determined that' certain 
c9mponents of the taxpayer's paint· spray booths may qualify for the manufacturing exemption; 
However, the paint 'spray booths are not fully exempt. . While the paint booths; at issue employ 
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new technology that enhances the quality of the products produced by the taxpayert the structural 
components do not playa direct role in and are not an immediate part of the production process. 
In this caset the wallst ceilingt and floor of the paint booths are not constructed of special 
materials or built in a manner that rises to the specialized nature and· use of the insulated panelst 
lead doors or the clean room framework discussed in the public documents cited by the taxpayer. 
49. Breast Implants. P.D. 11-141 (August 3t 2011). The taxpayer perfonns 
cosmetic and reconstruc~ive breast surgery for (i) post mastectomy patientst (ii) patientst with a 
lumpectomy or partial removal of a segment of the· breast and (iii) patients with significant 
abnOJ.malities .in development that result in very little or no breast volumet or significant 
differences between one breast and the other. As a result of the Tax Department's auditt the 
taxpayer was assessed the tax on breast implants used in breast augmentation. Breast implants 
deemed to have been purchased for reconstructive surgery were not taxed. The taxpayer 
appealed asserting that the contested implants are .used to .replace a missing body part are 
exempt. Virginia Code § 58.1-609.10(10) provides that the retail sales and use tax does not 
apply to durable medical equipment. "Durable medical equipment is equipment that (i) can 
withstand repeated uset (ii) is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purposet (iii) 
generally is not useful to a person in the absence of illness or injuryt and (iv) is appropriate for 
use in .the home.,t In order to qualify for the durable medical equipment exemptiont the 
contested breast implants must meet the criteria established in Va. Code § 58.1-609.10(10). 
Based on the infonnation provided Qn the taxpayer's web sitet breast implants for· breast 
augmentation are typicallYt perfonned to enlarge small or underdeveloped breastst restore the . 
natural breast volume that may have decreased as a result ofpregnancYt weight losst aging or for 
women that desire improved breast balance when each breast is a different size. The Tax 
Commissioner detennined that the contested breast implants can withstand repeated use and are· 
appropriate for use in the home. Howevert he also determined that the final two criteria are not 
met because the breast implants used in breast augmentation do not appear to serve a medical 
purpose and because they are not used to address some illness or injury. Thereforet the Tax 
Commissioner upheld the assessment. 
50. Manufacturing Exemption. P.D. 11-142 (August 5t 2011). The taxpayer 
manufactures absorbent materials for fluid control. The taxpayer's products are use in food 
packaging, hygiene products, decorating and filtration. The taxpayer protested the use tax 
assessed on a tensile testing system and a metal detector. 
The tensile testing system is used in conjunction with another machine that produces the 
absorbent pouches used in food packaging and hospital bed protection. The seals on the pouches 
must meet pre-detennined standards to ensure they do not burst during customer use. The 
machine uses rolls of film to produce the pouches. Each time a new roll of raw film is readied 
for use, it is tested for sealant strength using the tensile testing system. Based on test results, the 
machine operator will make the necessary adjustments to the machine's sealant bars to' bring the 
seal strength to acceptable levels. The tensile testing system is also used to test the fmal product. 
The taxpayer stated that the tensile testing system sits next to the machine on the production line. 
However, the auditor observed the tester in a separate area behind the machine. The tester was 
held taxable because the auditor concluded that the machine was not part of manufacturing based 
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on its location away fro1;11 the main production area and its performance of tests on raw materials 
and fInished products. ' 
The metal detector is used to test metal levels in completed sanitary pad and diaper 
products. Because Food and Drug Administration regulations forbid metal contaminants in these 
products, the manufacturer discards ,the product if metals are discovered. The metal detector sits 
in the production area and testing takes place on completed and bagged products that have not 
been packaged 'and sealed into boxes for sale., The metal detector was held taxable as the auditor' 
concluded that the testing of the fmal completed product was outside the manufacturing 
production process. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that both the tensile testing system and a metal 
detector qualifIed for the manufacturing exemption and were therefore exempt from use tax. The 
tensile tester was held tax,!ble as the auditor determined fIlm testing took place before actual 
production. The auditor believed that the fIlm testing at issue in this case is pre-production and 
not a part of the manufacturing process. The strength test takes place after the fIlm has been 
stored at the plant site for use in production. As discussed in Va. Code § 58.1-602, production 
includes the "storage and handling" of raw material. In P.D. 99-291, the Tax Commissioner 
determined that testing of raw materials qualifIes as "handling" and is part of the production 
, , 
process'. The metal detector is used to determine, if the fmal product is acceptable for packaging 
and 'shipment. This testing determines if the product is suitable for sale based on' pre-set 
standards. Although the products are bagged, they are not packaged for fmal sale. The 
defInition of "manufacturing" in Va. Code § 5,8.1-602 states that production ends when the 
product is completed for sale and conveyed to a warehouse at the production site. Because the 
tested products have not yet been 'packaged for fInal sale and shipped to the warehouse, this 
testing also takes place within the scope of the production process. 
51. Government Contractor. P.D. 11-146 (August 10, 2011). The taxpayer 
provides various products, systems, and services to prime contractors who are engaged in 
classifIed or unclassifIed contracts with the federal government. An audit resulted in the ' 
assessment of sales tax on untaxed sales of. tangible personal' property made to federal 
government contractors and use tax on untaxed purchases of tangible personal property used or 
consumed by the taxpayer. Due to insufficient documentation, he Tax Commissioner either 
upheld the related portion of the assessment or gave the taxpayer a second chance to produce 
sufficient documentation. On the portion of the assessment involving classifIed contracts, the 
Tax Commissioner acknowledged' that the Tax Department failed to provide an auditor with 
adequate security clear,ance to view the classifIed contracts. The Tax Commissioner sent this 
portion back to audit and directed an auditor with adequate security clearance to contact the 
taxpayer. 
52. Internet Cafe. P.D. 11-148 (August 12, 2(11). The taxpayer operates an 
Internet cafe. The taxpayer was assessed sales tax on unreported sales of prepaid telephone 
access cards. The taxpayer was also assessed use tax on fIxed assets, food, and software 
licensing purchases. The taxpayer protested the assessed amounts as unrepresentative of its 
business activity. The Tax Commissioner adjusted the assessment for certain issues. Despite the' 
taxpayer's argument that the access cards solely provided Internet access, the Tax Commissioner 
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cited evidence that the cards may also be used for telephone calls. As Virginia Code § 58.1-602 
defines tangible personal property to include "telephone calling cards upon their initial sale," the 
Tax Commissioner upheld the portion of the assessment related to the access cards. The 
taxpayer also argued that its food purchases were exempt from sales and use tax as the food was 
provided on a complimentary basis to the taxpayer's customers. The Tax Commissioner 
determined that the food purchases were subject to the use tax because they were used by the 
taxpayer to provide complimentary food to its customers. However, the assessment applied the 
use tax at the full 5% rate, not the reduced 2.5% food ,tax rate. The Tax Commissioner ordered 
this correction. The assessment of use tax on asset pw:chases was upheld as the taxpayer failed 
to provide sufficient information. Finally, the taxpayer protested the aSsessment of sales tax on 
software fees. The taxpayer stated it is not in the business of selling tangible personal and is 
leasing the software from a third party for its own use. The Tax Commissioner examined the 
pertinent contracts and'determined that the taxpayer was in fact leasing tangible personal 
property, not licensing so~are, under the contract. The Tax Commissioner upheld this portion 
of the assessment. 
53. Internet Service Provider Exemption & Amnesty Penalty. P.D. 11-149 
(August 17, 2011). The taxpayer is a provider of business solutions. An audit resulted in the 
assessment of sales tax on sales of maintenance contracts and other tangible personal property 
and use tax on incorrectly taxed purchases. The taxpayer contested several sales held in the 
audit. One of the contested sales involved the purchase of equipment under the Internet service 
provider exemption. Per Va. Code § 58.1-602, a taxpayer must provide proprietary content to be 
eligible to receive the exemption. The Tax Commissioner examined evidence from the ( 
taxpayer's website and the quarterly report and determined that the taxpayer solely provided 
Internet access and no proprietary content. Therefore, the Tax Commissioner upheld this portion 
of the' audit. The remaining contested sales were resolved by an examination of evidence. The 
taxpayer also requested abatement of post-amnesty pemilties, which the Tax Commissioner 
agreed to. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer paid the uncontested portion of 
the assessment 31 days after the date of assessment as directed in writing by the Tax Department. 
The amnesty guidelmes require payment of any uncontested liability within 30 days from the 
date of assessment to be eligible for a penalty waiver. Despite the failure to pay this portion of 
the liability within the timeline provided by the guidelines, the Tax Commissioner waived the 
penalty as th~ taxpayer complied with the Tax Department's written instructions. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
No recent opinions .. 
IV. PROPERTY (AD VALOREM) TAXES. 
A. 2011 Legislation 
1. Appeals of Tax Assessments to Boards of Equalization & Circuit Courts. 
House Bill 1588 (Chapter 232) and Senate Bill 1350 (Chapter 184) amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-
3331, 58.1-3379, and 58.1-3984 to provide that on appeal the taxpayer has the burden of 
rebutting the presumption that the valuation determined by the assessor is correct and showing 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is valued at more than its fair market value. 
In any appeal of an assessment by an owner of real property containing less than four residential 
units, the assessor will be required to provide written notice to the owner at least 45 days before 
the appeal informing him of his right. to review the assessment records and to have the assessor 
make a physical examiriation of the property. The assessor will have 15 days from the written 
request of the taxpayer in an appeal to provide such assessment records or would be required to 
present at the hearing: i) copies of the records, ii) testimony to explain methodologies to 
determine the assessed value of the property, and iii) testimony that states that the assessed value 
was arrived at in accordance with generally accepted appraisal practices. In appeals to a circuit 
court, the taxpayer win be required to make the written request for assessment records no later 
than 45 days prior to trial, unless otherwise ordered.by the court. 
Under current law, a property owner may appeal to a Board of Equalization or a 
circuit court seeking relief from an erroneous real property assessment. In all such cases, the 
taxpayer has the burden of -proving that the property in question is valued at more thim its fair 
market value., that the assessment is not uniform in its application, or that the assessment is. 
otherwise not equalized. In order to receive relief, the taxpayer must produce substantial 
evidence that the valuation determined by the assessor is erroneous. This legislation will· be 
effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1,2012. 
2. Statements of Income and Expense. House Bill 1526 (Chapter 200) 
amended Va. Code § 58.1-3294 to clarify that statements of income and expense may be used in 
a complaint before a Board of Equalization as long as the statements are submitted to the Board 
of Equalization no later than the appeal filing deadline of the Board .. Under current law, the 
failure to present statements of income and expense to the assessor bars the owner of the 
property from introducing such information in any judicial action to correct an erroneous 
assessment. This legislation was effective on JUly 1,2011. 
3.· Judicial Sale of Certain Real Estate. Senate Bill 1478 (Chapter 324) 
enacted Va. Code § 58.1-3965.2 to authorize localities to provide for proceedings to conduct a 
judicial sale of certain real property located in a community development authority or on 
abutting property within a community development authority when a special tax or special 
assessment imposed on the property is delinquent on the flrst anniversary of the date on which 
the tax or assessment became due. Under current law, when taxes are delinquent on the last day 
of the year following the two-year anniversary date on which such taxes were due, localities are 
authorized to sell the real estate for the pulpose of collecting all delinquent taxes on such 
property. The legislation contains an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its 
passage. 
4. Transfer of Certain Tax-Delinquent Properties to the Locality. House Bill . 
1532 (Chapter 688) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3970.1 to lower the threshold percentage of taxes 
and other liens, together with p~nalty and accumulated interest, on property from 50 percent to 
35 percent of the assessed value of the parcel for real estate in the Cities of Norfolk, Richmond, . 
Hopewell, Newport News, and Petersburg for a special commissioner to convey the property to 
the locality in lieu of a public sale at auction. The legislation would also lower .the threshold 
percentage, if only taxes, from 25 percent to 15 percent of the assessed value of the parcel for a 
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special commissioner to convey real estate in the Cities of Norfolk, Richmond, Hopewell, 
Newport News, and Petersburg to the locality. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
5. Membership of Boards of Equalization. House Bill 1470 (Chapter 10) 
amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-3371, 58.1-3373, and 58.1-3374 to authorize circuit courts for any 
locality to appoint up to two alternate board members to serve on local boards of equalization if a 
member of the board is absent or abstains. Under the terms of the legislation, the alternate· 
members would have the same terms, qualifications, and compensation as those· of regular board 
members. The chairman of the board. would be authorized to select one of the appointed 
alternates to serve in the absent or abstaining member's place and to vote on any proceeding in 
which a regular member is absent or abstains. The number of alternate members the circuit court 
would be authorized to appoint would differ, depending upon whether the alternates were 
appointed to a permanent board of equalization, whether the alternates were appointed in a 
county operating under a c9unty executive or county manager form of government, or whether 
the alternates were elected to a temporary board. Under current law, local governing bodies are 
required to appoint a board of equalization of real estate assessments for the year following any 
year a general reassessment or annual or biennial assessment is conducted, unless a permanent 
board of equalization is in place in that locality. The Board must consist of three or five 
members, depending upon the type of board of equalization to which the board member is 
appointed. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
6. Furnishing Statements of Income and Expense to Assessor. Senate Bill 
784 (Chapter 137) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3295 to clarify that a real estate assessor may 
. require an owner of real property with four or fewer residential units that is operated in whole or 
in part as affordable rental housing to furnish to the assessor a statement of the income and 
expenses attributable to the property when the owner applies to the locality to have the real 
property assessed as affordable rental housing. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011. 
7. Collection of Taxes By Town and County Treasurers. House Bill 2019 
(Chapter 475) and Senate Bill 909 (Chapter 431) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3910 to authorize 
county treasurers and ¢.e treasurers of any towns located within these counties to enter into 
reciprocal agreements, with the approval of the respective· governing bodies, authorizing the 
town treasurer to collect real and personal property taxes owed to the county, and the county 
treasurer to collect real and personal property taxes owed to the town .. Each treasurer collecting 
taxes under the agreement is required to account for arid pay over whatever amount is owed to 
the other locality. This legislation waS effective on July 1,2011. 
8. Disabled Veteran Exemption. House Bill 1645 (Chapter 769) and Senate 
Bill 987 (Chapter 840) enacted Va. Code §§ 58.1-3219.5 and 58.1-3219.6 to provide the 
necessary statutory authorization required by the constitutional amendment to Article x, § 6 of 
the Constitution ojVirginia, adopted by voters authorizing the General Assembly to exempt from 
taxation for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2011, real property that is the principal 
residence of a veteran (or widow or widower of a veteran) if the veteran has been determined by 
the United States Department of Veterans Affairs or its successor agency pursuant to federal law . 
to have a 100 percent combat-related, permanent, and total disability. The surviving spouse of a 
. veteran is eligible for the exemption, so long as the death of the veteran occurs on or after 
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\ January 1, 2011, the surviving spouse does not remarry, and the surviving spouse continues to 
occupy the real property as his or her principal place of residence. The legislation also provides 
that the veteran or surviving spouse claiming the exemption must file with the commissioner of 
the revenue in which the property is located, on forms to be supplied by the locality, an affidavit 
or written statement setting forth the name of the veteran and spouse, if any, whether the real 
property is jointly owned, and certifying that the property is occupied as the veteran's principal 
place of residence. The veteran must also provide documentation from the U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs or its successor agency pursuant to federal law to have a 100 percent combat-
related, permanent, and total disability. This legislation contains an emergency clause and has 
been in force from the date of its passage. 
. . . 
9. Partial Exemption for Structures in Redevelopment or Conservation Areas 
or Rehabilitation Districts. House Bill 1899 (Chapter 460) and Senate Bill 785 (Chapter 423) 
amended Va. Code §§ 58.1-3219.4 and 58.1-3220 to require the local governing body of a 
loc'ality in which partial exemptions for structures in redevelopment or conservation areas or 
rehabilitation districts are available to provide written notification to the property owner of the 
amount of the assessment of the property that will be exempt from real property taxation and the 
period of such exemption. The legislation also clarifies that the exempt amount is a covenant 
that runs with the land for the period of the exemption, and would prohibit local governing . 
bodies from reducing that amount during the period of the exemption. This legislation contains 
an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its passage. 
10. Separate Classification for Certain Historic Buildings. House Bill 1851 
(Chapter 571) and Senate Bill 860 (Chapter 581) enacted Va. Code § 58.1-3221.5 to classify 
buildings listed on the Virginia Landmarks Register, not including the real estate or land on 
which they are located, as a separate class of real property from all other real estate and 
authorizes localities to tax such property.at a lower rate than the general class of real property, so 
long as the building is maintained in a condition such that it retains the characteristics for which 
it was listed on the Virginia Landmarks Registry. Under current law, generally all real estate is 
considered to be one class of property subject to the same rate of tax. This legislation was 
effective on July 1, 2011. 
11. Real Property Tax Relief for. Elderly or Disabled. House Bill 2278 
(Chapter 496) and Senate Bill 1073 (Chapter 438) amended Va. Code §§ 15.2-936, 15.2-2407, 
21-118.4, 58.1-3211.1, 58.1-3212, 58.1-3213, and 58.1-3215 to provide the necessary statutory 
authorization ·required by the constitutional amendment to Article X, § 6(b) of the Constitution of 
Virginia, adopted by voters authorizing the General Assembly to permit local governments to 
establish their own income or financial worth limitations for purposes of granting property tax 
relief for homeowners who are 65 years of age or older, or permanently and totally disabled. 
The legislation also requires that if the governing body establishes a net fmancial worth 
limitation, net frilancial worth must be computed by adding together the total· net fmancial worth, 
including the present value of all equitable interests, as of December 31 of the immediately 
preceding calendar year, of the owners, and of the spouse of any owner, of the dwelling. The 
provisions of this legislation is effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2011. The 
legislation contains an emergency clause and has been in force from the date of its passage. 
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12. Real Property Tax Relief for Residences with Chinese Drywall. Senate 
Bill 942 (Chapter 46) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3284.2 to provide that an owner of residential 
property containing defective drywall may request the commissioner of the revenue or other 
assessing official where the property is located to reassess the property. After confirmation by 
the local building official of the presence of defective drywall, the commissioner of the revenue 
or other assessing official will (i) determine the amount by which the defective drywall has 
reduced the assessed value of the property, (ii) provide written notice to the owner of the 
reduction in value, and (iii) reassess the value of the property accordingly. The local building 
official will confmn the presence' of defective, drywall only after a review of the test results 
submitted to him from a testing agency that is approved by the building official and procured by 
the owner of the resideritial property. The local governing body may, by ordinance, designate 
the residential property containing defective drywall as a rehabilitation district for purposes of 
granting the owner a partial real estate tax 'exemption. This legislation was effective, on July 1, 
2011. 
13. Land Use Valuation. House Bill 1672 (Chapter 12) amended Va. Code § 
, 58.1-3237.1 to add James City Courity to the list oflocalities permitted to enact an ordinance to 
exclude land lying in planned development, industrial or comri:tercial zoning districts established 
prior to January 1, 1981 from its land use assessment program. James City County will also be 
permitted to provide that property subject to its land use assessment would no longer be eligible 
for land use assessment and would be subject to roll-back taxes at the time the zoning is changed, 
at the owner's request, to a more intensive nonagricultural use.' However, agriculturally zoned ' 
property that is subsequently rezoned to a more intensive use which is complementary to 
agricultural use will not lose its eligibility, provided that the agricultural activity continues to be 
operated on the property and the property continues to be owned by the same owner. This 
legislation was effective on July 1,2011. 
, , 
14. Improvements to Real Propertv: City of Poquoson. Senate Bill 957 
(Chapter 146) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3221.1 to reclassify improvements to real property 
located in the City of Poquoson as a separate 'class of real property. As a result of this 
reclassification, Poquoson is authorized to impose a real property tax on improvements to real 
property at a rate of-tax which is different than the rate applicable 'to all other real property and is 
not zero. The bill authorizes Poquoson to leVy the real property tax on improvements after 
. publishing a notice in a newspaper having general circulation in the locality at least seven days 
before the levy is made and giving the citizens an opportunity to appear before, and be heard by, 
the local governing body on the subject. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
1. Riverside Owner~ L.ec. v. City of Richmond, 282 Va. 62 (2011). The 
taxpayers sued the City of Richmond in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, under Va. 
Code § 58.1-3984, for relief from a r~al property tax assessment. The City and the taxpayer's' 
predecessor entered into a development agreement ("Agreement") in 2003. The Agreement 
called for the construction of a mixed-use building with a parking garage through the 
rehabilitation of power plant buildings. In exchange for'the rehabilitation of the power plants, 
the City promised that "the [Property] shall qualify for the full benefit of the Rehabilitated Real 
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Estate Program." The Rehabilitated Real Estate Program ("Program") provides a partial 
exemption from real estate taxes for qualifying rehabilitated property. The taxpayer's 
predecessor applied for the Program in 2002. At that time, the City Assessor's office determined 
that the power plants each had a base value of $500. Construction on the Property began in 2003 
and was completed two years later at a cost of approximately $63.8 million. In August 2005, the 
Property was sold to the taxpayer for $85 million. One month later, the City Assessor's office 
conducted its final inspection of the Property and determined that, based on the cost of the 
rehabilitation, its office space had a value of $63.8 million. In May 2006, the City Assessor's 
office revised that amount to roughly $45.2 million for purposes of the Program. The difference 
in the two amounts was due to the application of the "Chandler policy." 
In 1981, former City Assessor Richard A. Chandler established a new policy for 
determirting a property's initial rehabilitated assessed value under the Program. Pursuant to the 
policy, he explained in an internal memorandum, "[t]he [mal estimate of value for rehabilitation 
credit will be determined as of the date of the application and computed only on the information 
which was available at the time the base value was established." The purpose of the policy, he 
further explained, was "to eliminate from the fmal estimate of value any enhancement created by 
something other than rehabilitation or physical improvement." The policy was not published in 
the Program's materials until. 2006. So, 'in accordance with the Chandler policy, the City 
Assessor's office took the value of the Property's office space as of 2005, when the rehabilitation 
was completed, and backdated it to 2002, when the Property's former owner, Richmond Power 
Plant, applied for the program; Because of this backdating, the value of the office space was 
reduced from $63.8 million to approximately $45.2 million for pUrposes of the Program. 
The taxpayer paid its 2006 real estate tax bill for the Property under protest and appealed 
to the City. Assessor, challenging the Chandler policy. The City Assessor denied the appeal, 
concluding that the Chandler policy was consistent with Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and City 
Code § 27-83, and was therefore "correct and legal.'~ In 2008, he taxpayer filed a "Complaint 
and Application for Relief from Erroneous Assessments of Taxes Upon Real Property" pursuant 
to Virginia Code § 58.1-3984. The taxpayer alleged that the Chandler policy was "ultra vires 
and an improper usurpation of legislative power by the City Assessor, and such policy [was] an 
i.J:llproper methodology for setting the assessed value of' rehabilitated improvements, and 
otherwise illegal." The taxpayer sought a refund of the excess taxes paid because of the 
application of the Chandler policy, interest on the overpayments, and attorney's fees. The trial 
court held the policy used to assess the property departed from Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and 
former Richmond, Va., City Code § 27-83, and. ruled in favor of the taxpayers, but denied their 
request for attorneys' fees. The city and the taxpayers appealed. 
Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 provides: 
A. The governing body of any county, city or town may, by ordinance, provide 
for the partial exemption from taxation of real estate on which any structure or 
other improvement no less than twenty years· of age, or fifteen years of age if the 
structure is located in an area designated as an enterprise zone by the 
Commonwealth, has undergone substantial rehabilitation . .'. subject to such 
conditions as the ordinance may prescribe .... The governing body of a county, 
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city or town may establish criteria for determining whether real estate qualifies for 
the partial exemption authorized by this provision and may require the structure to 
be older than twenty years of age,. or fifteen years of age if the structure is located 
in an area designated as an enterprise zone by the Commonwealth, or place such 
other restrictions and conditions on such property as may be prescribed by 
ordinance .... 
B. The partial exemption provided by the local governing body may not exceed an 
amount equal to the increase in assessed value resulting from the rehabilitation .. 
. as determined by the commissioner of revenue or other local assessing officer. 
City of Richmond Code § 27-83, which was adopted pursUant to Code § 58.1-3221, in 
pertinent part, provides: 
(a) Exemption authorized. Partial exemption from real estate taxes is provided for 
qualifying property rehabilitated . . . if eligible according to the terms of the 
Constitution, the Code of Virginia and the provisions of this section and Section 
27-86. 
(b) When deemed rehabilitated. For the purposes of this section, commercial or 
industrial real estate shall be deemed to be substantially rehabilitated when a 
structure . . . has been so improved by renovation, reconstruction or replacement 
as to increase the assessed value of the structure by no less than forty (40) percent. 
Upon receipt of an application for tax exemption, the Assessor shall 
determine the assessed value (hereafter referred to as base value) of the structure 
prior to commencement of rehabilitation. Such assessment shall serve as a basis 
for determining whether the rehabilitation undertaken increases the assessed value 
of such structure by at least forty (40) percent. The application to qualify for tax 
exemption shall be effective until December 31 of the third calendar year 
following the year in which [the] application is submitted. ... When it is. 
determined that a forty-percent increase in assessed value ... has occurred, the 
tax exemption shall become effe~tive beginning on January 1 of the next calendar 
year ... 
(g) Commercial or industrial structures in enterprise zones. Commercial or 
in.dustrial structures that are ... qualified under this· section shall be entitled to a 
fifteen-year period of exemption in the full amount of the difference in taxes 
computed upon the base value and the initial rehabilitated assessed value of the 
property for each year of the fifteen (15) years. 
The City argued that "initial rehabilitated. assessed value" does not mean the first assessed 
value after rehabilitation, i.e., the first value after rehabilitation that is determined by an appraiser 
for tax purposes. The Court disagreed. Contrary to the City's contention, the parenthetical in 
City of Richmond Code § 27-83 does not defme "initial rehabilitated assessed value," but rather 
describes what remains when the base 'value is subtracted from the initial rehabilitated assessed 
value, which is then used to calculate the amount of the tax credit to which an owner is entitled 
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under the Progr~. Accordingly, the Court read "initial rehabilitated assessed value" to mean 
what it says: the flrst assessed value after rehabilitation and that the Chandler Policy is 
inconsistent with Virginia Code § 58.1-3221 and former Richmond, Va., City Code § 27-83 .. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Local Mobile Property Tax. P.D. 10-282 (December 27, 2010). The 
taxpayer,. a resident, of the County, purchased Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) titles for 
two antique aircraft. The County determined that the taxpayer owned the two aircraft and 
assessed property tax for the 2009 tax year using the valuation provided in an aircraft blue book. 
The taxpayer appealed the assessment to the County, contending he did not actually own the 
aircraft or any tangible airplane parts. He asserted that all he actually owned was FAA titling. 
documents that would permit him to rebuild the aircraft and use the "N" number from the 
original aircraft, which had long been destroyed or scrapped by their owners. In its fmal 
determination, the County concluded that the taxpayer owned two aircraft based on the FAA 
information and upheld the assessment. The taxpayer appealed the County's determination to the 
Tax Department contending he did not have any tangible aircraft in the County during that tax 
year at issue. For the County to impose property tax on the aircraft based on their blue book 
value, the aircraft must be in a tangible form and sitused in the County. The Tax Commissioner. 
was unable to conclude that the taxpayer owned tangible aircraft subject to the tax in the C'ounty 
and remanded the case back to the County in order for it to determine whether the taxpayer's 
aircraft were physically located in the County during the 2009 tax year. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
1. Transfer of Duties to Assessor. 2010 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 10-042 
(December 17,2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for the City of Suffolk asked whether 
the devolution of the Commissioner of the Revenue's duties with respect to the assessment of 
real estate to a city real estate assessor transfers to the assessor the Commissioner's responsibility 
under section 58.l-3984(B). .Section 58.1-3984(B) provides that, Under certain circumstances, 
the Commissioner of the Revenue of a locality must apply to the appropriate court for the 
correction of an erroneous assessment. However, the City of Suffolk's charter transferred all of 
the duties with respect to the assessment of real estate for taxation from the Commissioner of 
Revenue to the City Assessor. The Attorney General opined that the charter transfers the 
Commissioner of the Revenue's responsibility under section 58.l-3984(B) to the extent section 
58:1-3984(B) applies to assessments of real property to city real estate assessor. 
2. Separated Spouse Information Required on Exemption Application. 2010 
Va. Att'y Gen. 10-062 (November 5, 2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Loudoun 
County asked whether a married person, applying for a real property tax exemption must include 
his or her spouse's net worth when calculating net combined financial worth to satisfy the 
condition set forth in section 58.1-3211(2) if the. spouse's name does not appear on the deed to 
property and such spouse either has separated from or abandoned the applicant. Section 58.1-· 
3211 imposes restrictions on granting property tax exemptions including, in pertinent part, that 
"[t]he net combined financial worth, including the present value of all equitable interests ... ofthe 
owners~ and of the spouse of any owner ... shall not exceed $200,000." . The Attorney General 
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opined that the spouse's net worth ,must be included on the application irrespective of whether-
such spouse has separated from or abandoned the applicant or whether the spouse's name appears 
on the deed. 
3. Meaning of "Substantial Gainful Activity". 2010 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-107 
(October 22,2010). The County Attorney for Arlington County asked whether an applicant for 
property tax relief under section 58.1-3210, who has obtained a signed statement from a doctor 
stating that the applicant is permanently incapacitated, yet who has been a fulltime employee of a 
governmental agency for over a decade, where he currently eams an annual salary of $44,000, is 
engaged in "any substantial gainful activity." The Attorney General opined that an individual 
who is employed full-time and who continues to earn a substantial salary is engaged in 
"substantial gainful activity II and is, therefore, ineligible for tax relief under section 58.1-3210., 
4. _ Exemption for Veterans and Their Surviving Spouses. _ 2011 Va. Att'y 
Gen. 11..;.061 (July 15, 201 i). Four members of the General Assembly asked twelve questions 
regarding the property tax exemption for veterans and their surviving spouses of veterans if the 
veteran is disabled due to service connected injuries. The Constitution of Virginia was amended 
in 2010 to include this exemption. The fIrst question was when the exemption was effective. 
The Attorney General opined that it became effective on January 1, 2011. A number of 
questions asked whether a surviving spou,se would qualify for the exemption if the deceased 
spouse passed away prior to the effect,ive date. In each different scenario presented, the Attorney 
General opined that a surviving spouse would not qualify for the exemption -if the deceased 
spouse passed away prior to the effective date regardless of the scenarios presented. 
Furthermore, there are no additional legal means to extend the exemption to these surviving 
spouses other than amending the Virginia Constitution again. Among the ot.'1er conclusion 
reached by the Attorney General: 
1. The local Commissioner of the Revenue is responsible for administering the 
exemption; 
2. The General Assembly may enact legislation authorizing the Commissioner of the 
Virginia Department. of Veteran Services - to promulgate rules and regulations 
regarding the administration and/or implementation of the exemption; 
3. Real property includes both land and a dwelling; 
4. The exemption is not available to a veteran who has placed his property into a 
revocable inter vivos trust with or without his spouse or an irrevocable trust; and 
5. The exemption does not follow a surviving spouse if the spouse chooses to relocate. 
V. PROCEDURAL 
A. . 2011 Legislation 
1. Reduced Accrual of Interest on Aooeals. Senate Bill 1152 (Chapter 295) 
amended Va. Code § 58.1-1822 to provide that once a tax liability has been assessed and an 
application for correction has been filed by the taxpayer, the amount of the tax paid by the 
taxpayer shall accrue interest at the normal Virginia interest rate until nine months from the date 
of assessment. After nine months, the amount shall accrue interest at the "Federal short-term 
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rate" established pursuant to § 6621 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code. If the Tax Commissioner 
determines that any portion of the assessment is correct, interest would resume accruing at the 
rate prescribed by Va. Code § 58.1-15 thirty days after the date of the Tax Commissioner's 
determination. This legislation is effective for administrative appeals filed on or after July 1, 
2011. 
2. Judicial Notice. House Bill 2145 (Chapter 800) amended Va. Code §§ 
2.2-4031, 58.1-204, and 58.1-205 to provide that tax bulletins, guidelines, and other published 
documents, published by the Tax Department are accorded judicial notice. The legislation also 
requires the Tax Department to publish tax bulletins and guidelines and would include posting 
the documents on the Tax Department's website as a permitted publication method instead of 
distribution to national and state tax services. The provisions of this legislation are effective in 
proceedings commenced on and after July 1, 2011. 
3. Local Tax Collection. House Bill 1425 (Chapter 383) amended Va. Code 
§ 58.1-3919.1 to reduce the period of delinquency before which private collection agents may be 
used to collect delinquent local taxes from six months to three months. This legislation also 
removes the exclusion of real estate taxes from the local taxes that a treasurer may refer to 
private collection agents for collection. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
. 4. Filing Tax Returns By Commercial Delivery. House Bill 2141 (Chapter 
368) amended Va; Code § 58.1-9 to recognize that tax returns or payment of taxes remitted by 
means of a commercial delivery service, in an envelope or sealed container bearing a 
confirmation of shipment on or before midnight of the day the return is due, are timely filed. 
Under current law, a tax return or payment remitted by mail and bearing a postmark from the 
United States Postal Service on or before the due date is considered timely filed, regardless of 
when the taxing entity actually receives it. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
5. Fillable Forms. Senate Bill 1450 (Chapter 680) enacted Va. Code §58.1-
202.3 to require the Department of Taxation to make all state tax forms fIllable in portable 
document format (PDF) for periods beginning on and after January 1; 2012 on the Department of 
Taxation's website. The Department of Taxation would begin making fillable forms available no 
later than January 1, 2012 and would make all fIllable forms available no later than March 1, 
2013. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
No recent court decisions. 
C.. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Live Chat. P.D. 10-247 (October 28, 2010). The taxpayer appealed an 
assessment of unreported sales and use taxes from auctions conducted by the taxpayer. The Tax 
Commissioner ultimately upheld the assessment. However, the taxpayer claimed that it received 
erroneous advice via the Tax Department's Live Chat function on its website. The taxpayer 
received the advice after the audit so the Tax Commissioner did not consider it. However if the 
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taxpayer received erroneous advice via Live Chat before he did not collect sales tax, it is 
conceivable that the Tax Department would be precluded from assessmg additional tax. 
2. Incomplete Appeal & Amnesty Penalty. P.D. 11-21 (February 18, 2011). 
The Tax Commissioner detennined that a taxpayer is barred from filing an application for 
correction of an assessment issued on July 13, 2010. The taxpayer filed a notice of intent to 
appeal on September 21, 2010, but ·did not file a complete appeal by October 11, 2010. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner noted that the amnesty penalty assessed against the taxpayer 
was correct. For certain assessments, the amnesty penalty is not imposed if (1) the audit is the 
taxpayer's first audit, (2) no penalty was applied to the tax deficiency, (3) any uncontested 
liability is paid within 30 days from the date of assessment, and (4) payment for any contested 
liability remaining upon resolution of an appeal under Virginia Code sections 58.1-1821 or 58.1-
1825 is paid within 30 days from the date of the Tax Corrimissioner's or the court's final 
determination. As the taxpayer never established that it was contesting all or a portion of the 
liability at issue by filing a complete appeal, the unco~tested tax was not paid within 30 days of 
the date of assessment and the imposition of the amnesty penalty was deterinined to be correct. 
See also P.D. 11-25 (February 28, '2011). 
3. Failure to Furnish Information. P.D. 11-28 (February 28, 2011). The· 
taxpayer claimed multiple itemized deductions on his Virginia individual income tax return. 
Under audit, the auditor requested supporting documentation to substantiate the deductions 
cla.hr\ed. When .the information was not received, the auditor disallowed the deductions and 
issued an assessment for additional tax and interest.· The taxpayer appealed the assessment, 
stating that he would. provide documentation to substantiate the deductions. The Tax 
Commissioner upheld the assessment as the taxpayer failed to' provide the promised 
documentation. 
4. Filing of Tax Returns and Payments by COlnmercial Delivery Service. 
P.D. 11-96 (June 8, 2011). The Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-5 to provide 
information regarding the filing of tax returns and payments by commercial delivery service. 
5. Failure to Provide Information. P.D. 11-126 (July 6,2011). The taxpayer 
manufactures and distributes pipes. An audit by the Tax Department resulted in the assessment 
of additional sales tax on combined shipping and handling charges. The taxpayer appealed and 
contended that the charges are mislabeled on the invoices and are for shipping only. The 
taxpayer argued that the invoiced' shipping and handling charges are for shipping services only 
that are provided by third party common carriers. Additionally, the taxpayer stated that any . 
amo\lI1t it charges above its shipping costs are not for handling, as those costs are included in the 
sales price of the product. However, the taxpayer presented no documentation to support its 
position. Because this was the taXpayer's first audit, the Tax Commissioner gave ·the taxpayer an 
additional 30 days to provide documentation supporting its position with the audit returned to the 
audit staff. Observation: Apparently taxpayers who are audited for the first time can appeal 
their assessment without providing any documentation· and taking a position that is inconsistent 
with precedent and still get 30 additional days to make their case. 
62 
6. Written Guidance. P.D. 11-132 (July 21, 2011). The taxpayer sells and 
repairs tires. The taxpayer was assessed sales tax on tire disposal fees related to the sale of tires. 
The taxpayer protests the assessment on the basis that it was given the incorrect guidance by the 
Tax Department when it requested instructions as to th~ correct application of the tax. During its 
initial registration with the Tax Department, the taxpayer stated it was verbally instructed that 
tire disposal fees were not subject to the tax and did not collect sales tax on the fees based on this 
guidance. When the taxpayer was subsequently assessed during the audit for failure to collect 
sales tax on tire disposal fees, it contacted the Department via "Live Chat." Transcripts of "Live 
Chat" document the taxpayer being advised that tire disposal fees are not subject to sales and use 
tax. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. Per Virginia Code § 58.l-1835, taxpayers 
may only rely upon written advice from the Tax Department. As the "Live Chat" session 
'occurred after the assessment was issue~, the taxpayer did not rely on the advice given. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
1. Issuance of Refunds of Local Taxes' to taxpayers. 2010 Op. Va. Att'y 
Gen. 10-094 (December 22,2010). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Spotsylvania County 
r~quested an Opinion of the Attor:ney General on (i) what a local commissioner of the revenue is 
required by Virginia law to tender to the board of supervisors in order to "certify" the 
commissioner's determination that a local tax assessment was erroneous; (ii) what is the role of a 
county attorney in providing his "consent" to the commissioner of the revenue's determination 
and to what extent the commissioner of the revenue lawfully may provide an affected taxpayer's 
local tax filings, with attached business and fmancial records to the county attorney; and, (iii) 
whether a county. attorney's review of and consent to a downward adjustment of a local real 
. estate tax assessment by the county's board of equalization is' a necessary predicate to the 
county's issuance of a refund of excess taxes that a taxpayer initially paid. 
The Attorney General responded that (i) a county commissioner of the revenue's 
"certification" of a correction of a local tax assessment means that the commissioner should 
provide written verification that he has determined tha~ the original local tax assessment paid by 
the affected taxpayer was erroneous; (ii) § 58.1-3(A)(2) authorizes a county commissioner of the' 
revenue to supply to the attorney for his county any information that is necessary to. enable the 
attorney to make an informed decision as to whether to consent to the commissioner of the 
revenue's determination; and (iii) that a county attorney's consent to a reduction of a n~al estate 
tax assessment by a county board of equalization is not a prerequisite to the county's issuance of 
a refund of excess taxes. . 
VI. BUSINESS LICENSE TAXES 
A~ 2011 Legislation 
1. Imposition of BPOL Tax on Taxable Income. House Bill 1437 (Chapter 
685) amended Va. Code § 58.l-3702 to allow localities the option to impose the Business, 
Professional and Occupational License ("BPOL") tax on either the gross receipts or the Virginia 
taxable income of a business; The BPOL tax is a tax on businesses for the privilege of engaging 
in business at a defmite place of business within a Virginia locality. Currently, the measure or 
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basis 'of the BPOL tax is the gross receipts of the business. This legislation was effective on July 
1,2011. 
2. Business License Incentive Program. House Bill 1587 (Chapter 25) 
amended Va. Code § 58.1-3703 to clarify that localities may provide an exemption, refund, 
rebate, or other relief from the BPOL Tax for a period not to exceed 2 years for businesses 
locating for the fITst time in a locality. The bill also provides that a business would not be 
deemed to .locate for the fITst time in a locality on the basis of merger, acquisition, similar 
business combination or a change in business form. This legislation was effective on July 1, 
2011. 
3. Unprofitable Businesses. Senate Bill 1408 (Chapter 188) amended Va. , 
Code § 58.1-3703 to authorize localities to exempt BPOL tax or fees of any business that loses 
money and does not have a_profit for the taxable year. The business will be required to offer its 
income tax return to the local commissioner of the revenue as proof of the losses. Eligibility will 
be determined annually, and it would be the obligation of the business owner to submit the 
applicable income tax return. This legislation will be effective for taxable years beginning on ot 
'after January 1,2012. ' 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
1. Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County, Supreme Court of 
Virginia Record No. 092158 (March 4,2011). The Supreme Court of Virginia again dealt with a 
locality imposing ~e BPOL tax on gross receipts generated outside its geographical boundaries. 
The taxpayer, Ford Motor Credit Company, (hereinafter "FMCC"), is a fmancial services 
provider primarily to the automobile, purchase or loan lessee environment. Until its closing in 
2007, the Chesterfield County branch was one of FMCC's 300 sales branches and, at one time, 
was one of three operating in Virginia. Approximately 75 percent of the Chesterfield County 
branch's business was consumer fmancing for the purchase of vehicles. The Chesterfield County 
, branch' was tasked with contacting and training dealers to increase vehicle sales and the number 
of loans made by FMCC, approving loan applications, determining loan interest rates, and 
providing programs and training for dealers concerning FMCC's fmancing programs. During the 
period in question, the Chesterfield County branch reported to a regional office located 
elsewhere in Virginia, while offices in Baltimore, Maryland; Nashville, Tennessee; Omaha, 
Nebraska; ,Mesa, Arizona; and, Livonia, Michigan also played a role in managing and 
administering loans that originated in FMCC's Chesterfield County branch. FMCC also had 
centers that dealt with loans originating in the Chesterfield County branch, and elsewhere, that 
subsequently went into default. ' , 
Typically, the Chesterfield County branch reviewed loan applications from 
customers who sought to purchase a vehicle from a Ford dealership, and decided whether or not 
to approve the loan based on procedures set out by FMCC headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan. 
While the Chesterfield County branch determined interest rates, sometimes approving a lower 
rate for a customer with a good credit score, most of the interest rates were set by the 
headquarters in Michigan. When the Chesterfield County branch approved a loan application, it 
notified the dealership~ where the customer actually executed the installment loan contract. The 
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headquarters in Michigan wired funds electronically to the dealership's bank account which were 
used to finance the customer's purchase. After the documents were signed and'returned to the 
Chesterfield County branch, all of the documents were forwarded to an office outside of 
Chesterfield County, which then serviced the loan. The Chesterfield County branch did not 
handle any aspect of the loan after forwarding the documents to another office. 
The local Commissioner of Revenue determined that all of the gross receipts of 
FMCC's loans were generated by the Chesterfield County branch and were not apportionable. 
Pursuantto Virginia Code sections 58.1-3702 and -3703(A), and Chesterfield County Code sec. 
6-4, the locality levied BPOLtaxes against FMCC in the amounts of $327,137.85, $306,435.65, 
$432,620.96, and $449,740.59 for the tax years 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. 
FMCC paid the taxes and applied for a refund, which'was denied. FMCC then filed suit in 
Chesterfield County Circuit Court and argued that the gross receipts should have been ' 
apportioned to Chesterfield County to reflect the liniited contribution of the Chesterfield County 
branch to FMCC's' natiOli'wide business. Ultimately, the circuit court rejected FMCC's 
arguments by finding that the Chesterfield County branch's marketing and closing operations 
generated the gross receipts in the form of interest and fees and the other FMCC locations merely 
serviced and collected the gross receipts: . 
FMCC appealed the circuit court's ruling to the Supreme CoUrt of Virginia based 
on three issues. First, FMCC argued that the Chesterfield County branch's gross receipts are 
subject to apportionment. FMCC also argued that the gross receipts must be apportioned by 
payroll, per Virginia Code section 58.1,.3703.1 (A)(3), as it is impractical or impossible to 
determine to which definite place of business gross receipts should be attributed. Finally, FMCC 
argued that it is entitled to a deduction under Code § 58.l-3732(B)(2) as that statute provides that 
receipts attributable to business ,conducted in another state in which the taxpayer is liable for an, 
income or other tax based upon income should be deducted from gross receipts that would 
otherwise be taxable. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with FMCC that the gross receipts are 
subject to apportionment and shoUld be apportioned by payroll. While FMCC's Chesterfield 
County operations could not produce 100% of its gross receipts, the locality essentially argued' 
that gross receipts were derived' from the exercise of FMCC's licensed privilege to conduct a 
fmancial services business as the gross receipts were generated when a loan was made to a 
customer. The Court said that, "To accept the County's position ... would mean that all ,services 
'necessary to FMCC's deriving gross receipts from its consumer msta1lment and inventory 
financing operations were provided at the [Chesterfield County] Branch."l Clearly, these were 
not the facts of the case. The Court rejected the locality's argument noting that only a receivable 
was created in Chesterfield County and no gross receipts were yet generated.2 
Next, the Court dealt with whether it was impractical or impossible to determine 
to which defmite place of business gross receipts should be attributed. An' expert provided by 
FMCC at trial testified that there was no way to take one payment or one dollar of interest and 
distribute it among all of the activities that may come into play .on a loan. The locality did not . 
1 Ford Motor Credit Company v. Chesterfield County. Supreme Court ofVirgiDia, Record No. 092158 at P. 25. 
2 The BPOL tax is imposed on gross receipts, not receivables. . , 
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contradict this testimony at trial. The expert's testimony led the Supreme Court of Virginia to 
conclude that it would be impossible or, at least, impractical to perform that process on every one 
of the approximately 20,000 loans processed annually by the Chesterfield County branch. 
c. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Definite Place of Business. P.D. 10-275 (December 16, 2010). The 
taxpayer, a contractor, leased space at a self-storage facility in the City where it stored five 
commercial vehicles· and all its equipment. The facility was owned by an unrelated third party 
and provided storage space for vehicles and equipment for the general public. Every work day, 
the taxpayer's employees met at the facility to get assignments and start their. work day. 
Construction jobs were assigned and the trucks were loaded at the facility. The owner conducted 
all business by mobile phone. The taxpayer did not receive mail (e.g., bills, tax returns, or 
payments) at the storage f,!cility, and no administration functions were performed in the City. 
The County examined the taxpayer and determined that it did not have a definite place' of 
business in the City for the tax years at issue. As such, the County issued BPOL tax assessments 
to the taxpayer for the 2006 and 2007 tax years because the taxpayer's sole owner resided in the 
County. The County also determined that some of the taxpayer's commercial vehicles garaged at 
the storage facility weighed less than' 10,000 pounds. The County sitused these vehicles to the 
owner's home in the County and assessed BTPP tax for the tax years at issue. The taxpayer paid 
the assessments and appealed the County's assessments, contending its defmiteplace of business 
was located in the City and that all of its vehicles weighed more than 10,000 pounds. In its final 
determination, the County determined that the taxpayer's definite place of business was not 
directed or controlled from the facility in the City and, by default, the taxpayer's definite place of 
business reverted to the County under Va. Code § 58.1-3700.1. The County also held·that the 
taxpayer was liable for the BTPP tax on any vehicles that weighed less than 10,000 pounds 
because they were directed and controlled from the definite place of business in the County. The 
taxpayer filed an appeal with the Tax Comntissioner contending it did not have a definite place 
of business in the County and that none of its vehicles were subject to the BTPP tax in the 
County. The Tax Commissioner upheld the assessment. According to the Tax Commissioner, 
characteristics that may help determine whether the location is a definite place of business 
include, but are not limited to, the following on-site activities: (1) a continuous presence; (2) 
having an office \Vith a phone; (3) the reception of mail; (4) having employees; (5) record 
keeping; (6). and advertising or otherwjse holding oneself out as engaging in. business at the 
particular location. The taxpayer's facility in the County was only used for storage and as a 
meeting place for employees which was not sufficient enough for the Tax Commissioner to 
determine that it is a definite place of business. The Tax Commissioner did not have enough 
infonnation to determine if the automobiles weighed more than.1 0,000 pounds and remanded 
that issue to the County .. 
2. Definite Place of Business. P.D. 10-277 & P.D. 10-278 (December 22, 
2010). The taxpayer is a government contractor with a defmite place of business in City A. The 
taxpayer is' primarily engaged in providing repair services at military installations in' City A and 
surrounding localities. City A has classified the taxpayer as a business service and has assessed 
BPOL tax based on the gross receipts generated from the services directed and controlled from 
the definite place of ~usiness Within its borders. The taxpayer is currently performing repair 
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services on vehicles at a military base located in City B. The taxpayer leases a trailer located on 
the base that is furnished with desks and computers. Repair personnel . use the trailer for 
meetings and to interact with the City A facility. Clerical staff employed· at the trailer provide 
administrative support and organize technical documentation. A telephone land line is installed 
in the trailer, but the phone number is not advertised to the public., The name of the taxpayer is 
not posted on any signage on or near the trailer pursuant to military requirements. The taxpayer 
does not negotiate any contracts or solicit any business from the trailer. The taxpayer did not 
receive mail at the trailer and contracts performed at the base list .the City A office as the 
taxpayer's address and place of contact. 
City B contacted the taxpayer concerning its business license obligations to City 
B. City B believes the activities conducted by the taxpayer as the military base are subject to 
licensure in City B. City A avers that the taxpayer does not have a definite place of business in 
City B, and all the services_ conducted at the base are directed and controlled from the office in 
City A. Cities A and B requested, an advisory opinion as to whether the taxpayer is subject to 
the BPOL tax in City B. The Tax Commissioner opined that the taxpayer's definite place of 
business is City B. According to the Tax Commissioner, characteristics that may help determine 
whether the location is a definite place of business include, but are not liinited to~ the following 
on-site activities: (1) a continuous presence; (2) having an office with a phone; (3) the reception 
of mail; (4) having employees; (5) record keeping; (6) and advertising or otherwise holding 
oneself out as engaging in business at the particular location. The determination was based on 
prior rulings. In P.D. 10-104 (7/18/2010) 'and P.D. 02..,153 (12/1112002), the Tax Department 
opined that contractors that maintained a trailer at a particular site on a daily and continuous 
basis for 30 days may have established a definite place of business at the locality in which the 
trailers were located. The Department found that the contractor's physicru presence, along with 
having some of the characteristics of having a definite place of business, such as having a phone 
was indicative of having a definite place of business. 
3. ' Classification of Licensed Contractor. P'.D. 11-01 (January 3, 2011). A 
taxpayer appealed a determination by a county commissioner of the revenue that it should have 
been paying BPOL tax to the County. The taxpayer is a corporation that performs tree and 
stump removal, tree pruning, landscaping and tree planting, grinding and recycling, mulch 
supply and commercial land clearing. The taxpayer also performs demolition projects and is 
engaged in the construction of buildings, additions, and retaining walls. These jobs are 
performed in various Virginia localities as well as outside Virginia. The taxpayer holds a Class 
A construction license and is licensed as a contractor' for BPOL purposes in the City. The 
taxpayer's operates from a facility leased in the City. Its sales staff and business estimators work 
from the City facility, and all of its equipment is located and dispatched from the City. The City 
facility includes a machine shop operated to 'maintain all of the taxpayer's equipment. The 
taxpayer has a phone at its City facility and holds itself out as operating from the City on its 
business cards. The taxpayer's president directs the operations of the taxpayer from his office at 
the City location or from his home, which is also located in the City. 
In addition to its City office, the taxpayer also has an office in the County. The 
taxpayer's office in the County· has four individuals that perform record, keeping and 
administrative functions. Business dpcuments, including license applications and tax returns, 
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reflect the County address. The telephone directory and the taxpayer's Internet web page provide 
the County phone number and the address of the County facility. Under audit, the County issued 
assessments for the 2006 through 2009 taxable years. In its fmal determination addressing the 
taxpayer's local appeal, the County concluded that the taxpayer was subject to BPOL tax because 
it had a definite place of business within its jurisdiction. The County also concluded that the 
taxpayer should be classified as a business service provider rather than a contractor .. The 
taxpayer appeals the fmallocal determination to the· Tax Commissioner contending: (1) it should 
be classified as a contractor; (2) it does not have a defmite place of business in the County; and 
(3) all of its business was directed and controlled from the City facility. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer should be classified as a 
business service provider as tree surgeons, trimmers, and removal services are listed as business 
services under Title 23 VAC 10-500-500. The fact that the taxpayer holds a contractor's license 
has no bearing on its clas~ification for BPOL tax' purposes. However based on other tasks 
performed by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner noted that the taxpayer might be operating 
multiple businesses which may require more than one license. The Tax Commissioner also 
determined that the taxpayer had a clear definite place of business in the County. Despite having 
a definite place of business, the activities performed in the county (administrative functions) 
were merely ancillary. However, if the taxpayer is conducting its contracting activities within 
County, and th~se. activities generate more than $25,000 in gross receipts in any year, .the Tax 
Commissioner determined that the County may require that the taxpayer get a business license 
and assess a tax on those gross receipts. 
4. Imposition ofCountv BPOL in Town. P.D .. 11-03 & 11-04 (January 7, 
2011). A county and a town jointly requested, an advisory opinion as to whether the county is 
permitted to impose the BPOL tax on lessors of real property within the town. The Tax 
Comniissioner determined that a county may not impose a BPOL tax on businesses operating in 
a town that lie within its borders unless it has the town's permission. Specifically, a county may 
oilly impose a BPOL tax on the lessors of real property within a town that lies within the county, 
if the town gives them such permission. 
5. Deduction for Gross Receipts Attributable to Business in Other States. 
P.D. 11-13 (January 21, 2011). The taxpayer is a provider of computer-based services with 
multiple locations in the locality and throughout the world. The taxpayer apportioned its gross 
receipts based on payroll·as it was impossible or impractical to determine the situs of its gross 
receipts under the general situs rules. The taxpayer calculated its gross receipts by first 
deducting from its total world wide gross· receipts those gross receipts generated from each state , 
in which it filed an income tax return and then multiplied applied the payroll apportionment 
percentage. The locality audited the taxpayer and disallowed the deduction for the gross 
receipts. The taxpayer appealed the assessments to the locality, contending it was not permitted 
a deduction for gross receipts attributable to business conducted in other states. Ultimately, the 
locality upheld the audit assessment, concluding that the deduction afforded by Va. Code § 58.1 ~ 
3732 B 2 is not applicable to the taxp;;lyer because the taxpayer was not otherwise taxable by the 
locality. The taxpayer appealed the locality'~ fmal determination to the Tax Commissioner, 
claiming it has been denied the deduction.for gross receipts attributable to its business conducted 
in other states or foreign countries. 
68 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer was entitled to the deduction 
per Virginia Code sec. 58.1-3732(B)(2) provided it can show some evidence that employees 
from the definite place of business in the locality earn, or participate in earning, receipts 
attributable to customers in other states where the taxpayer filed an income tax return. The 
amount of any deduction would be determined by multiplying the total out-of-state tax receipts 
by the same payroll factor used to determine situs of gross receipts. Before reaching this 
conclusion however, the Tax Commissioner noted. that the taxpayer) method of claiming the 
deduction was incorrect. The statutory construction of Virginia Code sec. 58.1.-3732 establishes 
that the taxable measure of gross receipts must first be determined before any deduction is, 
granted. In other words, receipts must first be assigned or sitused to a definite place of business. 
Then, from those assigned receipts, a taxpayer may take the deduction. The taxpayer was taking 
the deduction before apportionment. 
6. Change in Form of Entity. P.D. 11-27 (February 28, 2011). The taxpayer, 
a single member limited liability corporation, began operating in the City in March 2009. Prior 
to establishing the taxpayer, the single owner operated the same business as a sole proprietorship. 
The taxpayer continued to operate' under the original business license. issued to the sole 
proprietorship during 2009. As the result of an audit, the City issued a license fee to the taxpayer 
for the 2009 tax year based on the City's fmding that the taxpayer was a new business. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessment to the City. The taxpayer also claimed that the license fee 
should have been prorated based on the number of months it was in operation during 2009. In its 
final determination, the City upheld the assessment, concluding that .the change in the taxpayer's 
legal status created a new and separate business, and Virginia law does not provide for the 
proration of license fees. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Commissioner by offering the same 
arguments presented in its appeal to the City. In addition, the taxpayer requested the fee be 
waived due to personal and fmancial hardship. 
The Tax Commissioner upheld the imposition of the fee. Because the taxpayer, a 
limited liability company~ is an entity different from a sole proprietorship, it must be regarded as 
a beginning business in 2009 and subject to a license tax or fee for the 2009 tax year. 
Furthermore, the Tax Commissioner noted that it is in the sole discretion of local taxing 
authorities to accept offers in compromises such as the reduced fee' the taxpayer is requesting 
from the Tax Commissioner. 
7. Motor Carriers. P.D. 11-42 (March 16, 2011). During the tax years at 
issue, the taxpayer, a resident of the City, was a tractor trailer driver that owned a commercial 
tractor that was leased to a business (the ~otor carrier) located in State A. The taxpayer operated 
the tnick as an independent contractor on behalf of the State A company. The City determined 
the taxpayer was engaged in a licensable business activity within its jurisdiction for the tax years 
at issue. As such, the City issued BPOL tax assessments to the taxpayer for the 2009 and 2010· . 
tax years. The taxpayer appealed the City's assessments. In its final determination, the·City 
determined that the taxpayer's residence was his defmite place of business because he was 
engaged in business but maintained no defmite place of business elsewhere. The taxpayer filed 
an appeal with the Tax Commissioner contending he did not have a defmite place of business in 
the City and he was riot engaged in a licensable business activity within the City. In addition, he 
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argued that the motor carrier is exempt from the BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner disagreed 
and upheld the assessment. The Tax Commissioner stated that while motor carriers who were 
formerly certified by the Interstate Commerce Commission or presently registered for insurance 
purposes with the Federal Highway Administration are exempt, the drivers are not exempt unless 
they hold the same licenses. The Tax Commissioner also determined that the taxpayer's home 
was his definite place of business and that his gross receipts would be sitused there. The Tax 
Commissioner cited P.D. 99-84 which said that the home of truck driver who owned his truck, 
but leased it to an out-of-state business and operated the truck as an independent .contractor, 
would be considered to be a definite place of business if he did not maintain a definite place of 
business elsewhere. Finally, the Tax Commissioner sent the appeal back to the City to determine 
if the leasing of the taxpayer's tractor constituted a separate licensable business. 
8. Definite Place of Business. P.D. 11-49 (April 4, 2011). The taxpayer is a 
limited liability company with four members. The taxpayer formed as a joint venture i.J;:t State A 
and took over federal contracts from one of the members (Member A) to perform business 
s~rvices for the federal government. The services are performed by employees of Member A at 
Member A's facilities in Virginia and other states. Member A bills the taxpayer for the services 
if performs, which in turn, bills the federal agency for the services plus a markup. The taxpayer's 
corporate address was at Member A's definite place of business for nine months in 2009. While· 
the taxpayer's business address was in Virginia, it had no employees or property. It did not have 
a phone number or an address listed in the phone book. It did not have its, name on the building 
or listed in the building directory. The taxpayer's business records were kept at a facility in State 
B. In January 2010, the taxpayer's address was changed to the State B facility. The taxpayer 
requested an advisory opinion as to whether it has a definite place of business in Virginia. The 
taxpayer asks whether it had a BPOL filing requirement for the nine months in 2009 that it was 
located in the Virginia locality. Finally, the taxpayer asks how it should it situs gross receipts 
without employees if it is subject to BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner determined that the 
presence of the taxpayer at Member A's office does not constitute a "regular and continuous" 
business activity. The mere sharing of office space with an entity in a Virginia locality without 
having employees, property, phone, or in any way advertising or holding itself out as engaging in 
business in that particular location is not sufficient to create a definite place of business. 
9. Statute of Limitations & Business Classification. P.D. 11-83 (June 2, 
2011). The taxpayer is a corporation with two shareholders. One shareholder is a certified 
interior designer licensed as such by the Commonwealth. The taxpayer provides design, 
consultation and similar services to its· customers. The taxpayer maintains a small showroom 
where it displays household furnishings as well as the catalogs, samples and swatches. The 
showroom is closed to the public when the certified interior designer is out of the office. 
Customers can also order items through catalogs and procure installation and upholstery services 
from a third-party source. Catalog prices are not made available for client review. Items that are 
purchased by the taxpayer at wholesale prices are marked up and resold to customers. The 
taxpayer takes title to all items prior to their resale. Along with the sale of the furniture and 
furnishings, the taxpayer provides design consultation services, which are not separately charged. 
The taxpayer does charge an hourly fee for design, consulting, or other services with respect to 
items of property that it does not sell. The information presented indicated these separate 
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charges for design services represented less than 1 % of the taxpayer's total gross receipts for the 
tax years at issue. 
The taxpayer appealed its classification and argued that it should properly be classified as 
a retail merchant for BPOL tax purposes for the 2004 through 2009 tax years as 99.5% of its 
gross receipts come from the sales of goods, wares, and merchandise for use or consumption of 
the purchaser. In the alternative, the taxpayer argued that if separately stated services constitute 
a separate business, then it should be required to have multiple licenses pursuant to Va. Code § 
58.1-3703.1(A)(I). The City contended that because the taxpayer holds itself out to the public as 
an interior decorator and is marketed to the public as an interior designer in advertisements, 
newspaper articles and other seminar and event announcements, it should be classified as a 
business service. The City also argued that the NAICS description describes interior designers 
as services providers and Title 23 of the Virginia Administrative Code (V AC) 10-500-500 
defines interior decorating as a business service. 
Before addressing the issues appealed by the taxpayer, the Tax Commissioner addressed 
whether the tax years were open for appeal. The City received the taxpayer's initial request for 
reclassification in February 2007 and responded by initiating an audit. The final local 
detennination issued in September 2007 affinned the original assessments for the 2004 through 
2007 tax years. The last day of the tax year for which the 2004 assessment was made was 
December 31, 2004. As such, the taxpayer would have needed to file the amended return for the 
2004 tax year by December 31, 2007 to meet the limitations period.' Likewise, the last day the 
taxpayer could have filed a refund claim for 2005 was December 31, 2008. The taxpayer filed 
refund claims for the 2004 and 2005 tax years in September 2009, well after the period of 
limitations had expired for making such a claim. As the statute of limitatipns had expired, the 
Tax Commissioner declined to review the claims for these years. Also, the Tax Commissioner 
declined to review the claim for the 2006 and 2007 years as those years were reviewed in a prior 
ruling and the taxpayer did not submit new evidence. 
For the 2008 and 2009 tax years, the Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer is 
not a retail merchant and was properly classified by the City as a business service based on facts 
discussed in the appeal. The taxpayer is not open for regular business hours, but is closed 
randomly depending on when the owner has consulting appointments away from the definite 
place of business. Furthennore, the taxpayer holds itself out as an interior design service in the 
local online and print telephone directory. The Tax Commissioner noted that these 
advertisements leave little doubt that the taxpayer is advertising the expertise in interior design as 
its primary business. The Tax Commissioner stated that the taxpayer may be classified as 
separate businesses however. The Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer would have 
to establish the existence of two separate business activities by providing documentation of gross 
receipts attributed to each of the following business activities: (1) interior design consulting fees 
not associated with the purchase of home furnishings; (2) consulting fees and associated 
purchases of furnishings; and (3) home furnishing purchases from either the showroom samples 
or the manufacturer's catalogs. The taxpayer indicated to the Tax Commissioner that no 
consulting fees were charged in association with the purchase of home furnishings. Therefore, 
the Tax Commissioner detennined that the taxpayer would only need to provide documentation 
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of gross receipts attributed to (1) interior design consulting fees and (2) home furnishing sales 
from either the showroom samples or catalogs. 
10. Vertically Integrated Manufacturer. The taxpayer operates a business in 
the City that processes poultry, soybeans and grain products, soybean meal and oil, and animal 
feed. The taxpayer had been filing BPOL tax returns classified as a business service. In 
December 2008, the taxpayer filed refund requests for the 2005 through 2008 tax years asserting 
that it was a vertically integrated manufacturer entitled to the manufacturer's exemption from the 
BPOL tax. In its final local determination, the City concluded that the taxpayer's operations 
were properly classified as a business service and upheld the original assessments. The taxpayer 
appealed the local determination to the Tax Commissioner contending it was a vertically 
integrated manufacturer that was not subject to tax on its wholesale sales. It also avered that it 
transferred all of its assets and operations located in the City to V ALLC, a separate but affiliated 
entity, in April 2007 and was no longer subject to the BPOL tax after that time. 
In its response to the appeal to the Tax Commissioner, the City raised an astonishing 
number of baseless objections and ignored prior rulings. First, the City asserted that the Tax 
Department lacks jurisdiction to address the taxpayer's appeal because there was no appealable 
event at the local level. The City contended that the taxpayer's appeal was filed pursuant to Va. 
Code § 58.1-3983.1, and the taxpayer's appeal was not timely filed in accordance with Va. Code 
§ 58.1-3703.1 (A)(6). The Tax Commissioner disagreed as the taxpayer was denied a refund 
because the City declined to change the taxpayer's classification. Such a determination 
constitutes an appealable event under Va. Code § 58.1-3703.1(A)(5). Also, Va. Code § 58.1-
3703.1(A)(6) provides that any taxpayer may appeal a final local determination to the Tax 
Commissioner within 90 days of the issuance of a final local determination. The City issued its 
final local determination on July 13,2010. The 90th day for filing an appeal fell on October 11, 
2010, which was a federal and state holiday. Therefore, the taxpayer had until the next business 
day, or October 12, 2010, to file its appeal. The appeal was delivered to the Tax Department on 
October 12, 2010, which was within the 90-day period. Therefore, the Tax Commissioner 
determined that the appeal was timely filed. . 
The Tax Department previously addressed the issue as to whether the taxpayer is a 
vertically integrated manufacturer with regard to the business tangible personal property tax and 
machinery and tools tax in P.D. 08-80. Despite this ruling, the City maintained that the 
taxpayer's soybean processing operations are separate and distinct from its grain import and 
export business and, therefore, subject to a separate BPOL tax. (Second bite at the apple, 
anyone?) The Tax Commissioner considered the American Woodmark decision to determine if 
the taxpayer is vertically integrated or multiple businesses as the City argued. Ultimately the 
Tax Commissioner stated that if the taxpayer is a vertically integrated business, the. activities that 
occUrred at the taxpayer's facility in the City are not the sole consideration for the purposes of 
BPOL taxation. If the taxpayer can show that it conducted substantial manufacturing activities 
as a single business, the facility in the City would be considered to be part of a manufacturing 
business. 
In addition to ignoring P.D. 08-80, the City argued that the Tax Commissioner may not 
rely on other public documents because the facts are not exactly the same as the facts in the 
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taxpayer's situation. The City relied upon Article X, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia which 
provides that all taXes must be uniform upon the same class of taxpayers; The Tax 
Commissioner summarily dismissed this argument and stated that the Tax Department will 
continue to cite and rely on its previous opinions and determinations interpreting the tax laws 
unless and until they are modified or reversed by a court or the General Assembly. 
As to whether the taxpayer is classified as a manufacturer and not subject to BPOL, the 
Tax Commissioner referred back to P.D. 08-80. In P.D. 08-80, the Tax Commissioner 
determined that for the 2002 through 2006 tax years, the taxpayer was a manufacturer for 
property tax purposes. This determination was made by applying the same three-part test 
enumerated in BBC Brown Boveri that is applied in determining whether a taxpayer is a 
manufacturer for purposes of the BPOL tax. The Tax Commissioner then did not issue an 
opinion but instead opined that the taxpayer would be a manufacturer for purposes of the BPOL 
tax provided that the City fip.ds that the taxpayer's facts and circumstances were the same as they 
were in the 2002 through 2006 tax years. . 
In the. final argUinent, the taxpayer contended that even if it were not exempt from the 
BPOL tax, its BPOL liability in the City would have ended in April 2007 because it transferred 
all of its business assets and operations to VALLC. Oddly, the Tax Commissioner failed to 
address this issue. In a possible rope-a-dope, the City objected and argued that since this issue 
was not raised in the initial appeal that the Tax Commissioner cannot consider this argument. 
The Tax Commissioner cited Title 23 V AC 10-500-760 in which a locality is permitted 30 days 
from· the date of the. receipt of an appeal to the Tax Commissioner to file a written response to 
such appeal or a written request to address new issues raised by the taxpayer. Per the regulation, 
localities are not required to make such a request. In this case, the City only objected to the issue 
being considered and did not request to address the new issue. Based on the regulation and lack 
of a request from the City, the Tax Commissioner said he could consider the issue. Of course; 
then he failed to do so. 
Observation: Based on this ruling, it is quite clear that the. City was being as difficult as 
possible. Given that fact, the Tax Department did a disservice to the taxpayer by sending the 
appeal back to the City to consider additional information. After reading this ruling, is there any 
basis to consider whether the City will objectively consider the information provided by the 
taxpayer? The City obviously ignored one previous ruling from the Tax Commissioner. Why 
should we think the City will do anything less with this ruling? It is a fair bet that a: third ruling 
will have to be issued from the Tax Commissioner finally resolving these issues. On a side note, 
it would be very helpful to the business community to know which of Virginia's 150+ localities 
takes frivolous positions in appeals like this. For any business looking to locate in Virginia, such 
knowledge would be very valuable. 
11. Situs of Gross Receipts. P.D. 11-95 (June 7,' 2011). The taxpayer· 
operated a call center in City A. The call center performed customer service, took telephone 
orders and performed various other customer support activities for unrelated third party 
customers. The taxpayer also operated a fulfillment center in the County). The fulfillment 
center performed distribution services, such as receiving, pick-pack-ship, returns handling, cycle 
counts, gift wrapping, package inserts and various other distribution services for unrelated third 
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party customers.' Customers contracted with the taxpayer for services that were provided by 
either the call center or the fulfillment center, or services that were performed by both the call 
center and the fulfillment center. Customers contracted with the taxpayer for services that were 
provided by the call center or the fulfillment center. City A· audited the taxpayer for the 2007 
, and 2008 tax years. City A was unable to verify the situs of gross receipts based on the 
taxpayer's records and determined Virginia sales reported in the sales factors on the'taxpayer's 
Virginia corporate income tax returns represented the total gross receipts. Because the IT center 
generated no gross receipts, City A and the County orally agreed to evenly divide the total gross 
receipts resulting in an ~sessment of BPOL tax for the 2007 and 2008 tax years. The taxpayer 
filed an appeal with City A contending that City A included all gross receipts in its assessment 
including those that came from the fulfillment center in the County. In its final local 
determination, City A upheld that audit assessment, concluding that the taxpayer did not provide 
conclusive evidence of the situs of its gross receipts. The City determined it·had the authority to . 
apportion gross receipts pursuant to an apportionment agreement with the County. The taxpayer 
appealed City A's fmal deteiminatioh to the Tax Commissioner contending it accurately reported 
the gross receipts attributable to the call center on its 2007 and 2008 BPOL returns. The 
taxpayer also asserted that the City erroneously included' gross receipts attributable to the 
fulfillment ~enter in the County when issuing its assessment. 
Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner punts this appeal back to the City. The Tax 
Commissioner noted. that it could not determine why the City and County agreed to the 50% 
apportionment method instead of payroll apportionment after talking to both localities. Neither 
the taxpayer nor City A provided conclusive evidence with regard to the situs of the gross 
receipts. Because the issues involving the taxpayer's records are a matter of fact, the Tax 
Commissioner stated that a determination as to whether such records adequately indicate the 
proper situs of gross receipts remains the prerogative of City A. Accordingly, he remanded the 
case to City A in order to review any evidence the taxpayer .can provide concerning the amount 
of gross receipts derived from the call center. If sufficient evidence for determining the situs of 
the gross receipts. is not provided~ the County and City A may determine to apportion gross 
receipts by agreement. Any agreement must rationally relate gross receipts to the licensable 
activities transacted within each locality. If such agreement cannot be reached, gross receipts 
should be apportioned to City A using the payroll of only those employees. who directly 
participate in the businesses' licensed activity. 
12. Untimely Appeal. P.D. 11-124 (July 1, 2011). In August 2008, the 
County issued a BTPP tax bill for the first half of 2008 to the taxpayer .. On August 19, 2008, the 
taxpayer appealed the BTPP assessment, contending certain equipment that .the County classified 
as business tangible personal property was actually machinery and tools. This letter did not 
. reference· a 2008 BPOL assessment or any 2007 assessments. . The County investigated the 
taxpayer's operations and verbally indicated in December 2008 that the taxpayer was not a 
manUfacturer. Subsequently~ the taxpayer paid its 2007 and 2008 BPOL and BTPP tax 
assessments. On April 14, 2010, the taxpayer paid its 2010 BPOL tax under protest, stating that 
it was a manufacturer and that it intended to file a protest with the Tax Commissioner. The' 
County issued a letter that was received by the taxpayer on May 3, 2010. In this letter, the 
County concluded that the taxpayer was not a manufacturer based on its analysis done in 
September 2008. On March 2,2011, the taxpayer filed an appeal with the County, contending it 
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was a manufacturer for purposes of the BTPP and BPOL taxes. On April 14,2011, the County 
issued a letter concluding that the taxpayer's appeal was not timely filed .. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that no appeal of BTPP tax has been filed with the 
County for the 2007 through 2010 tax years. Therefore, he lacked the jurisdiction to make a 
. determination concerning the BTPP tax issues at this time. However, if the taxpayer files refund 
reques~ with the County pursuant to Va. Code§ 58.1-3980; the County would be required to 
issue a determination as to whether the refunds were valid. If the County denies 1:J?e refunds, the 
taxpayer would be eligible to appeal pursuant to the procedures set forth under Va. Code § 58.1-
3983.1. In the alternative, the County would have the discretion to issue a fmal determination in 
response to the taxpayer's requests for refund in order to expedite the appeals process. With 
regard to BPOL tax, the Tax Commissioner determined that Tax Department is prohibited from 
addressing the taxpayer's appeal of BPOL taxes for the 2007 through 2010 tax years at this time. 
The taxpayer may, however, seek correction of its assessments with the County as permitted 
under Va. Code § 58.1-3980. Again, the County's response to such claims would be considered 
to be an appealable event under Va. Code § 58.l-3703.1(A)(5)(a). 
13. Defmite Place of Business. P.D. 11-161 (September 20, 2011). The 
taxpayer provides technology· products· and services to clients in Virginia. and throughout the 
. United States. It performs "around the clock" infrastructure support and maintenance services to 
a client located in the County. The taxpayer's employees are located and perform all activities at 
the client's facility. The taxpayer does not own or lease any real or tangible property in Virginia. 
The taxpayer does not maintain a telephone, it does not advertise to the public, and all 
administrative functions are performed at the headquarters location in State A. The taxpayer 
requested an opinion as to whether its activities within the County are sufficient to establish a 
definite place of business, and therefore subject the taxp~yer to BPOL filing obligations. 
Pursuant to Title 23 Virginia Administrative Code 10-500-200, when a service provider performs 
services at a location away from its established or principal office and does not maintain a 
continuous presence for more that 30 consecutive days at the other location, its definite place of 
business remains the established or principal office. In 1978-790p. Va. Att'y Gen 279, the 
Attorney General determined that a continuous and regular course of dealings at a location would 
seem to constitute a defmite' place of business in such location when employees are "more or 
less" permanently assigned to such a location. The taxpayer's employees are at the client's 
location in the CoUnty 365 days a year. Based on this fact, the Tax Commissioner determined 
that the taxpayer has a definite place of business at the client's location and may be subject to the 
BPOL tax in the County. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
1. Pass-Through of BPOL Tax to Customers. 2010 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-038 
(August 24,2010). Del. Calvin C. Massie, Jr. requested an opinion regarding who may be liable' 
for payment of local business, professional, and occupational license ("BPOL") taxes' and in 
which instances Virginia law permits businesses subject to BPOL taxation to invoice separately 
and charge their customers for the 'businesses' BPOL taxes. Specifically, Del. Massie asked 
whether motor' vehicle dealers remain liable for payment of BPOL taxes when the dealer 
invoices BPOL taxes imposed on its sales separately from.the base charges pursuant to Va. Code' 
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§ 58.1-3734, or whether the tax liability then attaches to customers. Del. Massie also inquired 
whether Va. Code § 58.1-3734 provides the sole legal basis upon which motor vehicle dealers 
may pass their BPOL tax on to consumers, and if not, whether a BPOL taxpayer other than a 
motor vehicle dealer, such as a telecommunications service provider, may demand payment from 
its customers of charges that it separately invoices as "local gross receipts tax" or "local business. 
license surcharge." The Attorney General opined that liability for payment of BPOL taxes 
always lies with the persons engaged in businesses, professions, or occupations upon which 
localities levy such taxes, and not with their customers. Also under Va. Code § 58.1-3734, only 
motor vehicle dealers may recover from their customers by way of a surcharge the BPOL taxes 
attributable to the gross receipts generated by sales to those customers without the surcharge also 
being included in the gross receipts and subjected to the BPOL tax. 
VII. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MACmNE~Y AND TOOLS TAXES 
A. 2011 Legislation 
1. Machinery & Tools Tax - Classification for National Defense. House Bill 
1822 (Chapter 875) and Senate Bill 999 (Chapter 877) amended Va. Code § 58.1-3245.12 and 
enacted Va. Code §§ 58.1-3508.4 and 58.1-3853 to create a separate class of property for' 
purposes of the Machinery and Tools Tax for machinery and tools designed and used directly in 
manufacturing materials and equipment for national defense. Localities would be authorized to 
levy a tax on this separate class of property at a different rate from that levied on other 
machinery and tools, but which would not. exceed the rate for the general class 'of machinery and 
tools. Additionally, the legislation authorizes local governing bodies to create, by ordinance, one 
or more defense production zones, inside which localities would be permitted to grant tax 
incentives and provide certain regulatory flexibility for a maximum period of twenty years. The 
legislation also authorizes the adoption of a development taxation program for the defense 
production zone, regardless of whether the zone has been designated by the Governor as an 
enterprise zone, and. would make the laws that apply to enterprise zones also applicable to 
defense production zones. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
B. Recent Court Decisions 
No' recent court decisionS. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: Distineuishing Between Real 
Property and Tangible Personal Property. P.D. 11-02 (January 5, 2011). A taxpayer appealed a 
determination by a locality that refrigeration units installed in a building were tangible personal 
property, not real property. The taxpayer owned a warehouse in the City that included 
refrigerated space. The taxpayer leased a portion of the warehouse including the refrigerated 
space to a tenant .on a seasonal basis. The refrigerated space is divided into three rooms capped 
by four ceiling-moUnted refrigeration units, each weighing fifteen tons. In 2005, the taxpayer 
installed new refrigeration units. Installation of the refrigeration units required cutting a hole in 
the building'S roof and using a crane to· hoist· the units atop the refrigerated area. The locality 
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assessed the refrigeration units as tangible personal property, not part of the real property. On 
appeal, the locality determined that that the refrigeration units could be removed without damage 
to the property or the units themselves and, therefore, they remained tangible personal property. 
On appeal to the Tax Commissioner, the Tax Commissioner applied the three part 
test enunciated in Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232, 16 S.E.2d 345, 349 
(1941). The three tests are: (1) the annexation of the chattel (property) to the realty, actual or 
constructive; (2) its adaptation to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is 
connected is appropriated; and (3) the intention of the parties, i.e., the intention of the owner of 
the chattel to make it a permanent addition to the freehold. In order for the rules to apply, it is 
presumed that the property is annexed to the realty in some form. In its decision, the Supreme 
Court noted that the "intention of the party making the annexation is the paramount and 
controlling consideration. " . 
The overridmg characterization of the taxpayer's appeal is that no objective 
evidence was provided. For instance, the taxpayer indicated in its appeal'that the process of 
installing the new units was a complicated process that involved removing a section of the roof 
of the building in order to have the 15 ton units placed properly. The taxpayer, however, did not 
provide any objective evidence concerning the installation process. Likewise, the locality stated 
that the refrigeration units were used to refrigerate an area used by the tenant, and were not used 
to provide climate control for the building. The taxpayer argued that the heat removed by the 
refrigeration units was exhausted into the nonrefrigerated area and was the only source of heat 
for the area of the building leased by the tenant. Again lio objective evidence was provided to 
support these assertions. Lastly, the locality asserted that under the lease agreement, the 
intention of the parties is to allow the tenant to use the refrigerated space in its business. Based 
on this analysis, the locality concluded that the refrigeration units were used as equipment in a 
business process and, therefore, subject to BTPP tax. The taxpayer argued that it replaced 
existing ~ts that had been on the building and provided no evidence. 
Ultimately, the Tax Commissioner concluded that the taxpayer failed to provide 
objective evidence concerning the annexation of the refrigeration units or their adaptation to the 
building's purpose. In addition, the Tax Cot:mIussioner determined that the locality erred in., 
determining, the units were tangible personal property based on the tenant's use in a production 
process. The Tax Commissioner remanded the case to the locality so that the locality may 
evaluate the taxpayer's evidence concerning annexation and adaptation of the refrigeration units 
and consider the taxpayer's intent for installing the units, consistent with the tests enunciated in 
the Danville Holding case. The Tax Commissioner required the taxpayer to provide the locality 
with evidence concerning the annexation and adaptation of the refrigeration units. 
Practice Point: This appeal does not break any new ground regarding the tests 
for determining whether property is tangible personal property or real property. However if the 
descriptions of the annexation and adaptation in the appeal are correct, it is easy to imagine that 
the taxpayer should have prevailed on this appeal. Why didn't the taxpayer prevail on this 
appeal? No evidence was provided with the appeal. Do not forget that a taxpayer has the burden 
of proof in an. appeal of an assessment. If a taxpayer does not carry that burden, the taxpayer 
will not prevail. 
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2. Ownership and Valuation of Tangible Personal Property. P.D. 11-17 
(February 11, 2011). The taxpayer owned and operated a motel in a locality. In addition, the . 
taxpayer's parent entity owned furnished apartments and rental homes in the sale locality. Under 
audit, the locality determined that the taxpayer underreported both the amount and value of its 
business tangible personal property and issued assessments for the tax years at issue. The 
taxpayer appealed assessments contending the locality included property owned by the 
taxpayer's parent and its valuation exceeded fair market value. The locality, citing a fixed asset 
listing provided by the taxpayer's accountant, issued a fmal determination upholding its 
assessment. The taxpayer appealed the local fmal determination to the Tax Department. 
The Tax Commissioner realized that the controlling factor in Virginia property 
taxation is who.is to determine the legal owner of the property identified for taxation. Therefore, 
only the property owned by" the taxpayer in the locality is subject to the BTPP tax in the locality. 
The Tax Commissioner did not render an opinion regarding the valuation as the Virginia Code 
charges local commissioners of the revenue with the responsibility of assessing property at FMV 
and it is incumbent upon the taxpayer to prove to the satisfaction of the local taxing authority 
that the taxpayer properly reported the value of its property on its BTPP returns. 
3. Aircraft Hangared in Locality for Less Than Six Months are Not Subject 
to BTPP Tax. P.D. 11-34 (March 4, 2011). During the 2009 tax year the taxpayer owned and 
operated an aircraft for the purpose of transporting employees on company business. The 
aircraft weighed more than 10, 000 'pounds, and when not in use, the aircraft was housed in a 
hangar at an airport located in the City. The City concluded that the aircraft was situs ed' within 
its jurisdiction and issued a BTPP tax assessment to ,the taXpayer for the 2009 tax year. The 
taxpayer appealed the assessment to the City, and in its final determination,. the City foUnd that 
the aircraft was located in the taxpayer's state of domicile (Virginia) and was normally garaged at 
the airport in the City when in Virginia. The taxpayer filed an appeal with the Tax 
Commissioner, contending the City did not apply the proper test for assessing the BTPP tax on 
the aircraft. The taxpayer asserted that the aircraft spent less than six months atthe hangar in the 
City. Accordmgly, the taxpayer requests correction of the assessment issued by the City for the 
2009 tax year and a refund of any tax coll~cted. ' 
The Tax Commissioner agreed with the taxpayer and determined that the 
assessment was erroneous. The Attorney General of Virginia has issued several opinions 
,regarding the ability of a locality to tax certain tangible personal property, such as automobiles, ' 
boats, and aircraft. In 1979-1980 Op. Att'y. Gen. 353 (2/1/1980), the Attorney General stated, , 
"If the boat is not 'normally garaged, docked or parked' in anyone locality for a significant', 
. portion of the year (e.g., six months), it is then taxed in the jurisdiction in which the owner, 
resides. II Based on the Attorney General opinions and the fact that the aircraft spent less than six 
months at the hangar in the City, ,the Tax Commissioner determined that the assessment was 
incorrect. 
-
4. Definition of "Manufacturer." P.D. 11-44 (March 23, 2011). The 
taxpayer operates a facility in the County that assembles prefabricated components that are used 
to construct homes. Thes,e components were sold exclusively to the taxpayer's parent company 
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and delivered to the Parent's job sites. The Parent, a general contractor of single family homes, 
employed third-party subcontractors to install the finished components. The taxpayer had 
reported all of its assets on business tangible personal property (BTPP) tax returns for the 2005 
through 2008 tax years. The taxpayer filed an administrative appeal with the ~ounty seeking to 
reclassify itself as a manufacturer and as such, have its assets that are used in the proce'ss of 
manufacturing taxed at the machinery and tools tax rate and have all other business assets 
exempt from local tax. The County issued a final determination denying the taxpayer's amended 
returns on the basis that the taxpayer was a contractor subject to the BTPP tax on all of its 
tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed the County's final determination contending it 
is a manufacturer. The County countered that the taxpayer is not a manufacturer and, therefore, 
is subject to tax on its, tangible business personal property at the BTPP tax rates. The Tax 
Commissioner determined that the taxpayer is a manufacturer and subject to the machinery and 
tools tax, not BTPP tax. 
The Tax Commissioner applied the definition of "manufacturer" as determined by 
the Virginia Supreme Court. The Virginia Supreme Court's test involves three essential 
elements to determine whether a manufacturing activity is being undertaken. These elements 
are: (1) original material~ referred to as raw material; (2) a process whereby the original material 
is changed; and (3) a resulting product, which by reason of being subject to such processing, is 
different from the original material. County of Chesterfield v. BBC Brown Boveri, 238 Va. 64 
(1989). For local tax purposes, a manufacturer is one engaged in a processing activity, whereby 
the original materials are transformed into a product that is substantially different in character 
from the original materials. It does not matter whether the transformation is a step in getting the 
product ready for market or it is a complete process. What matters for purposes of local taxation 
is whether the transformation of the material takes place in the locality. See Commonwealth v. 
Meyer, 180 Va. 466, 23 S.E.2d 353 (1942). , 
The taxpayer used raw materials such as wood, nails, brackets, glue, steel, 
insulation, sheathing, concrete and aggregates in a number of processes that result in concrete 
moisture residential foundation walls, open-web floor truss systems, structured insulated external 
wall panes, and steel framed interior walls. ,Based on this, the Tax Commissioner determined 
that raw materials were transformed by an assembly process into a new products that were 
substantially different in character from the original materials. The County also argued that the 
taxpayer's non-manufacturing activities were too substantial for the taxpayer to be considered a 
manufacturer. However, the Tax' Commissioner determined that the taxpayer's non-
manufacturing activities only accounted for 25% of its receipts and therefore permitted the 
taxpayer to be classified as a manufacturer for purposes of the machinery and tools tax and the 
BTPP tax. 
5. Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: Leasehold Improvements. P.D. 
11-47 (March 28, 2011). The taxpayer operates a restaurant in a shopping center located in the 
County. It retains a leasehold interest in the premises. The taxpayer filed a 2008 BTPP return 
that reported leasehold improvements, such as concrete', masonry, doors and windows, woods 
and plastics, plumbing, HV AC, electrical insulation, trim, and certain built-in furnishings, and 
BTPP. The taxpayer subsequently filed an amended 2008 BTPP return reclassifying items 
originally classified as BTPP as leasehold improvements; The County disallowed the taxpayer's 
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amended return and assessed BTPP tax based on the original return. The taxpayer filed an 
appeal with the County contending that property it reclassified as leasehold improveinents is real 
property. In its final decision, the County affirmed its conclusion that the reclassified property is 
subject to BTPP tax based on the taxpayer's intent. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax 
Commissioner asserting that the property it reclassified as leasehold improvements on its 
amended 2008 BTPP return is realty. The Tax Commissioner determined that the 'leasehold 
improvement were real property and not subject to BTPP tax. The County' argued that the 
taxpayer's _ lease expressed his intention for the improvements to remain tangible personal 
property as the 'lease gives the taxpayer the option to keep all ad4itions and improvements at the 
end of the lease. Upon reviewing the lease, the Tax Commissioner disagreed and found that the 
overall intent of the taxpayer and its landlord is that all additions, alterations, _ and improvements 
attached to or installed on the property become the landlord's property. 
6. Machinery' & Tools Tax: Property Removed from Facility. P.D. 11'-54 
(April 7, 2011). In 2005, the taxpayer ,acquired a manufacturing facility in the City. In April 
2009, the taxpayer filed amended returns with the City for the 2006 through 2008 tax years to 
report equipment that had been shipped to another facility. The City requested additional 
information, toured the plant, and examined the property at issue. In its final determination, the 
City agreed to remove assets that were transferred to other locations with proof. of shipment. 
Because the taxpayer failed to provide verification of disposals and additional transfers of assets, 
the City did not issue a refund to the taxp~yer related to these assets. The taxpayer appealed the 
City's final determination contending that the property was not located at the plant during one or 
more of the tax years at issue. The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer must 
provide sufficient documentation to the City to show when it disposed of the property in question 
and returned the appeal to the City for such a determination. ' ' 
7. Machinery & Tools Tax: Notification of Idle Machinery. P.D. 11-84 
(June '2, 2011). The taxpayer operates a manufacturing plant in the County. The plant had seven 
manufacturing lines at the end of 2007. One line operated continuously since 2007. Three of the 
seven lines were never placed in service. Three other lines were placed in service in 2007, but 
_ were shut down prior to January 1, 2008. ·The lines were then placed back in service in 2010 
when demand increased for the product that the equipment produced: The taxpayer did not file 
M&T tax returns with the County for the 2008 through 2010 tax years. As a result, the County 
. issued assessments for M&T tax. The taxpayer appealed to County claiming that a six of the 
seven manufacturing lines were not subject to the M&T tax for the tax years at issue. The 
County issued a fmal determination concluding that the line that was in continuous operation 
from 2007 was subject to the M&T tax and the three lines that were never put into service were 
not subject to the M&T tax. The County's fmal determination also held that the three lines put in 
service in '2007, but ceased production ,prior to 2008 were not idle machinery because the--
taxpayer had failed to provide written notice that these lines were idled prior to April 1 of the 
previous tax year. The taxpayer appealed the County's fmal determination to the Tax 
Commissioner, contending that the three manufacturing lines at issue should have been classified 
as idle machinery for the 2009' and 2010 tax years. The Tax Commissioner upheld the County's 
final determination. The taxpayer conceded that the manufacturing lines at issue were not idle 
machinery for the 2008 tax year beca,usethey were not out of service for an entire year, and the 
County was not notified in writing that these lines had been withdrawn from service prior to 
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April 1, 2007. The taxpayer contended, however, that the lines qualified as idle machinery for 
the 2009 and 2010 tax years because they were discontinued in use for at least one year prior to 
any tax day. The County concluded that the lines were not idle machinery and tools because the 
taxpayer failed to provide written notice by April 1 of the prior year. As Virginia Code § 58.1-
3507(D) requires taxpayers to provide written notice of idle machinery, the Tax Commissioner 
upheld the assessment. ., 
8. Machinery and Tools Tax: Pollution Control & Recycling Equipment 
Exemptions; Modification Costs. P.D. 11-110 (June 17, 2011). The taxpayer, a manufacturer 
located in the County, filed amended M&T tax returns for the 2007 thfough 2009 tax years 
requesting removal of certain equipment included on the original returns as machinery and tools. 
The County did not remove all of the equipment and issued a partial refund. The taxpayer 
appealed the County's final determination contending certain equipment was incorrectly 
classified by the County ~ machinery and tools. It argued that certain pollution control and 
recycling equipment were not machinery and tools. In addition"the taxpayer disagreed with the 
County's treatment of replacement costs for certain assets. The taxpayer believed the County 
should not be permitted to assess M&T tax on' both the original equipment cost and the 
replacement parts that are necessary for the continuing operations of the equipment. 
The pollution control equipment at issue was used to remove fumes from the taxpayer's 
manufacturing facility caused by certain processes in the manufacturing process. Specifically, 
they were used to control particulates, volatile organic compounds and carbon monoxide 
emissions. This equipment was located on the roof of the facility. In this case, the pollution 
control equipment was used to control particulates and emissions into the air. However, it was 
not clear to the Tax Commissioner what happens to the waste materials generated by the 
pollution control equipment. There is some indication thatthe taxpayer is permitted to use the 
waste materials to provide power and heat for the manufacturing plant. If the particulates and 
emiss'ions were in fact used to provide power to the manufacturing machinery" the pollution 
control equipment could be classified as machinery and tools. The Tax Commissioner remanded 
this matter to the County with the instructions that it consider any other documentation the 
taxpayer may be able to provide to demonstrate that the pollution control equipment was not 
used to produce power and heat for the manufacturing plant. 
The taxpayer contended that the recycling equipment, a fmes bin, met the standards of the' 
exemption under Va. Code § 58.1-3661. The exemption for certified recycling equipment and 
facilities is a general property tax exemption offered as an' option to localities. However as the 
County did, not adopted such an ordinance, the Tax Commissioner determined that the exemption 
did not apply.' ' 
The taxpayer capitalized certain modifications to items of machinery., Most of the 
modifications involved replacing signifi~ant parts on original equipment. The taxpayer asserted 
that these capitalized cpsts should be classified as repairs for purposes of the M&T taX and not 
included in the cost of the machinery. The taxpayer believed that assessing the refurbishment 
costs resulted, in some equipment being taxed on both the original cost and the replacement cost, 
which is essentially double taxation. The County countered that allowing for the removal of all 
replacement costs fails to consider the value added to the upgraded equipment. The Tax 
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Commissioner noted that the taxpayer provided no objective evidence that the County's method 
of valuing the modified machinery exceeds fair market value or results in double taxation and 
did not adjust the retuln, but allowed the taxpayer to provide additional evidence to the County 
as to the fair market value of the modified machinery. 
9. Business Tangible Personal Property Tax: HV AC Units. P.D. 11-117 
(June 22, 2011). The taxpayer is engaged.in business at a facility in the City. The facility is 
owned by the taxpayer. Under audit, the City found a number of items of property that were not 
listed on the taxpayer's BTPP returns. The property included that two heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning (HV AC)'units with related HV AC "fit outs" and a backUp generator with a related 
transfer switch. The taxpayer filed an appeal with the City, contending the HV AC systems and 
backup generator were real property. In its fmal determination, the . City concluded that the 
HV AC equipment was tangible personal property used to cool computers, and the generator and 
transfer switch were subject to BTPP tax because they were placed in service after the taxpayer 
began operating the building and their removal would not impact the value of the building. The 
taxpayer appealed to the Tax Commissioner, contending the HV AC systems and generator were 
permanently affixed to the real property and it would be economically infeasible to remove any 
of the equipment. The taxpayer also asserted that the HV AC equipment was used to cool the 
building and not the computers. Furthermore according to the taxpayer, the generator and 
transfer switch were part· of the realty because they were a necessary part of the technical nature 
of the taxpayer's business and would not be removed if the taxpayer left the building .. 
The Tax Commissioner' considered both the taxpayer's position and the City's position .. 
He applied the three tests enunciated by Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232, 
16 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1941), to determine whether property is real property ortallgible personal 
property. The three tests are: 1) the annexation of the chattel (property) to the. realty, actual or 
constructive; (2) its adaptation to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is 
connected is appropriated; .and (3) the intention of the parties, i. e., the intention of the owner of 
the chattel to make it a permanent addition to the freehold. The Tax Commissioner determined 
th~t although the equipment was annexed to the building, he could not determine whether its use 
part of the building or if it was the owner's attention to make it part of the building. According 
to the ruling, there is disagreement as to whether the equipment was used to cool the building or 
. computers. Accordingly, the tax Commissioner sent the appeal back to the City to determine 
whether the HV AC units are necessary for the cooling of the building or the computers. 
However the tax Commissioner did determine that the backup generator and transfer switch were 
necessary for the taxpayer's operations and therefore are taxable as tangible personal property. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
No recent opinions. 
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS TAXES· 
A. 2011 Legislation-
1. Aircraft Sales and Use Tax: Exemption for Qualified Companies 
Headquartered in Virginia. House Bill 2221 (Chapter 492) and Senate Bill 1188 (Chapter 443) 
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amended Va. Code § 58.1-1505 to provide an exemption from the aircraft sales and use tax 
beginning July 1, 2011 and ending December 31, 2014 for any aircraft sold or leased by a 
qualified company that is an aviation-related company, limited liability company, partnership, or 
a combination of such entities that have a common ownership interest. Persons qualifying for 
the proposed exemption will also be entitled to a refund for any aircraft sales and use tax paid 
between January 1, 2011, and before July 1, 2011. The two bills also exempt aircraft sold in the 
Commonwealth and registered outside of the Commonwealth from the aircraft sales and use tax 
so long as the aircraft is removed from the Commonwealth within 60 days of the date of 
purchase on the Bill of Sale. If the aircraft is removed within 60 days of the date of purchase, the , 
time between the date of purchase and the removal of the aircraft will not be counted for 
purposes of determining whether an aircraft is required to be'licensed in the Commonwealth. 
This bill was effective on July 1,2011. 
2. Tire ~ecycling Fee Collection. Senate Bill 1431 (Chapter 649) amended 
Va. Code § 58.1-640 to impose the tire recycling fee on individuals who perform installation of 
tires in Virginia pursuant to an agreement with a person whq makes a retail sale of such tires, but 
does not collect the tax'. Under current law, every retailer of tires in Virginia is subject to the tire 
recycling fee. "Retailer of tires" means any person engaged in the business of making retail 
sales of tires, whether new or used, in Virginia. This legislation was effective on July 1,2011. 
3. Insurance Premiums Tax: Retaliatory Tax Credit. House Bill 2335 
(Chapter 817) and Senate Bill 1359 (Chapter 863) amend Va. Code § 58.1-2510 to increase the 
maximum annual retaliatory tax credit refund amount for the insurance premiums tax from $1.6 
million to $7 million for qualified companies receiving a credit in taxable year 2000 that file a 
refund application with the State Corporation Commission for taxable years beginning on and 
after January 1, 2011. It also allows taxpayers to carry forward any' unused credits until the 
entire credit amount is used. This legislation requires that all refunds be made after July 1 
following the filing of the refund application. Finally, the legislation limits the amount of the 
credit for qualified companies not receiving a credit for the 2000 taxable year to 60 percent of 
the retaliatory costs paid to other states. The limitation provision is retroactive to license years 
beginning on'and after July 1, 2006 and taxable years ending on and after December 31, 2006, 
which is the effective date of the same provision in the Appropriation Act. The effective date for 
the refund date and carryover portions of this legislation was July 1, 2011. 
4. Fuels Tax: ' Commercial Watercraft. Senate Bill 1137 (Chapter 165) 
amends Va. Code §§ 58.1-609.1 and 58.1-2201 to clarify that the definition of cqmmercial 
watercraft includes watercraft owned by a private business and used in the ,conduct of its own 
business or operations, including but not limited to the transport of persons or property. This 
legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
5. Insurance Premiums Tax: Administration. Senate, Bill 1124 (Chapter 
850) amends and enacts numerous sections in the Virginia Code to transfer the administration of 
the insurance premiums tax from the State Corporation Commission ("SCC") to the Tax 
Department. The duties transferred include the processing of tax returns, the handling of 
payments and billing, customer service functions, collections, and aUditing duties. The Tax 
Department would also be responsible for administering the retaliatory costs assessment on ' 
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certain foreign insurance companies, as well as the retaliatory cpsts tax. credit for domestic 
insurance companies. The SCC would continue to be responsible for the licensing of insurance 
companies and the administration of the maintenance fund. This legislation also makes certain 
changes to the taxation of surplus lines brokers to ensure that their tax is based on direct gross 
premiums from Virginia insureds as required by a recently enacted federal law. This legislation 
is effective for taxable years beginning on and after January 1, 2013, except that certain 
provisions related to surplus lines brokers were effective on July 1,2011. 
6. Motor Vehicle Rental Tax: Transfer of Administration. House Bill 1798 
(Chapter 405) and Senate Bill 1132 (Chapter 639) amends and enacts numerous sections in the 
Virginia Code to transfer the administration aIid collection of the Motor Vehicle Rental Tax from 
the Department of Motor Vehicles to the Department of Taxation. The revenues from the 2% 
rental fee on daily rental vehicles will continue to be dedicated to pay the debt service on the 
bonds issued for the Statew!.de Agencies Radio System. This legislation was effective on July i, 
2011. 
7. Cigarette Tax: Enforcement Working Group. House Bill 2038 (Chapter 
366) and Senate Bill 1085 (Chapter 293) requires the Tax Commissioner to c~mvene a working 
group to review the current policies on i) appeals of penalties related to the cigarette tax. assessed 
on wholesalers and retailers; ii) the desirability of having a single stamp for state and local taxes; 
iii) methods of determining the validity of partially visible cigarette tax stamps; and. iv) other 
related issues. The working group will consist of representatives the Virginia Wholesalers and 
Distributors Association, Virginia Retail Merchants Association, the Retail Alliance, the Virginia 
Petroleum, Convenience and Grocery Association, the Northern Virginia Cigarette Tax Board, 
the Virginia Municipal League, those counties that levy a local cigarette tax, and other 
individuals as deemed necessary. The legislation requires the working group to begin as soon as 
possible after the conclusion of the 2011 General Assembly Session and provide a report and 
recommendations to the chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on Finance no· later than 
December 1, 2011. 
8. Combined Transient Occupancy and Food Tax. House Bill 1451 (Chapter 
192) amends Va. Code § 58.1-3842 to authorize Madison County to levy.a combined transient 
occupancy and food and beverage tax. on the aggregate charges for rooms and meals in bed and 
breakfast establishments when .such charges are not separately stated. Madison County would be 
authorized to impose the tax at a maximum rate of four percent of the total amount charged for 
the occupancy of the room and for the food and beverages. Madison County would .only be 
permitted to levy this tax if a food and beverage tax has been approved in a referendum within 
the county. Under current law, Rappahannock County is the only county that is authorized to 
. levy a combined transient occupancy and food and beverage tax on the aggregate charges for 
rooms and meals in bed and breakfast establishments, provided the requirements set forth above 
are met. This legislation was effeCtive on July 1, 2011. 
9. Transient Occupancy Tax. House Bill 1452 (Chapter 385) and Senate .Bill 
984 (Chapter 606) amend Va. Code' § 58.1-3819 to add the counties of Accomack (HB 1452 
only), Brunswick (HB 1452 only), Madison, and Washington to the list of localities that are 
currently authorized to Impose a transient occupancy tax at a maximum rate of five percent. 
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Revenues from the portion of the tax in excess of two percent would be required to be used 
solely for tourism or marketing of tourism. This legislation was effective on July 1, 2011. 
B. Recent Court Decisions· 
1. AMG National Trust Bank v. Commonwealth of Virgini~ Civil Docket 
No.: CLI0-3031 (Norfolk Circuit Court; April 7, 2011 and July 6, 2011). See also P,.D. 11-151, 
11-152, & 11-153. The Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk determined that a trust company 
was exempt from the Virgirtia corporate income tax and instead subject to the Virginia bank 
franchise tax. The trust company is chartered as a national banking association yet did not 
accept any deposits at its Virginia location. In addition, the Circuit Court declined a request 
from the Virginia Tax Commissioner (the "Tax Commissioner") to determine how the trust 
company should apportion its 'net capital for purposes of the Virginia bank franchise tax. 
, The taxpayer, AMG National Trust Bank ("AMG"), ·was chartered as a national banking 
association pursuant to the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 21, et seq. in August 2001 and 
maintained that charter and held itself out to the public as engaged in the banking business 
continuously throughout 2004 through 2009; During this time period, AMG had an office 
located in Norfolk known as Old Dominion Trust Company. Through this office, AMG offered 
trust services and investment management services, which AMG and the Commonwealth agreed' 
are traditional and historical parts of banking. AMG neither solicited nor accepted deposits at its 
Virginia office from January 1, 2004 through January 31,2008. After January 31, 2008, AMG 
solicited deposits and loans from its Virginia office, but did not accept deposits or loans at that 
location. Deposits and loans were accepted at its main banking office in Boulder, Colorado. 
In 2009, the Tax Department rejected AMG's 2009 bank franchise tax return on the. 
ground that AMG did not meet the definition 'of a "b8.Qk" contained in the Virginia Bank 
Franchise Act (the "Act"). The Tax Commissioner determined that AMG was not conducting 
banking business in Virginia because the Virginia branch did not accept deposits. Therefore, she 
ruled that AMG was not subject to the bank franchise tax and instead subject to the corporate 
income tax. Based on this conclusion, the Tax Commissioner directed AMG to file corporate 
income tax returns for all the years that its trust office operated in Virginia. ,As a result, AMG 
filed suit and asked the Circuit Court to determine that it is a "bank" within the meaning of the 
Act. 
The Act requires every bank to pay annual franchise taxes based on the net capital of the 
taxpayer. This tax is paid in lieu of all other state or local taxes. Va. Code § 58.1-1202. The 
Act pro~ides four separate definitions of a "bank," plus a fifth exclusionary clause: 
"Bank" means: 
(1) any incorporated bank, banking association, savings bank that is a member, 
of the Federal Reserve System, or trust company organized by or under 
.the authority of the laws of the Commonwealth and ' 
(2) any bank or banking association organized by or under the authority of the 
laws of the United States, ,doing business or having an office in the 
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Commonwealth or having a charter which designates any place within the 
Commonwealth as the place of its principal office, and 
(3) any bank which establishes and maintains a branch in this Commonwealth 
under Article 6 (§ 6.2-836. et seq.) of Title 6.2 or Article 7 (§ 6.2-849 et 
seq.) of Title 6.2, whether such bank or banking association is authorized 
to transact business as a trust company or not, and 
(4) any joint stock land bank or any other bank organized by or underthe 
authority of the laws of the United States upon which the Commonwealth 
is authorized to impose a tax. . 
(5) The tenn shall exclude all corporations organized under the laws of other 
states and doing business in the Commonwealth, corporations organized 
not as banks under the laws of the Commonwealth and all natural persons 
and partnerships. Va. Code § 58.i-1201. 
The Circuit Court detennined that AMG met the definition of a "bank" under the second 
and fourth clauses of the definition above. The Circuit Court also detennined that AMG was not 
excluded by the exclusionary clause in the definition. 
The Tax Depa.rtrn.ent made two arguments to the Court that AMG should not be 
considered a "bank" for purposes of the Act. Both arguments were based on the fact that AMG 
. did not accept deposits in Virginia. First, the Tax Department argued that because the statute 
uses the word "bank" to defme "bank,'~ the Court should also consider the definition of "bank" 
which is included in the Virginia Banking Act. The Virginia Banking Act defines "bank" as "a 
corporl:!-tion authorized by statute to accept deposits' and to hold itself out to the public as engaged 
in the banking business in this Commonwealth." Va. Code § 6.2-800. Based on this defmition, 
the Tax Department argued that AMG should not be classified as a "bank" in Virginia asAMG 
did not accept deposits in Virginia. The Tax Department's second argument was that the "doing: 
business or having an office in the Commonwealth" in the second clause of the defmition in the 
Act requires AMG to conduct the business of banking in the Commonwealth. In support of this 
argument, the Tax Department pointed to the section of the Act (Virginia Code sec. 58.1-1204.1) 
that provides a treatment for banks that were only present in Virginia for part of the calendar 
year. Virginia Code sec. 58.1-1204.1 defmes "transacting business" as '~accepting deposits from' 
customers in the regular course of business." . 
The Circuit Court rejected both arguments by focusing on the defmition of a "bank" in 
the Act. First, the Circuit Court noted that the defmition of a "bank" in the Virginia BankingAct 
is shorter and less detailed that the definition of "bank" in the Act Citing Lynchburg Div. of 
Soc. Servs. v. Cook, 276 Va. 465, 481, 666 S.E.2d 361, 369 (2008), the Circuit Court followed 
the principle that when two statutes address the same subject, the two statutes should be 
harmonized, if possible, and the more specific statute should prevail when they conflict. Based 
011. this principle, the Circuit Court concluded ~at the definition in the Act did not require AMG 
to accept deposits in Virginia to be considered a "bank." The Circuit Court recognized that if the 
General Ass~mbly had intended for such a requirement to be in effect, it would have included the 
requirement in the Act. Therefore, the Circuit Court detennined that AMG met the definition of 
a "bank" under the Act and was subject to the bank franchise tax, not the corporate income tax. 
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Following this detennination by the Circuit Court, the Tax Department asked the Circuit 
Court to reconsider its ruling or, in the alternative, clarify its ruling regarding the proper method 
the Tax Department should use to apportion AMG's net capital. The Circuit Court did not 
reconsider its detennination that AMG is a "bank". and instead focused on the Tax Department's 
request for clarification. After some discussion of the issue, the Circuit Court declined to give 
guidance on the proper method the Tax Department should use to apportion AMG's net capital 
as the Tax Department did not file a declaratory action itself. 
The Tax Department requested guidance on apportionment because the Act fails to 
provide a method for apportionment of a multi-state bank's net capital as is required by the U.S. 
Constitution. To adapt for this lack of a statutory apportionment method, the Tax Department 
has required banks present in Virginia to apportion net capital based on the location of deposits. 
However for banks who do not accept deposits, the Tax Department requires such banks to 
request pennission to use an alternative method for apportionment. As AMG fell into this latter 
category, it properly requested an alternative apportionment method based on its cost of 
perfonnance. 
The Tax Department argued to the Circuit Court that under the Act AMG's tax liability is 
zero as the Tax Department never approved an alternative apportionment method. Ergo, AMG 
was not "subject" to the bank franchise tax and was subjeGt to the corporate income tax. The 
Circuit Court rejected this argument and stated that whileAMG might have a bank franchise tax 
liability of $0, it is still subject to the bank franchise tax and exempted from the corporate 
income tax. The Circuit Court added that if AMG's tax liability is indeed zero, it is only because 
the Tax Department failed to approve an alternate method of apportionment. 
2. Buchanan County v. Equitable Production Company, Case No. 
1: 11 CV00004 (United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, March' 28, 2011 
and June 1, 2011). Buchanan County filed a collection action in the Circuit Court of Buchanan 
County, Virginia, against defendants Equitable Production Company, Equitab~e Resources, Inc., 
and EQT Production Company (collectively, "EQT") to collect unpaid coal severance tax. In its 
Complaint the County sought a declaratory judgment rejecting certain deductions it alleged EQT 
took in calculating the amount of coal severance tax due to the County. It also sought monetary· 
relief in the fonn of taxes owed from previous years. The case was removed by EQT to federal 
court,. with subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and amount m 
controversy. 
The County moved to remand the case back to state court pursuant to the Tax Injunction 
Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341, or based on abstention doctrine or the principles of comity. EQT 
opposed the motion. The Tax Injunction Act provides that "[t]hedistrlct courts shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrairi the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under Stat.e law where a plain, 
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341. It 
applies to actions for anticipatory relief and actions for declaratory relief. California v. Grace 
Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982). The Court .also.noted that the Tax Injunction Act 
does not bar federal jurisdiction over tax collection actions or over defenses to such actions 
bas~d on Jefferson County, Alabama v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 435.(1999). Despite the CoUnty's 
arguments that because of the declaratory nature of the relief sought the Tax Injunction Act 
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prohibited the Court from considering this c~e, the Court opined that such a prohibition did not 
exist as this case sought declaratory and monetary relief. 
The County also asserted that the case should be remanded under principles of abstention 
and comity. Abstention is an insufficient basis for declining jurisdiction. The County argued 
that abstention doctrines apply because the state law issues are both important and complex and 
because the case involves state taxes and would affect government revenues. However, the 
Court noted that abstention is the exception, not the rule, and, only applies in exceptional 
circumstances. The Court determined that the only exceptional circumstance plausibly 
applicable to this case would exist when a difficult question of state law of substantial public 
importance whose importance would transcend the ultimate result in the case is presented. As 
the County did not allege such a circumstance, the Court rejected the County's assertion that the' 
case should be remanded under principles of abstention. 
The Court also rejected the County's comity argument. Under the principle of comity, 
the Court would remand the case to avoid interference with state laws. The Court determined 
however that there is no challenge to the state tax law, and federal jurisdiction will not result in 
federal. interference with the state's administration of its taxing al;lthority. 
After its fIrst motion to remand the case was rejected, the County filed a second motion 
to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice in order to refile it in state court with additional 
nondiverse defendants so that it cannot be removed to federal court. In other words, the County 
tried to publicly do an end-run around the first ruling. The County intended to refile the action in 
the Circuit Court of Buchanan County and add local business defendants so as to make the case 
nonremovable. The Court denied this motion as it would have been prejudicial to EQT. The 
Court noted that the case had been pending for well over a year, and EQT expended considerable 
resources in bringing it ·to the current point. ' In addition, the joinder of additional taxpayers 
would likely add extra procedural hurdles and prolong, the resolution of'the dispute, to the' 
prejudice of EQT. Furthermore, the County did not show that Virginia procedure would permit 
the joinder of multiple taxpayers in a single collection lawsuit. 0 The Court' said that while there 
may be common questions of law to collect the coal severance tax from multiple Buchanan 
County taxpayers, the facts supporting the claims are likely to be different and would not arise 
out of the same transaction or occurrence. Each defendant's ultimate liability would depend 
upon its particular buSiness operation and tax'returns. For these reasons, the Court rejected the 
second motion. According to the second opinion issued by the Court, this case is set for trial in 
December 2011. 
C. Recent Virginia Tax Commissioner Rulings 
1. Recordation Tax: Related Entities & Value of Property. P.O. 10-266 
(December 15, 2010). In June 2008, Corporation A and Corporation B merged their United 
States operations into a combined entity that commenced operating as the taxpayer. Corporation 
A and Corporation B maintained a 58% and 42% interest in the taxpayer, r~spectively. ,As part , 
of this merger, real property located in the County was transferred from Corporation B to the 
taxpayer and recordation taxes were paid. The taxpayer requested a refund of the recordation 
taxes paid, contending that the transfer of the property was exempt from recordation tax as 
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transfers between certain related' parties' under either Va. Code §§ 58.l-811(A)(8), 58.1-
811(A)(9), or 58.l-811(A)(10). The taxpayer also disputed the value of the property the tax was 
levied on as less than 100% of each parcel was conveyed. The Tax Commissioner detennined 
that the infonnation submitted with the appeal was insufficient to determine if any of the 
exemptions apply. The Tax Commissioner did forward the taxpayer's concerns about the value 
that was conveyed to the circuit court clerk. 
2. Guidelines and Rules for the Tobacco Products Tax. P.D. 10-277 
(December 17, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued updated guidelines and rules for the 
tobacco products tax. 
3. Guidelines and Rules for the Prepaid Wireless E-911 Fee. P.D. 10-284 
(December 27, 2010). The Tax Commissioner issued updated guidelines and rules for the 
prepaid wireless e-911 fee. 
4. Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-19 (February 18, 
2011). The taxpayer's original 2006 home mortgage was held by Lender A. In February 2010, 
the taxpayer refinanced his mortgage and recorded the refmanced deed of trust in the County. 
The County's deed of receipt shows the taxpayerrefmanced with Lender B. The County 
determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the recordation tax exemption pursuant to the 
provisions under Virginia Code § 58.1-803(D) for refmancing with the same lender because 
Lender A and Lender B did not qualify as the same lender. The taxpayer appealed to the State 
Tax Commissioner contending that the refinanced loan was made through the same lender. The 
Tax Commissioner agreed with the County and determined, that Lender A and Lender B are 
separate legal entities despite the fact that the lenders were related. Therefore, the taxpayer was 
not entitled to the exemption for refmancing a debt with the same lender as the taxpayer's 
refmancing'did not occur with the same lender as required by Virginia Code § 58.l-803(D). 
5. Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-23 (February 24, 
2011). The taxpayer refinanced her mortgage and recorded the refmanced deed of trust m. the 
County. The County determined that the taxpayer was, not entitled to the recordation tax 
exemption pursuant to the provisions under Virginia Code§ 58.1-803(D) for refinancing with the 
same lender. The taxpayer appealed to the State Tax Commissioner contending that the 
refinanced loan was made through the same lender. The Tax Commissioner ultimately upheld 
the tax as imposed as the taxpayer did not respond to several written attempts by the Tax 
Department to obtain the infonnation necessary to verify that the taxpayer refmanced her deed of 
trust withthe same lender. ' 
6.' ,Recordation Tax: Value of Parcel. P.D. 11-41 (March 14,2011). In May, 
2010, the taxpayer presented a deed for recordation to the County. The County assessed 
recordation .tax based on the assessed value of the property, which was greater than the 
consideration for the conveyance of the real property interest. The taxpayer appealed .the 
assessment and contended that the state and local recordation taxes should have been based on 
the consideration paid. The taxpayer presented an appraisal that values the subject property at 
less than' the consideration of the conveyance in support of its position. The Tax Commissioner , 
did not issue a decision as he stated that the responsibility for placing a value on real estate is 
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entirely' a factual determination that is best made by one who is thoroughly familiar with the· 
property itself and local market conditions that lies with the Clerk. 
7. Consumer Utility Tax: Pipeline Distribution Company. P.D. 11-51 (April 
5, 2011). The taxpayer is a parent holding company for numerous subsidiaries, including 
"Energy." Energy performs fuel management services for all of the taxpayer's operating 
facilities. Energy purchases various types of fuel from utilities and other vendors, sells the fuel 
to the taxpayer and its subsidiaries, and facilitates the delivery of the fuel to operating facilities. 
In 1997, the-taxpayer acquired a facility (the "Plant") that generates electric power in the City. 
Soon thereafter, Energy began purchasing and managing natural gas for use in the Plant's 
operations. The natural gas was transported by pipelines owned by a pipeline distribution 
company to a pipeline owned by the City. The City-oWned pipeline connected the Plant and 
other natural gas consumers to the pipeline distribution company's line. The taxpayer paid the 
City a fee for transporting natural gas through the pipeline. In 2004, the City initiated an audit 
and determined that the taxpayer was subject to consumer utility tax on the natural gas used at 
the Plant. Assessments were issued for the January 2001 through December 2004 tax periods. 
The -taxpayer timely filed an- appeal of these assessments in March 2005. A subsequent audit 
resulted in assessments for the January 2005 through February 200.8 tax periods followed by 
another timely appeal filed by the taxpayer. In August 2009, the City issued its final 
determination in both cases. The City found that: (1) the taxpayer was a consumer of natural gas 
subject to the consumer utility tax; (2) Energy was a pipeline distribution company required to 
collect _ the tax; (3) the City's assessment did not conflict with the "revenue neutrality" 
amendments enacted by the General Assembly in 2000. The taxpayer appealed the City's final 
determination to the Tax Commissioner. The taxpayer argued the consumer utility tax applies 
only to natural gas provided by a pipeline distribution company or gas utility. 
The Tax Commissioner determined that the taxpayer is a pipeline distribution 
company and subject to the tax. For purposes of the consumer utility tax on natural gas, Va. 
_ Code g 58.l-3814(J) provides- that the term "pipeline distribution company" has the same 
meaning as provided in Va. Code § 58.1-2600. Under this code section, a pipeline distribution 
company is "a corporation, other than a pipeline transmission company, which transmits, by 
means of a pipeline, natural gas, manufactured gas or crude petroleum and the products or by-
products thereof to a purchaser for purposes of furnishing heat or light." In this case, Energy 
purchased natural gas from utilities and other suppliers and contracted with a pipeline company 
to deliver the gas to the City's pipeline where the gas was sold to the Plant. The taxpayer argued 
that Energy did not transmit or deliver gas to the -Plant by means -of a pipeline or otherwise and 
did not operate any natural gas pipeline. The City, on the other hand, concluded that Energy was 
a pipeline distribution company because it transmitted the gas through a pipeline to the Plant. 
The City points out that the statutes do not require a pipeline distribution company to physically 
deliver the gas to a purchaser. For purposes of the consumer utility tax,_ the tax Commissioner 
determined that a pipeline distribution company could include a corporation that transmits or 
causes to be transmitted natural gas through a pipeline, whether owned or operated by such 
corporation or not, to a purchaser for purposes of furnishing heat or light. -
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8. Merchants' Capital Tax: Consignment Inventory. P.D. 11-63 (April 21, 
2011). The taxpayer is an artist who produces works ofart in her studio located in the County A. 
The taxpayer sells her work on consignment in a gallery located in the County B. County B 
imposes a merchants' capital tax in lieu of the Business, Professional, and Occupational License 
(BPOL) tax on merchants' gross receipts located in County B. The taxpayer asked whether art is 
inventory for purposes of the merchants' capital tax and sought an explanation of art inventory 
valuation. The Tax Commissioner said 'that the art would not be subject to merchants' capital 
tax. Citing 1972-1973 Op. Att'y General 407, the Tax Commissioner stated that inventory that is 
in possession of a dealer is subject to the merchants' capital tax if it is owned by the dealer, not if 
the dealer is holding the inventory on consignment for an owner. Citing 1990 Op. Att'y General 
262 and 1988 Op. Att'y General 560, the Tax Commissioner stated that art that is inventory 
would be valued at 100% of the cost. 
9. Watercraft Sales and Use Tax: Unreported Sales. P.D. 11-76 (May 23, 
2011). The taxpayer sells-, rents, and services boats and other watercraft. In addition, the 
taxpayer sells watercraft acc~ssories. The Tax Department conducted an audit of the taxpayer'~ 
business as a result of an investigation by the Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. As a 
result of the Tax Department's audit, the taxpayer was assessed the retail sales and use tax on 
untaxed sales, asset and expense purchases. In addition, the taxpayer was assessed the watercraft 
sales and use tax on untaxed watercraft sales. The taxpayer contested the audit assessments and 
claims that it had no sales during the audit period. The Tax Commissioner upheld the 
assessment as the taxpayer's records that it made sales and rentals during the audit period and the 
taxpayer did not provide any evidence to the contrary. 
10. Tobacco Products Tax Dealer Discount. P.D. 11-97 (June 8, 2011). The 
Tax Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-6 to update Tax Bulletin 10-5 regarding the tobacco 
products tax dealer discount. 
11. Virginia Tire Tax Recycling Fee. P.D. 11-98 (June 10, 2011). The Tax 
Commissioner issued Tax Bulletin 11-8 regarding the changes to the Virginia tire tax recycling 
fee pursuant to 2011 Senate Bill 1431. 
12. Wireless E-911 Fee: Prepaid Phone Cards. P~D. 11 .. 115 (June 21,2011). 
All individual who represents approximately 48 clients who sell prepaid phone cards at retail 
requested a ruling regarding the application of the Prepaid Wireless E-911 Fee on such prepaid 
phone cards. The prepaid phone cards can be used for both landline and mobile phones and are 
not specifically for wireless calling service. The individual contended that the phone cards are 
not subject to the prepaid wireless E-911 fee. The Tax Commissioner disagreed as Virginia 
Code § 56-484.17:1 provides that a $0.50 prepaid wireless E-911 charge shall be collected by the 
dealer from the end user on each purchase of "prepaid CMRS" from a dealer for any purposes 
other than resale. "Prepaid CMRS" is defmed as CMRS, or mobile telecommunications service, 
that allows a caller to dial 911 to access the 911 system, which CMRS service is required to be 
paid for in advance and is sold in predetermined units or dollars of which the number declines 
with use in a known amount. 
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13. Recordation Tax: Refinancing Exemption. P.D. 11-160 (September 19, 
2011). The taxpayers refinanced their home mortgage in November 2007 through a broker, (the 
"Broker"), a subsidiary of the "Bank," in the County and paid the recordation tax. Mortgage 
payments under the agreement were made to the Bank's mortgage servicing center. In May 
2010,the taxpayers again refinanced their mortgage through the Broker. When the deed was 
submitted for recording, the County concluded that the taxpayers were not entitled to the 
recordation tax exemption for refmancing with the same lender because the mortgage payments 
were made to the Bank rather than the Broker. The taxpayers paid the recordation tax based on 
the entire amount of the refmanced mortgage and filed an appeal contending the refinanced loan 
was made through the same lender. 
Virginia Code § 5S.1-S03(A) imposes the recordation tax on deeds of trust, mortgages, 
arid supplemental indentures. Under Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D), when a deed of trust is used in 
refinancing an existing debt with the same lender ~d the tax has been previously paid on the 
original deed of trust securing the debt, the recordation tax will only apply to the portion of the 
deed of trust that exceeds' the amount originally secured by the original debt. The Tax 
Department has defined "existing debt with the same lender" to mean that the lender providing 
the refmancing must be the same as the lender now holding the' existing debt being refmanced. 
In other words, in order to qualify for the exemption provided in Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D), a 
taxpayer must refmance his debt with the mortgage lender that holds the deed of trust. 
According to the evidence provided to the Tax Commissioner, the taxpayers refinanced their 
mortgage with the Broker in November 2007. The documentation indicated that'the Broker sold 
its entire interest in.the mortgage to the Bank. The Tax Department did not consider the Broker 
to be the same lender for the purposes of Va. Code § 5S.1-S03(D) when the taxpayers refmanced 
the mortgage in May 2010, as the Broker retained no interest in the original mortgage. 
Accordingly, the Tax Commissioner determined that ,the taxpayers were not entitled to the 
exemption from recordation tax for refmancing a mortgage with the same lender. 
D. Opinions of the Attorney General 
1. Recordation Tax: Calculation of Tax. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 11-073. (May 
27, 2011). The Circuit Court Clerk of Henrico County inquired about how to calculate the 
recordation tax on deeds of trust when the amount secured under the deed is greater than the fair 
market value of the property subject to the deed. The Attorney General opined that when the 
amoUnt secured by a deed of trust is known, the Clerk of Court should calculate the recordation 
tax based on the amount of indebtediless rather than the fair market value of the encumbered 
property. Prior opinions of the Attorney General have concluded that the measure of the 
recordation tax is the amount of the obligation secured, and that Va. Code sec. 5S.1-:-S03(A) 
provides that the tax is assessed on the basis of the fair market value of the property only where 
the amount of the obliga~ion cannot be ascertained from the face of the instrument. This is so 
even where the amount of the loan secured is considerably less than the fair market value of the 
property. Furthermore, where the question presented was whether the tax should be based on the 
maximum amount authorized under the line of credit or the fair market value of the property, the 
Attorney General determined that the proper tax should be based upon the maximum amount for 
which the owners may be held liable under their guaranty. That maximum is the same maximum 
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amount which is authorized under the line of credit line and not the fair market value of the 
property conveyed. 
2. License Tax on Gas Producers. 2011 Va. Att'y Gen. 10-110 (August 5, 
2011). The Commissioner of the Revenue for Tazewell County inquired whether Va. Code 
§ 58.1-3712, which authorizes localities to impose a license tax on gas producers, pennits a 
taxpayer to deduct expenses and production costs from the gross receipts upon which the tax is 
imposed, when the receipts are for gas produced by means not in connection with coal mining. 
The Commissioner ,also inquired regarding the scope of the Commissioner's ability to conduct 
audits relating to the collection of severance taxes authorized under Va. Code § 58.1-3712. The 
Attorney General opined that Va. Code § 15:2-3712 allows persons engaged in the production 
and operation of severing gas from the earth not in connection with coal mining to take certain 
deductions when the sale occurs at a point outside the county or city where the gas was extracted 
and the producer has incurred additional expenses, for the gas to reach its destination. Those 
deductions might include, -but are not limited to, depreciation, compression, maintenance, 
transportation fees, and personal property taxes; however, persons, who are engaged in the 
production and operation of severing gas from the earth in connection with coal mining may not 
take such deductions. The Attorney General also opined that Commissioners of the Revenue are 
authorized to perfonn audits in connection with their duty to assess license taxes. 
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Local Tax Appeals 
. January 1,2011 through September 20,2011 
10 Determinations 
Taxpayer Wins* 
9 
Treatment on Remand 
No discretion 
(complete win) 
1 
Discretion on· 
some issues * * 
2 
.' .' 
Taxpayer Loses 
1 
Discretion on 
all issues * * * 
6 
* A "win" is a ruling that does not completely affirm· the locality's 
position(s) . 
** Taxpayer won on all issues not remanded .. 
*** One ruling (PD 11-51) remanded one issue; taxpayer lost on second issue. 
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